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DOES GIDEON STILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Thomas F Liottit
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has."1
I. INTRODUCTION
March 18, 1998 marked thirty-five years since the United
States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,2 the landmark
case affirming an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel.
Since Gideon was decided, crime has increased and our prisons
seem to be growing faster than private enterprise. As a society, we
seem to believe that it is far better to be punitive and to imprison
offenders than it is to provide meaningful educational and eco-
nomic opportunity, as well as true rehabilitation programs and al-
ternative sentences. A significant portion of the population feels
strongly that we should have a death penalty. A federal death pen-
alty statute exists and recently New York State's governor and legis-
lature have dehumanized our state by enacting one. Life and
death hang in the balance. So does our dignity as a civilization.
While these severe penalties have been injected into our crimi-
nal justice system, we provide only the most cursory defense serv-
ices to the poor. Public defender budgets are routinely slashed to
the bare bone. Lawyers who serve the poor zealously strive to pro-
vide effective legal representation, yet they are overrun by the supe-
t J.D. 1976; M.P.A. 1972; B.S. 1970. Mr. Liotti is Past President of the New York
State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the Editor of the Criminal Justice Sec-
tion Journal of the New York State Bar Association; Village Justice of Westbury, Long
Island, New York; and co author of VILLAGE, TowN, AND DISTRICT COURTS IN NEW
YoRK (1997). He was the founder and first chair of the Assigned Counsel Sub-Com-
mittee for State and Federal Courts of the Criminal Law and Procedure Committee of
the Bar Association of Nassau County, Inc. and created the name "Gideon Day" for
the annual pilgrimage by lawyers to the State Legislature to lobby for increased fund-
ing and rates for assigned counsel attorneys statewide. He also served on a committee
of his County Bar Association which recommended the first MCLE program for law-
yers in the state as a condition for continued membership on the Nassau County
assigned counsel panel. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his law
clerk Jason Spector in the research and drafting of this article. The author also
thanks the New York State Defenders Association and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers for the data, literature and research materials that they
provided and which assisted in the preparation of this article.
1 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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rior resources of law enforcement and the Government. The lack
of funding for defense services for the poor makes a mockery of
justice.
Counsel assigned to federal cases in New York receive $75 per
hour for in-court and out-of-court time,3 less arbitrary reductions
made by judges who seem to retaliate against them for being
strong advocates.4 A commission appointed by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist has recommended that judges be removed from the process
of approving these fees.5 The federal judiciary has chosen to ig-
nore these recommendations.6
In New York State courts, assigned lawyers work for the paltry
sums of $40 per hour for in-court time and $25 per hour for out-of-
court time.7 Only their dedication to equal justice and their com-
mitment to the spirit of Gideon keeps them working. Pay vouchers
are routinely delayed, arbitrarily reduced, or lost by mean-spirited
judges. Many of these jurists were never defense lawyers or, if they
were, it was a long time ago and their memories appear to have
dimmed.
We must look beyond the sensational case and remember
what is at stake for the indigent defendant. While we routinely
under-represent the poor in criminal cases, the government brands
them with the scarlet letter of criminal conviction. When a citizen
who has no prior convictions pleads guilty to a felony, that person
can no longer apply for many jobs or aspire to many careers,8 or
ever vote in a general election.9 Without a substantial cadre of well
trained and uninhibited defense lawyers, our adversarial system of
justice simply breaks down. The end result is that society's most
powerless citizens are methodically disenfranchised without any
certainty that their convictions are just.
In spite of obstinate and uncomprehending opposition by the
3 SPANGENBERG GROUP, SURVEY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PROVISIONS By STATE (1992).
4 SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUN-
SEL IN NON-CAPrrAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL (October 1997); see also Thomas F. Liotti &
Harriet B. Rosen, Review of the Report on the CriminalJustice Act, N.Y. L.J., Outside Coun-
sel Column, Nov. 17, 1992 at 1, 7; THE MOUTHPIECE (A publication of the New York
State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), Nov./Dec. 1992 at 19.
5 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT REVIEW
COMMITTEE: INTERIM REPORT, (1992), reprinted in 51 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2335, 2337
(Aug. 19, 1992).
6 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, (1993), reprinted in
53 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2003, 2010 (Apr. 14, 1993).
7 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
8 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 751-55 (McKinney 1981).
9 N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 1998).
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state legislature, the New York State Defenders Association, Inc.
helps criminal defense attorneys by providing research, briefs, tran-
scripts, and strategic and tactical advice. Criminal defense lawyers
all too often must wage a lonely fight for justice with nothing more
than the fire in their bellies. On the thirty-fifth anniversary of
Gideon, it's time to give more than just tacit support to that
landmark decision. Lawyers must have the tools to fight-without
them, all of us are in danger.
Part II of this article inquires into the spirit of Gideon. It dis-
cusses the history of court-appointed counsel to represent the indi-
gent and the breakdown of that system around the turn of the
century. Next, it analyzes federal and state cases that led up to
Gideon. Finally, it describes New York State's statutory response to
Gideon.
Parts III and IV address several causes of action that hopefully
will spur litigation on behalf of indigent defendants. Part III de-
scribes United States Supreme Court treatment of indigent defend-
ants and fundamental rights, with special emphasis on equal
protection. Part IV addresses the quality of representation for indi-
gent defendants in New York. Finally, Part V concludes with a gen-
eral litigation strategy for the fight for equal justice for the poor.
II. THE SPIRIT OF GIDE-ON
A. The History of Court Appointed Counsel
Courts have looked to the historical obligations of the bar to
justify their own power to appoint and the lawyer's duty to serve.10
Some commentators claimed to have discovered the roots of ap-
pointed counsel in Roman history." However, other commenta-
tors question the support for this premise. 2 Historical English and
American case law have been used to justify the appointment of
attorneys to serve the indigent.' The English tradition also sup-
ports the attorneys' obligation to accept court appointments.1 4
10 See, e.g., Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 229-30 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
900 (1979).
11 SeeJohn MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Hav. L. Rkw. 361,
385 (1923).
12 See David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. RE-v.
735, 73948 (1980).
13 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72-73 (1932); see also White v. Board of Com-
missioners, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989); State v. Remeta, 547 So. 2d 181, 182
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-37 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
14 See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636.
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Courts maintain that the history of appointment in England estab-
lished the bar's duty to serve the indigent without payment. 5
However, the English system does not establish this obligation.
16
The early reported cases demonstrate a mixed response by the
courts when faced with situations requiring appointment. In fact, a
number of cases that date back to the sixteenth century show that
defendants frequently had to beg the court for the assistance of
counsel, and regularly did so to no avail." Yet, this was not always
the case. The Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Dillon'8 that
some English statutes and case law required certain attorneys to
render unpaid services to the indigent as officers of the court.19
Although mandatory court appointment burdened some privi-
leged members of the legal profession, 20 the claim that these spe-
cial appointments require an obligation by all attorneys today is
unfounded.
American courts have relied on the English tradition of court
appointment tojustify their own appointment of counsel with little
or no compensation. Although authorities disagree about the ex-
tent of the right to counsel during the colonial period,21 the his-
tory of that period demonstrates a general departure from the
English tradition of not appointing counsel. The colonial legisla-
tures produced a variety of statutes creating a right to counsel.22
The idea of appointed counsel was clearly on the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Convention. 2' There, three differ-
15 Id.
16 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 744-49.
17 Id. at 743. See also Lord Lovat's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 578-79 (1746) (blind,
deaf invalid denied counsel); Scroop's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 1034, 1043-46 (1660) (in-
carcerated defendant required to represent self); Howard's (Duke of Norfolk's) Case,
1 How. St. Tr. 957, 966-67 (1571) (defendant accused of high treason denied
counsel).
18 346 F.2d at 636.
19 But see Shapiro, supra note 12, at 743-49 (criticizing the court's selective use of
case law to establish that counsel was always appointed for the indigent in England).
20 See id. at 746. Historically, an officer of the court was the holder of public office,
usually a sergeant-at-law. A sergeant-at-law was granted unusual privileges not given to
other members of the bar and created a special strata within their own exclusive pro-
fession. This elite body alone bore the burden of mandatory service to the indigent.
Id.
21 See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 750.
22 See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1030 (1964) (noting that all states except Georgia and Rhode Is-
land had adopted some right to counsel statute by 1789).
23 See Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 WM. &
MARY Q. 1, 24-25 (1954).
108 [Vol. 2:105
1998] DOES GIDEON STILL MAKE A DlFFERENCE? 109
ent versions of the Sixth Amendment were debated. 4 The final
version of the Amendment, entitling indigent defendants represen-
tation by an attorney, was very similar to the original proposed lan-
guage.25 The first Congress passed an Act that required the
appointment of counsel in capital cases.2 6
B. State Court Reaction
Three early decisions held on constitutional grounds that an
attorney could not be compelled to represent an indigent defend-
ant without compensation. The Supreme Court of Indiana in Webb
v. Baird,27 was the first to dismiss the historical justifications for
"gratuitous defense of a pauper."28 The Indiana Court recognized
the argument that an attorney has an "honorary" duty to aid the
indigent.29 However, the Court dismissed this claim as having no
place under state law or the United States Constitution.3" The
Court considered all professions equal. Therefore, none could be
subjected to the unique burden of providing services without
compensation.3 '
In Carpenter v. Dane County,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
repudiated court appointment without compensation on the same
grounds as Webb.3' The Iowa Supreme Court in Hall v. Washington
Co.,34 relied on the Fifth Amendment's takings clause to hold un-
constitutional court appointment without compensation. 5 The
Iowa Court ruled that the right to compensation was a fundamen-
tal right that would be violated by such an appointment.
36
By the close of the nineteenth century, the idea of compelled
representation without pay was losing acceptance. Generally, states
have rarely disciplined lawyers who refused to serve when ap-
24 See Note, supra note 22, at 1031.
25 See Rackow, supra note 23, at 24-25.
26 See Rackow, supra note 23, at 25-26 n.98.
27 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
28 Id. at 16-17.
29 Id. at 16.
30 Id. at 16-17.
31 Id.
32 9 Wis. 249 (1859).
33 Id. at 252.
34 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
35 Id. at 478.
36 Id. But see Samuels v. County of Debuque, 13 Iowa 536, 538 (1862) (holding
that lawyers must provide representation for a prescribed statutory fee based on the
theory that lawyers were officers of the court).
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pointed without compensation. Courts have held attorneys in
contempt for refusal to proceed as appointed counsel, but they
have been reluctant to exercise their judicial power to compel at-
torneys to serve the indigent.38 Lawyers began to assert that un-
compensated service constituted an excessive burden.
C. Challenges to Appointment Without Provisions for Compensation
Many courts accepted the argument that uncompensated ser-
vice constituted an excessive burden and found challenges to
mandatory court appointments both compelling and cognizable.
For example, in In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in
Title VII Proceedings,39 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held the Title VII provision granting
courts the discretion to compel representation without provision
for payment unconstitutional, as it allowed for the creation of a
form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.4 ° The court distinguished between the fundamental right to
defend oneself against criminal charges and the right to initiate a
civil lawsuit.'" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the
decision .42
The Nine Applications holding was subsequently rejected by
most circuit courts addressing the issue. To justify uncompensated
service by appointed counsel, courts relied on the public service
exception which is grounded in a line of cases permitting the state
to call its citizens into temporary service. The Supreme Court's
holding in Hurtado v. United States,44 practically assured the applica-
tion of the public service exception to court appointment chal-
lenges by reinforcing the public service exception when applied to
criminal justice proceedings.4" The Hurtado Court held that the
attorney's duty to represent the indigent was analogous to the pub-
37 J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Attorney's Refusal to Accept Appointment to Defend Indi-
gent, or to Proceed in such Defense, as Contempt, 36 A.L.R. 3d 1223-24 (1990).
38 See id. at 1224.
39 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
40 Id. at 88.
41 Id. at 92.
42 See White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
43 See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973); Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
44 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
45 Id. at 588-89. However, the application of the public service exception has been
limited. In Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the government's power to compel public service is restricted by
the requirement that the service bear a reasonable relation to the state's needs. Id. at
131-32.
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lic's duty to provide evidence in criminal cases.4 6
Utilization of the public service exception to court appoint-
ment prevents Thirteenth Amendment challenges because the vol-
untary nature of the service may be imputed from the attorney's
oath taken upon entrance to the bar. Other fundamental policies
form the foundation of court appointment rather than instances
where the state temporarily requires the services of its citizens.4 7
In United States v. Dillon,48 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a deprivation of property challenge to uncompensated
court appointment.49 The Dillon court held that lawyers have a
professional responsibility to render unpaid services.5" To find a
deprivation, due process analysis requires the court to determine
that a taking of property has occurred.5 The court disposed of
this question by holding that no taking of services occurs with court
appointments because lawyers by implication consent to service
upon entering the profession.52 The court reasoned that lawyers
owed this duty as officers of the court.
The Dillon rationale has commanded a wide following in both
state and federal courts.5' However this rationale appears untena-
ble in light of the Supreme Court's current test for examining tak-
ings. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,55 the Court
noted that courts have held a taking exists when the state directs
"acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public
functions."56 Court appointments facilitate a public function be-
cause appointment allows the state to fulfill the duty imposed upon
it by Gideon and subsequent cases.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,57 the Supreme Court held
that no compensation will be awarded unless there is a showing
that the means are "unduly oppressive" to the petitioner. 58 Some
46 410 U.S. at 589.
47 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
48 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
49 Id. at 635-36.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 635.
52 Id. at 635-36.
53 Id.
54 See White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir.
1981); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965);Jackson v. State, 413
P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska 1966).
55 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56 Id. at 128.
57 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
58 Id. at 594-95 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
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courts have used an analysis similar to the one used in Goldblatt to
address takings challenges to court appointment. 59 Courts which
implicitly follow Goldblalt have found that compensation systems vi-
olate the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, some decisions declare
that uncompensated appointments are ipso facto violative of the
Fifth Amendment.6
D. Dominance of the States
The original Constitution ratified in 1789 contained few refer-
ences to individual rights. 6 1 Its major concern was the structure of
the new federal government. However, the ratification debates re-
vealed a popular demand for additional constitutional protections
of individual and state's rights. The response to these pressures
was the introduction and ratification of the first ten amendments,
the Bill of Rights, in 1791.62
There was little opportunity for the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the Bill of Rights before the Civil War. The first century of
constitutional decisions was marked by a concentration on struc-
tural issues; the respective roles of the national and federal govern-
ments as well as the tripartite separation of powers at the national
level.6" Moreover, ChiefJustice Marshall would lay to rest any chal-
lenges to state supremacy in the landmark case of Barron v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore.' Barron sued the City for ruining the
use of his wharf in Baltimore harbor.65 Justice Marshall, ordinarily
not adverse to nationalistic interpretations, held that the Bill of
59 See People ex reL Conn. v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1966) (holding trial
court may reimburse court-appointed attorney beyond amount authorized by statute
where attorney would otherwise "suffer an intolerable sacrifice and burden"). Id. at
340; Kansas ex reL Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987) (holding a violation of
the Fifth Amendment has occurred when an attorney is required to advance expense
funds without full reimbursement or "is required to spend an unreasonable amount
of time on indigent appointments so that there is genuine and substantial interfer-
ence with his or her private practice"). Id. at 842; Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490
(Nev. 1976).
60 See Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1968); Bradshaw v.
Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa
1982).
61 Stewart F. Hancock Jr., The State Constitution, A Criminal Lauryer's First Line of
Defense, 57 ALB. L. REv. 271, 278 (1993); see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION, SENATE DOCUMENT No. 103-6 (1996) [hereinafter CONSTI-
TUTION ANNOTATED].
62 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
63 See generally CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note 61.
64 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
65 Id. at 244.
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Rights restricted only the federal government and did not limit
state authority.66 Marshall pointed to the fears about encroach-
ments of the new national government expressed during the ratify-
ing conventions. 67 Noting that the citizens had adopted not only
the Federal Constitution but separate, and sometimes different,
constitutions for the states, he saw the Bill of Rights as limiting only
the government established by the Federal Constitution.68
The result of the Barron holding was that neither the Supreme
Court nor the lower federal courts were able to exercise meaning-
ful control over the substance or procedures embodied in state law.
Therefore, issues surrounding the appointment of counsel without
provision for compensation were settled on the state level without
consideration of the Sixth Amendment. The Constitution enabled
the Supreme Court to provide federal protection of individuals
and groups against governmental overreaching. This role would
eventually expand with the passage of the Post-Civil War
Amendments.
1. Enactment of the Civil War Amendments and
Early Interpretations
After Barron the Constitution afforded individuals few safe-
guards against state action. The Civil War itself would radically al-
ter that picture. From an historical perspective, the Civil War was
about slavery and emancipation.69 From a legal standpoint, the fo-
cus of the Civil War was federalism - a group of states asserting their
prerogative over increasing federal interference into their way of
life.7" The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
passed in the wake of the Civil War, were a reaction to these causes
of extreme divisiveness.
The Slaughter House Cases,71 the Supreme Court's first interpre-
tation of the Civil War amendments, stated that the purpose of the
amendments was to bar discrimination by the states against
blacks, 2 but the court rejected the opportunity to give the amend-
ments reach beyond the issues that spawned them. The Court
proved unwilling to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment lim-
66 Id. at 250-51.
67 Id. at 250.
68 Id. at 247-48.
69 BRUCE CArtON, THE CMVL WAR 10 (1960).
70 Id. at 8-10.
71 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
72 Id. at 71-72. See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil
Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 5 DUKE L.J. 800, 805 & n.90 (1987).
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ited the states' powers. 71 In its interpretation, the majority relied
on the historical background of the amendments and concluded
that they were not to be read to "radically change the whole theory
of the relations of the State and Federal Government to each other
and both of these governments to the people. ' 74 Additionally, the
court reasoned that they would not create a "perpetual censor
upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own
citizens. 75
The growth of industrialization and corporate power in the
post-Civil War years led to popular demands and legislative re-
sponses. New regulatory laws clashed with the economic laissez-faire
theories of Adam Smith and the Social Darwinism embraced by
writers such as Herbert Spencer.76 During those clashes, ideas
such as survival of the fittest, the defense of economic inequalities,
and governmental hands-off policies found their way into legal
briefs and found responsive listeners on the bench.7 7 Thus, the
seeds of substantive due process began to surface in majority
opinions.
The Supreme Court increasingly began to question state regu-
lations 78 and eventually began to overturn them based on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 79 The focus of the
Court's scrutiny was economic regulation that conflicted with the
Court's laissez-faire theory of minimal governmental interference
with business. The most infamous of these economic regulation
cases was Lochner v. New York.8" At issue was a New York law which
limited the hours a bakery employee could work.8 The Court
struck down this law as an abridgment of liberty of contract and a
violation of substantive due process.82 The Lochner era had begun.
73 83 U.S. at 78.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Mark G. Yuduf, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One
Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1389 (1990).
77 Id. at 1389-90 (describing Justice Holmes chastisement of his fellow justices for
reading Herbert Spencer's brand of utilitarian philosophy into the Constitution); see
also H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 106 (1865).
78 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132-34 (1877) (deferring to the legislature's
judgment on the issue but indicating a willingness to determine what regulations were
"reasonable").
79 SeeAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana
statute which prohibited anyone from obtaining insurance on Louisiana property
from any company not licensed in Louisiana).
80 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
81 Id. at 46.
82 Id.
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Cases of the Lochner era had much in common. First, the
Court was highly suspicious of legislative motives.8 3 The Justices
looked only at the legislature's actual motive, not a hypothetical
one, and would often go so far as to substitute their own interpreta-
tion. For example, in Lochner, the Court rejected the proposition
that the law at issue was intended to regulate health and safety.8 4
Instead, the Court saw the law as a regulation of labor conditions
which interfered with liberty of contract.85 Second, the Court con-
tinually refused to defer to legislative findings of fact.86 The Court
concluded, "[i] t is not... possible to discover the connection be-
tween the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the
healthful quality of the bread made by the workman."87
Lochner symbolizes the rise of substantive due process as a pro-
tection of economic and property rights. 88 For the next three de-
cades the Court intensely scrutinized economic regulations and
frequently struck them down. Lochner and the judicial philosophy
behind it were subjected to intense criticism.
The election of Franklin Roosevelt and the promise of the
New Deal programs convinced many of the need for aggressive leg-
islation to ensure the nation's economic survival. Such large scale
government intervention in economic affairs was clearly at odds
with the Lochnerfreedom of contract philosophy. As a result, in the
mid-1930s, judicial intervention in economic legislation began to
gradually decline. 89 The use of substantive due process to give spe-
cial protection to economic and property rights was discredited.9"
The economic regulation cases are useful to the understand-
ing of Gideon because they focused on the judicial power used to
protect individual liberties. These cases changed the relationship
between federal judges and legislative bodies by changing their
powers to determine the scope of "liberty." The new question that
arose would be the pace and nature of this change.
83 Id. at 62-63.
84 Id. at 57.
85 Id. at 61.
86 Id. at 62.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 45.
89 See William Michael Treanor, Jam For Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 865 (1998).
90 Id.
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2. The Rise of Procedural Due Process and the
Incorporation Debate
Change in court personnel, together with Roosevelt's court
packing plan, contributed to a philosophical shift toward greater
deference to legislation in economic affairs. 1 Cases such as Nebbia
v. New York,9 2 explicitly, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,93 implic-
itly, abandoned the Lochner philosophy. The battlefield having
shifted, the new competing views became selective and total
incorporation.
The selective incorporation approach denies that the entire
Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, only those aspects of liberty that are in some
sense "fundamental" are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference. Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter were
the two best-known proponents of the selective incorporation, fun-
damental rights approach. In Palko v. Connecticut,94 Justice Car-
dozo articulated the selective incorporation test as being whether
the Bill of Rights guarantee is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."9 5 The proponents of selective incorporation also hold that
the Bill of Rights does not set outside limits on the concept of
liberty.96
The contrary view, total incorporation, asserts that all of the
guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The best known proponent of this view was Justice Black, whose
position fell one vote short of becoming law in Adamson v. Califor-
91 WiLLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-
1940, 231-37 (1963).
92 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that the use of private property and the making of
private contracts are free from governmental interference, but neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute: they are subject to public regulation when the public
need requires. Regulation of this liberty is constitutional as long as it is not unreason-
able, arbitrary and capricious, and the means selected are real and substantially re-
lated to the ends).
93 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that property and contract rights are subject to
regulation as long as the regulation is reasonable and the means selected are genuine
and substantially related to the ends).
94 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
95 Id. at 325.
96 See, eg., In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (a selective incorporation deci-
sion holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the "essentials of due
process and fair treatment" and therefore binding on state trials even though no spe-
cific Bill of Rights provision imposes such a requirement) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 13 (1967)).
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nia.Y In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the procedural guar-
antees applied to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment were automatically rendered applicable to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Justice Black argued that this
was the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.99
Moreover, in his view, the majority's fundamental rights approach
allowed the Court "to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy
and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain
of the States as well as the Federal Government."'100
Although the Supreme Court has continued to adhere, in the-
ory at least, to the selective incorporation fundamental rights ap-
proach, the Warren Court sped up the process by which individual
Bill of Rights guarantees were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment." 1 Today, virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, one guarantee at a
time. 1 2 In the process, the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, has come to protect the values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing reach of government
officials.
1 0 3
3. The Constitutional Right of Indigent Defendants to
Appointed Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to
have assistance of counsel for his defense."'0 4 It was obvious from
the outset that this provision guaranteed a right to representation
by privately retained counsel. Whether the Sixth Amendment also
included an obligation of the state to provide counsel for the indi-
gent defendant was far less certain.10 5
97 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
98 Id. at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 72, 74-75.
100 Id. at 90.
101 See Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, The Florida Constitution: Still Champion of Citizen's
Rights?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. Rhv. 87, 91 (1997).
102 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 91 n.32. Bill of Rights guarantees not incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment are the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of criminal trials
without grand jury indictment and the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury in civil
cases.
103 See id. at 91.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105 SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (requiring federal courts to provide
indigent defendants with appointed counsel in criminal cases); But cf. Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that an indigent defendant in a non-capital case had to
show that he had been prejudiced without a lawyer and that special circumstances
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1. Right to Appointed Counsel in Felony Cases
Powell v. Alabama0 6 was the first United States Supreme Court
case to recognize a constitutional right to court appointed coun-
sel.10 7 In Powell, nine black youths had been charged with the rape
of two white girls near Scottsboro, Alabama. 108 Amid a popular
frenzy, the defendants who were under the constant guard of the
state militia were rushed to trial.' °9 Eight of the youths were con-
victed and the jury imposed the death sentence. 10 The Supreme
Court held that the defendants were denied effective appointment
of counsel. 111
Powell was decided under the then prevailing "fundamental
fairness" analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. According to the Court, the right to appointed counsel
derived from the due process right to a fair hearing." 2 The indi-
gent defendant was entitled to a fair hearing,1 13 just as the more
affluent defendant who could afford to retain a lawyer. The Powell
opinion stressed that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel."" 4 Accordingly, the state had a due process obligation
to provide the indigent defendant with a lawyer where the assist-
ance of counsel was essential to achieve a fair hearing.1' 5 However,
the majority limited the holding of Powell to the specific facts
before the court.'
1 6
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,117 the Supreme Court held
that the right to appointed counsel was found in the Sixth Amend-
ment."1 8 The Court discarded the fundamental fairness interpreta-
existed, such as defendant's ignorance, illiteracy, etc., to make the proceedings inher-
ently unfair); But see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overturned Belts and
held that court appointed counsel is a fundamental right stating, "[w]e think the
Court in Betts was wrong... in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights"). Id. at 342.
106 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
107 Id. at 71.
108 Id. at 49.
109 Id. at 51.
110 Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 203 (Ala. 1932).
111 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
112 Id. at 71.
113 Id. at 72-73.
114 Id. at 68-69.
115 Id. at 71.
116 Id.
117 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
118 Id. at 462-63.
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tion in favor of the selective incorporation analysis" 9 that made
the Sixth Amendment directly applicable to the states.1 20 Its inter-
pretation of the Sixth Amendment rested heavily upon the analysis
of the need for counsel first suggested by Justice Sutherland in his
opinion for the Court in Powell 12 1 Johnson involved a federal prose-
cution in which two indigent defendants were charged with coun-
terfeiting. The defendants argued that they had been refused
appointed counsel because counterfeiting is not a capital
offense. 122
Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that a trial without
counsel violated the Sixth Amendment because the right to coun-
sel applies to "all criminal prosecutions."1 23 Relying heavily on the
language in Powell, that the right to be heard would be of little
value without assistance of counsel, Justice Black noted that the av-
erage defendant does not have the requisite skill to protect himself
in a criminal trial.1 24 Therefore, in federal court, a defendant
could not be deprived of the right to assistance of counsel unless
the defendant waived that right.1
25
This right applied to all criminal defendants, including those
who were unable to afford counsel. 126 The Court viewed the right
to counsel as a constitutionally defined element of a criminal trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 12 Therefore, it was the trial
court's affirmative obligation to see that the accused was given this
right.12' Furthermore, in the case of an indigent defendant, ap-
pointed counsel was required unless he knowingly and intelligently
waived this right.
129
For another twenty-five years the Supreme Court refused to
extend the Johnson holding to state courts. Even though the Court
in Johnson held that the Sixth Amendment required appointed
counsel in all federal felony cases, state courts were not compelled
to employ more than the "fundamental fairness" test of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 30 Accordingly, in Betts v. Brady,'3 a the Court
119 Id. at 467-68.
120 Id. at 465-66.
121 Id. at 462-63.
122 Id. at 460.
123 Id. at 463.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 468-69.
126 Id. at 464.
127 Id. at 467.
128 Id. at 468.
129 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1942).
130 Id. at 466.
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held that due process required the appointment of counsel only
where special circumstances of the particular case demonstrated
that the indigent defendant would need a lawyer to obtain a fair
trial. 13 2 Capital cases such as Powell presented an example of these
special circumstances. However, the need for appointed counsel
could also be shown in cases where the nature of the offense or the
possible defenses raised complex legal questions 13 3 or the personal
characteristics of the defendant, such as youthfulness or incapac-
ity' 34 raised the issue.
The Court in Gideon v. Wainright,135 rejected the special cir-
cumstances test of Betts and extended the right to appointed coun-
sel in state cases to all indigent felony defendants. 36 The Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth
Amendment and made appointment of counsel applicable to the
states in all criminal prosecutions. 37 Gideon established the re-
quirement that a lawyer's assistance was necessary to guarantee a
fair trial. 138 Therefore, if a defendant was unable to afford an at-
torney, the court had to appoint one for his defense.
139
In both Johnson and Gideon the Court viewed the Sixth Amend-
ment as defining the basic elements of a fair trial and included the
assistance of counsel among those elements. 4 In Johnson, Justice
Black viewed the Sixth Amendment as imposing a single counsel
requirement, designed to assure a fair trial.' Following that
premise, no Sixth Amendment distinction should exist between
the indigent and affluent criminal defendant as to the basic right
of representation by counsel.
2. Right to Appointed Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
Until 1972 all of the appointed counsel cases decided by the
Supreme Court had involved felony prosecutions. 4 2 In Argersinger
131 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
132 Id. at 462, 472-73.
133 See, e.g., Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
134 See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 45-
46 (1945); Canizo v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134, 137-38 (1947).
135 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
136 Id. at 339.
137 Id. at 341-42.
138 Id. at 344.
139 Id.
140 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
141 304 U.S. at 467-68.
142 See Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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v. Hamlin,4 ' the Supreme Court held that the right to appointed
counsel applied to petty offenses.'44 The Court noted that the
problems associated with petty offenses might call for the appear-
ance of counsel to assure a fair trial because the legal issues raised
in misdemeanor trials were not less complex just because the jail
sentence could not exceed six months.1 45 Moreover, misdemean-
ors created a special need for counsel because the large number of
such offenses often caused an "obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result.'
46
The defendant in Argersinger had been sentenced to jail, but
the Court declined to delineate the imposition of jail time as the
standard for the requirement of appointed counsel. 147 However,
the opinion laid the foundation for differentiating between cases
involving sentences of imprisonment and those involving an impo-
sition of a fine.'48 It did this by highlighting the special nature of
punishment that led to the loss of liberty.' 49 Moreover, the opin-
ion cited the practicability of an actual imprisonment standard. 5 °
Therefore, Argersinger only required that counsel be appointed
where there was an actual deprivation of personal liberty.1
5 1
In Scott v. Illinois,'52 the Court refused to extend the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel beyond the actual imprisonment
standard suggested in Argersinger. In Scott, the petitioner was
charged with shoplifting, which carried a penalty of a fine, impris-
onment, or both. 53 The defendant was convicted and only a fine
was imposed. 54 In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the
Federal Constitution did not require state courts to appoint coun-
sel in this case. 15 5 The majority read Argersinger as resting on the
conclusion that the loss of liberty due to incarceration was so harsh
a penalty that due process required counsel to be appointed to
protect the defendant's interests. 56 The mere possibility that im-
143 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
144 Id. at 40.
145 Id. at 33.
146 Id. at 34.
147 Id. at 39.
148 Id. at 38-39.
149 Id. at 37-40.
150 Id. at 39. (quoting A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVID-
ING DEFENSE SERVICES (Approved Draft 1968)).
151 407 U.S. at 40.
152 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
153 Id. at 368.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 373-74.
156 Id. at 372-73.
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
prisonment could be imposed did not invoke the right to
counsel.1
5 7
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Scott stressed the major-
ity's reliance on the fact that the actual imprisonment standard
would provide clear guidance to lower courts. 158 Hejoined the ma-
jority reluctantly, preferring instead a flexible case-by-case adjudi-
cation of the need for appointed counsel in petty offense cases.
159
In ArgersingerJustice Powell urged consideration of a series of fac-
tors in petty offense cases, including the complexity of the offense,
the probable sentence, the competency of the individual to repre-
sent himself, and the "attitude of the community" toward the par-
ticular crime.1 6 ° In light of the subsequent cases building upon
Argersinger, it appears that the Court would not retreat from the
requirement of counsel in actual imprisonment cases. 1 6 1 The close
division among the Court in Scott combined with Justice Powell's
reluctant concurrence holds open the possibility that the Court
might revisit the issue of appointment of counsel in a particularly
compelling non-imprisonment misdemeanor case.
1 6 2
3. New York's Statutory Response to Gideon
Following the 1963 Gideon decision, states that had not previ-
ously made provisions to provide counsel for indigent defendants
scrambled to enact legislation. New York followed suit in 1965 by
amending Article 18 of the County Law, creating Article 18-B.
163
Article 18-B commands each county in New York State to sup-
ply representation to criminal defendants who are financially un-
able to obtain counsel.' 64 This representation must take one of
three forms: (1) representation by a public defender as provided
for by Article 18-A, 65 (2) representation provided by a private legal
aid bureau or society designated by the county, 16 6 (3) representa-
157 Id. at 373.
158 Id. at 374.
159 Id. at 374-75; see alsoJohn E. Nowak, Due Process Methodology in the Postincorpora-
tion World, 70J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 409 (1979).
160 See 407 U.S. at 64 (1972).
161 See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding uncounseled convic-
tion which resulted in fine could not be used as prior misdemeanor-theft conviction
to support harsher sentence in future sentencing preceding).
162 See Nowak, supra note 159, at 408-09.
163 N.Y. CouN-rY LAw § 722 (McKinney 1965) (current version at N.Y. CouNTr-v LAW
§ 722 (McKinney 1991)).
164 See N.Y. COUNTrY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991).
165 See id § 722(1).
166 See id § 722(2).
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tion by private counsel pursuant to a plan designed by the bar asso-
ciation of each county,1 6 7 or (4) representation according to a plan
containing a combination of the foregoing. 6  Article 18-B also
provides compensation for investigative, expert, and other services
necessary for an adequate defense.
169
Compensation for private attorneys was provided for under
section 722-b.170 As enacted in 1965, rates were fixed at fifteen dol-
lars per hour for in-court time and ten dollars per hour for out-of-
court time.' 71 Limits were placed on the total compensation an
attorney could receive at five hundred dollars for cases involving
felonies and three hundred dollars for cases involving misdemean-
ors with an option provided for compensation in excess of those
limits if provided by the court.1 7 2 In 1966, section 722-b was
amended to allow attorneys to receive payment during the course
of representation.
71
Article 18-B was passed with much fanfare. Governor Nelson
Rockefeller noted, "New York has always been a leader in the pro-
tection of the rights of its citizens and the passage of 18-B
mark[ed] another great step in that direction. "17  In addition to
the Governor, supporters included the Attorney General, deans of
law schools, the State Administrator of the Judicial Conference, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Chairman of the
Commission to Revise the Penal Law and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, many local bar associations, and the Joint Conference
on Legal Education.1 75 Opponents were concerned with 18-B's ef-
fect on home rule 19176 and the costs placed on the counties,
1 77
relative to the differences in the cost of living in more populated
167 See id § 722(3).
168 See id. § 722(4).
169 See id. § 722-c.
170 See id. § 722-b.
171 N.Y. CouNrv LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1965).
172 Id.
173 N.Y. CouN=rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1966) (current version at N.Y. CouNTY
LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991)).
174 Memorandum filed with: Assembly Bill, Introductory Number 2233, Senate
Print Number 5744 and Assembly Bill, Introductory Number 4786, Senate Print
Number 7273.
175 See Bill Jacket, L. 1965, c. 878.
176 Id. Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of Montgomery County (June 8,
1965); Letter from F. Clark Hamlin, Clerk, Jefferson County Board of Supervisors, to
Governor Nelson Rockefeller (May 28, 1965).
177 See id. Letter from Irving Libenson, County Attorney, Westchester County, to Sol
Neil Corbin, Counselor to the Governor (June 30, 1965).
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areas as compared to those of rural areas. 178
Statutory fees for trial counsel have been increased only twice
since 1965, to twenty-five dollars per hour for in-court time and
fifteen dollars per hour for out-of-court time in 1977, and forty dol-
lars per hour for in-court time and twenty-five dollars per hour for
out-of-court time in 1985.17' The equivalent increases in the caps
have brought them to $1,200 for cases involving felonies and $800
for cases involving misdemeanors. 8 ' As time passed, it became
more difficult to attract able attorneys to represent indigent de-
fendants181 which led to the "abuse and neglect" of indigent
cases. 18 2 Moreover, the consistently higher rates paid in the federal
court system acted to dissuade counsel from accepting state
cases. 183 Proponents of the increases hoped that they would en-
courage a greater number of attorneys to participate in the pro-
gram thereby reducing the individual caseload and providing
higher quality legal representation to those clients served by the
program. 184 The rates, which went into effect in 1986, have not
been increased since.
185
III. How THE LAW TREATS THE POOR
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel is
a fundamental right. 186 Counsel must not only be appointed for an
indigent defendant, but must also be paid. If a state establishes a
scheme to enact Gideon and affects another fundamental right, in-
justice may result. The injustice may not be just an inequitable dis-
tribution of social goods, but the imprisonment of people who do
not possess that item by which other social goods are valued.
Therefore, the concept of equal protection and the right to coun-
sel for indigent defendants points to inequalities that may impinge
directly on access to, or levels of, those rights.
178 See id. Letter from Benjamin I. Taylor, President, Mammamroneck-Harrison
Bar Association, to Sol Neil Corbin, Counselor to the Governor (Apr. 6, 1965).
179 N.Y. CouN-rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
180 Id.
181 See Bill Jacket L. 1985, c.315 (Memorandum in Support of Increase in Rates as
per S.824/A.1216, Prepared by Joseph W. Bellacosa, Chief Administrator to the
Courts).
182 See id. (Budget Report on Bill, Prepared by State Senators Dunne, Johnson and
Goodhue).
183 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Pro-
moting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice For All
Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. C~iM. L. REv. 73, 94-95 (1993).
184 Id.
185 N. Y. CouN'rY LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
186 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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1. The Meaning of Indigency
Supreme Court opinions generally refer to the rights of an 'in-
digent defendant' without ever offering a specific definition of in-
digency. Federal and state appellate courts have established
guidelines defining indigency, 187 although studies suggest that trial
judges often will create their own standards.' 88 Most if not all
courts agree that indigency does not mean destitute. Generally,
courts consider the full range of defense expenses in light of the
defendant's current personal and financial situation."' Among
the most common considerations are income from employment,
real and personal property, number of dependents, outstanding
debt, and seriousness of the charge.19 ° The court will look to the
defendant's current earnings and assets, as well as his potential to
generate future income, but will disregard potential assistance
from friends and relatives.91
2. Equal Protection and Poverty in Constitutional Law
Decisions addressing legislative classifications based on wealth
began to attract the attention of the Supreme Court during the
Warren Era. The Warren Court expressed the idea that society has
a limited duty to lift some of the handicaps of poverty in some cir-
cumstances. 19 2 Equal protection of the law provided the vehicle
for the Warren Court to promote a constitutional vision of equal
justice for rich and poor alike. 93 On the other hand, the Burger
Court halted the expansion of the wealth classification doctrine
187 See Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Determination of Indigency of Accused Entitling
Him to Appointment of Counsel, 51 A.L.R. 3d 1108, 1111-14 (1973).
188 See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am.
CriM. L. RIEv. 601, 630 (1975); Ken Anderson, Indigency: The Need for a Definition, 5
TEX. S.U.L. Riv. 45, 47 (1978).
189 See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 159 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1946) (estimated costs
of appeal); see also Morgan v. Rhay, 470 P.2d 180 (Wash. 1970) (attorney fees in light
of defendant's financial situation).
190 Williams v. Sup. Ct. of County of Stanislus, 38 Cal. Rptr. 291, 294 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964) (quoting Note, Representation of Indigents in California, 13 STAN. L. REv. 522
(1961)); see Assad-Faltas v. Univ. South Carolina, 971 F. Supp. 985 (D.S.C. 1997); see
also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45 (1974); Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311
(D. Fla. 1969).
191 See Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 299-300 (3rd Cir. 1988); see also United States
v. Viemont, 91 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1996).
192 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941); Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); McDonald v. Board of Education Commission-
ers of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
193 See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McDonald v.
Board of Education Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
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into other areas.' 94 Significantly, the Burger Court abandoned the
rhetoric of the Warren Court, sacrificing both the spirit and letter
of the Warren Court's equal protection decisions.'95
A. The Rise of Equal Access
In Griffin v. Illinois,'9 6 the Supreme Court held that the state
must provide the indigent criminal appellant with a free transcript
of the trial when the bill of exceptions necessary for appellate re-
view could not be prepared without it.'97 Earlier decisions held
that a state was not required to provide appellate review of all crim-
inal convictions. 9 " However, the Court in Griffin reasoned that
once the state establishes an appellate system, that system must
treat rich and poor alike. 199 The majority viewed Illinois' justifica-
tions as irrational, 20 0 since there was no relevant relationship be-
tween ability to pay and guilt or innocence.20 '
In Douglas v. California,2 the issue was whether a state had to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants for their first appeal as of
right.20 1 In the procedure at issue, the California appellate courts
would determine whether the petitioner's claim had merit before
appointing counsel.2 4  The Supreme Court reaffirmed Griffin
holding, "[i]n either case the evil is the same: discrimination
against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the
kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money
he has.' "205 The Court in Douglas reasoned that California's right
of appeal violated due process because indigent defendants were
forced to make a preliminary showing of merit.20 6
Similarly, in Anders v. California,2°7 the Court sought to ensure
that court-appointed counsel would passionately represent their
194 See generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Function of Criminal Procedure: The War-
ren and Burger Courts Competing Idealogies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185 (1983).
195 See id.
196 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
197 Id. at 19.
198 See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894).
199 351 U.S. at 19.
200 Id. at 17-18.
201 Id. at 19.
202 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
203 Id. at 355.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
206 372 U.S. at 357.
207 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see alsoJenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that the state appellate court committed a constitutional error by entertain-
ing a defendant's appeal without providing him with effective appellate counsel).
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clients regardless of the merits of their claims. 20 8 The issue in An-
ders was the constitutionality of California's withdrawal system,
which permitted court-appointed attorneys to remove themselves
from a case if they felt that the appeal was frivolous. 20 9 The
Supreme Court held that the process did not meet the constitu-
tional requirements of due process and equal protection, thus re-
quiring that counsel submit a brief suggesting any argument that
might support the appeal.2 10 The California court could then de-
cide the appeal on the merits by the same standard used for a non-
indigent appellee. 21' This "assure[s] penniless defendants the
same rights and opportunities on appeal-as nearly as practica-
ble-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation
but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel."
212
These cases demonstrated the Court's commitment to equal
justice for the poor. The Court's fundamental rationale was to cre-
ate a protective rule to ensure equal treatment of indigent defend-
ants. 213 The Supreme Court imposed rules in cases like Anders so
that judges and lawyers may perceive an indigent's claim more crit-
ically.214 These rules provide indigent defendants with the tools to
draw attention to their claims. Moreover, they ensure that individ-
uals are treated equally without regard for their ability to pay and
are thus given an equal opportunity to preserve their liberty.
Further examples of these rules can be found where the
Supreme Court dealt with rights they had already deemed funda-
mental. In Gideon v. Wainright,215 the Court adopted a rule requir-
ing appointed counsel for every indigent criminal defendant
accused of a felony.216 Subsequently, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,217 the
Court extended Gideon to all prosecutions which resulted in impris-
onment for any term.218 This extension served as a hedge against
the "obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of
the result, '219 caused by the larger number of misdemeanor cases.
Moreover, the Court did not limit this rationale solely to right
208 Id. at 744-45.
209 Id. at 739-40 & n.2.
210 Id. at 744.
211 Id. at 744-45.
212 Id. at 745.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 744-45.
215 372 U.S 335 (1963).
216 Id. at 342-45.
217 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
218 Id. at 37.
219 Id. at 34.
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to counsel cases. For example, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
lions,220 involved a challenge to Virginia's poll tax. 2 2 1 Like the right
of appeal from criminal convictions in Griffin, the franchise is not
independently guaranteed by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the
Court held that using wealth as a class to grant the vote to some
while denying it to others was a violation of equal protection. 222 As
in Griffin, the majority refused to legitimatize the purported fiscal
purposes served by the poll tax.22 3 Moreover, the Court expressed a
willingness to mandate the fiscal amounts the state must spend on
private services for private citizens.224 The court also suggested
that when there is a fundamental interest at stake, the state has a
duty to the indigent because the state bears a special responsibility
for the infringement of that right.
225
B. The Decline of Judicial Intervention on Behalf of the Poor
In the three decades since it was decided, Griffin spawned
many cases reaffirming the state's duties to the indigent defendant,
including Douglas. Douglas remained essentially untouched until it
was overturned by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffit. 2 2 6 Ross con-
cerned the state's duty to appoint counsel for indigent state prison-
ers seeking discretionary review. 227 The Court's holding, that states
did not have this duty22 8 was no different from the holding in Doug-
las. However, the rationale used in Ross was radically different.
The explicit elimination of wealth as a suspect classification
was noteworthy. The Court accomplished this by choosing not to
impose the cost of counsel for discretionary review on the states.2 2 9
The way the Court defined the issue of wealth within the equal
protection paradigm was more subtle, but in the end more devas-
tating to the cause of the poor. In Ross, the Court viewed Griffin
and its progeny as "stand [ing] for the proposition that a State can-
not arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open
avenues of appeal for more affluent persons."230  On the other
hand, the Court in Ross viewed Douglas as "an examination of
220 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
221 Id. at 664.
222 Id. at 670.
223 Id. at 668-69.
224 Id. at 668.
225 Id. at 670.
226 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
227 Id. at 602-03.
228 Id. at 610, 617-18.
229 Id. at 612.
230 Id. at 607.
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whether an indigent's access to the appellate system was ade-
quate."23 1 This subtle shift was a sign that the Court would no
longer proactively seek to level the playing field between the rich
and the poor.
Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
g-uez, 232 the Supreme Court chose to re-characterize laws that class-
ify people based on wealth. At issue in Rodriguez was Texas' system
of financing its public schools. 233 The state system guaranteed a
minimal level of state financing and permitted the individual dis-
tricts to raise additional revenues, usually through local property
taxes.234 This led to a gross disparity in educational spending be-
tween affluent and poor districts based solely on the underlying
property values.235 The Supreme Court chose to defer to the
state's legislative judgments on raising money and how to educate
children.236 More importantly, as further evidence of its retreat,
the Court would rely on federalism 237 to uphold a financing system
that existed in many states. 23 8 Ultimately it became apparent that
the Court would not guarantee equal access to education but
would only mandate that a threshold level be met, assuring at a
minimum that each child had a chance to acquire the basic
skills.
23 9
Following Ross and Rodriguez, the Court would vacillate on its
commitment to equal justice for the poor. In Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services,240 a 5-4 majority held that the state is not required
to pay for an attorney for an indigent woman whose child is being
taken away, but that such determinations should be made at the
trial court level on a case by case basis. 24 1 Justice Stewart's majority
opinion concluded that an indigent is preemptively entitled to
counsel only when faced with the risk of being deprived of physical
liberty.242 In the same year, the court decided Little v. Streater,243 in
which the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock and was
231 Id.
232 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
233 Id. at 4-5.
234 Id. at 9-10.
235 Id. at 15-16.
236 Id. at 40-41.
237 Id. at 44.
238 Id. at 55.
239 Id. at 37.
240 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
241 Id. at 24-32.
242 Id. at 25-26.
243 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
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forced by the Connecticut Department of Social Services to bring a
paternity suit in order to qualify for welfare. 24 4 The Supreme
Court unanimously held that Connecticut's refusal to pay for the
blood tests needed to bring a paternity suit was a violation of due
process.2 4 5 The Court reasoned that the state played a "prominent
role in the litigation ' 246 and was required to pay for the blood tests
so that the petitioner would have a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard.
24 7
In Plyer v. Doe,248 the Court overturned a Texas law that denied
public education to the children of illegal aliens.249 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan acknowledged that states "have some au-
thority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such ac-
tion mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state
goal. ' 250 He reasoned that the Texas law did not "operate harmo-
niously" with federal immigration law251 and that it served no state
interest, but to the contrary, only promoted "the creation and per-
petuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely
adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and
crime.
' 25 2
One principle established in Plyer is that a state may not pur-
sue policies which invariably create a permanent class of people
who are economically depressed and politically disadvantaged, and
indeed in some circumstances, the state may have a duty to spend
public money to avert creation of a permanent caste of the
underclass.
253
C. Equal Protection of the Laws and Article 18-B
As some recent media trials demonstrate, even to those who
are not familiar with the details of criminal defense work, the
wealthy can buy justice in our country. 254 The Supreme Court has
244 Id. at 15.
245 Id. at 16-17.
246 Id. at 6.
247 Id. at 5-6 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
248 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
249 Id. at 228-30.
250 Id. at 225.
251 Id. at 226.
252 Id. at 230.
253 Id.
254 See generally Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed
Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 47 (1997)
(discussing the notion thatjustice before the law, particularly criminal law, should not
depend on financial resources and that a "purchased" outcome in a criminal trial is
not tolerable).
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never required that the government neutralize the advantages of
wealth. You get what you pay for.
It is indisputable that the abysmally low rate paid to private
trial attorneys who represent the indigent in New York under sec-
tion 722 of Article 18-B of the New York County Law25 5 places indi-
gent criminal defendants at a substantial disadvantage. The
relative amount of money that New York pays private attorneys has
decreased since the passage of Article 18-B. A 1994 report adopted
by the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association
points out that despite the two increases in the rates paid to private
attorneys, the consumer price index has increased five times since
1965, amounting to a 44 percent decrease in terms of purchasing
power.256
The rates paid by New York State for non-capital cases are sig-
nificantly disproportionate to the federal rates, the rates paid by
other states, and the rates paid in New York for other types of legal
representation.257 New York rates are among the lowest in the
country despite its higher cost of doing business. 258 Thirty-one
states pay more for in-court time and thirty-two states pay more for
out-of-court time.259 Only seven states pay less than New York for
in-court time and only six for out-of-court time. 21 It would be fool-
ish to think that an indigent defendant charged with a crime in a
New York state court is receiving the same quality of representation
as an indigent defendant in a New York federal court.
The rates paid to private attorneys for other types of represen-
tation in New York indicate an implicit choice to provide a lower
level of representation to poor criminal defendants. Partners as-
signed under Public Officers Law Section 17 to represent state em-
ployees receive $100 per hour for in-court time and $75 per hour
for out-of-court work. 261 Associates with three years experience re-
ceive $75 and $50 respectively for the same work.2 6 2 In 1992, New
York City, which retains attorneys to represent the City and its
255 N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991).
256 See STATEMENT ON ASSIGNED COUNSEL FEES. Criminal Justice Section of the New
York State Bar Association (Adopted at NYSBA Annual Meeting held in New York City
on January 28, 1994).
257 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 94.
258 See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 93.
259 See SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL (1997).
260 Id.
261 See "LEGAL FEES" SCHEDULE, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF AUDIT AND CON-
TROL, BUREAU OF Co NRACTS AND STATE EXPENDITURES.
262 Id.
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agencies, established maximum rates for partners of $150 per hour
and for associates of $100 per hour. 26" These higher rates suggest
a disregard for the indigent criminal defendant's presumption of
innocence.
Unfortunately, these incredibly low rates have caused exper-
ienced trial attorneys to shun 18-B cases. Veteran attorneys either
leave the state 18-B panel or accept more federal cases, thereby
depleting the state panel. The current system yields two other in-
teresting results. First, the higher in-court rate causes attorneys to
devote more time in court even though out of court preparation
and investigation could result in speedier disposition of cases. Sec-
ond, if caps are exceeded before the case goes to trial, the attorney
could be faced with representing the client without a fee, which is
impermissible.26 4
IV. INDIGENCY AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama.265 In Powell the
Court recognized that where due process requires the state to pro-
vide counsel for an indigent defendant, "that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
aration and trial of the case."2 66 Ten years later, in Glasser v. United
States,267 the Supreme Court held that there was a Sixth Amend-
ment violation when a judge denied a defendant the "right to have
the effective assistance of counsel." 26' Later, in Evitts v. Lucey,
269
the Supreme Court found that a defendant was entitled afortiori to
effective representation by retained counsel on a first appeal of
right.270 The Court noted that "a party whose counsel is unable to
provide effective representation is in no better position than one
who has no counsel at all.
271
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to any pro-
ceeding where there is a constitutional right to counsel. In other
263 See Edward A. Adams, Lauryers Cost City $12 Million Last Year, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16,
1992, at 1.
264 See generally Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183.
265 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
266 Id. at 71.
267 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
268 Id. at 76.
269 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
270 Id. at 402.
271 Id. at 396.
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words, the constitutional right to counsel that is grounded in
either the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Where there is no such constitutional right, the same constitu-
tional requirement of effective assistance of counsel does not ap-
ply.272 In Wainwright v. Torna,273 the defendant claimed to have
been denied effective assistance of counsel when his retained attor-
ney failed to file a timely application for discretionary review.27 4
The Court noted that "[s]ince respondent had no constitutional
right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective assist-
ance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file the applica-
tion timely."
2 75
Over the years the courts have allowed appeals based on de-
fense counsel failures in several areas. Some examples include the
failure to investigate, 276 to consult sufficiently with the defend-
ant,27 7 to adequately represent client interests in plea bargain-
ing, 27 8 to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence, 2 7 9 and to
raise or properly present various available defenses.280
In Strickland v. Washington,28 1 and United States v. Cronic,
28 2
which were announced the same day, the Supreme Court sought to
provide a general framework for the analysis of ineffective assist-
ance claims. Both opinions noted that the critical element of inef-
fective assistance claims is to evaluate the performance of counsel
in light of the underlying purpose of the constitutional right to
counsel.283 In Strickland the Court noted that the objective of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was to provide the "basic ele-
ments of a fair trial."284 Because the essential character of a fair
trial is our adversarial system of litigation, effective assistance
claims must be measured by reference to the proper functioning of
272 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
273 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
274 Id. at 586-87.
275 Id. at 587-88.
276 In reJones, 917 P.2d 1175, 1179-82 (Cal. 1996).
277 State v. Savage, 577 A.2d 455, 466-69 (N.J. 1990).
278 Mitchell v. State, 762 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Diaz v. Mar-
tin, 718 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984)).
279 State v. Fisher, 874 P.2d 1381, 1384-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
280 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1346-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578
(2d Cir. 1996), and cert. denied (1996).
281 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
282 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
283 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 692; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56.
284 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
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the adversarial process in a particular case. 285 Therefore, the criti-
cal question is whether counsel's performance has been so lacking
that the process "los[t] its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, "286 leading to an "actual breakdown of the adversarial
process."
287
The concept of effective assistance of counsel stated in Strick-
land and Cronic allows a constitutional challenge only when a de-
fendant can establish that counsel actually failed in some respect to
discharge his duties and that the failure affected the adversarial
process to an extent that undermines the confidence in the out-
come of the proceeding. 288 The Court in Strickland emphasized
the importance of a fact-sensitive analysis of the nature and impact
of the attorney's representation under the circumstances of the
particular case.289 In Cronic, Justice Stevens recognized settings in
which there could be per se violations of the right to effective coun-
sel g.2 " First is the situation in which "counsel was either totally ab-
sent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage
of the proceeding."291 Second, Justice Stevens acknowledged that
there were "occasions when although counsel is available to assist
the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the
actual conduct of the trial. 2 92
A. Conflicts of Interest
It has long been recognized that the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel entitles a defendant to the undivided
loyalty of his attorney.293 In Strickland, Justice O'Connor stated that
capable representation "entails certain basic duties,"29 4 and among
these duties is an obligation for lawyers to "avoid conflicts of inter-
est."29 5 The defendant will not receive a fair trial when his coun-
sel's decisions are affected by obligations to persons other than the
defendant. Thus, a conflict of interest is present when defense
285 Id. at 690.
286 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57.
287 Id. at 657.
288 Id. at 656; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
289 466 U.S. at 690.
290 466 U.S. at 658-59.
291 Id. at 659 n.25.
292 Id. at 659-60.
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counsel has personal interests that affect their professional judg-
ment in representing the client.
296
Courts have not found a constitutional bar against representa-
tion in potential conflict of interest settings. 9 7 However, courts
have been willing to view representation in those settings as sus-
pect.298 They have also recognized that it is often impossible to
reconstruct the precise impact of an attorney's loyalty because a
conflict of interest arises from matters that are not reflected in an
appellate record. The reviewing courts have expressed the diffi-
culty in pinpointing acts or omissions at trial that are not readily
apparent from the record.299 Ultimately, the only person who
knows the true ramifications of a conflict is the defense attorney.
One response to this issue has been for courts to make a pre-
trial inquiry into an attorney's possible conflicts. However, if the
court itself is the source of the conflict, the inquiry is futile. There-
fore, the defendant is forced to utilize post-conviction review. The
prevailing standard for post-conviction review was established in
Cuyler v. Sullivan. °° In Cuyler the Supreme Court stated that "[i] n
order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant
who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."
3 0 '
This does not require the defendant to establish that he or she has
been prejudiced by the attorney. Once a defendant "shows that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representa-
tion" he or she is entitled to relief."0 2 Thus, there is no need to
establish that the Sixth Amendment violation might have adversely
affected the outcome of the case. Once the defendant demon-
strates both an actual conflict of interest (that the attorney was
placed in a situation where conflicting loyalties pointed in opposite
directions) and, as a result, the attorney proceeded to act against
the defendant's interests, prejudice would be presumed and auto-
matic reversal is required.
New York's scheme for compensating private attorneys creates
conflicts of interest that may result in claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. Advocates cannot live in the vacuum of a single
296 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 (1980).
297 SeeLightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 934 (1988).
298 See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975)
299 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
300 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
301 Id. at 348.
302 Id. at 349-50.
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case. They must also consider office rent, support staff, and per-
sonal expenses as they allocate their time. The low fees paid to
those who represent the indigent force them to choose not only
how many of these cases they can take, but also the amount of time
they devote to each case. The abysmally low rates create inherent
conflicts of interest that undermine the quality of representation
an attorney is able to provide.
The process of compensation under Article 18-B is equally
flawed. Section 722 establishes caps on the total amount per case
an attorney may receive. An attorney can exceed those caps only
with the permission of the judge handling the case.3 04 Thus, the
attorney is financially beholden to the judge hearing the case. The
attorney's ability to choose how much time to devote to each case
and meet expenses as the case progresses depends upon the judge
handling the case. Therefore, attorneys may feel that they must
tailor their representation strategies to the quirks of the judge in
order to survive financially.
Attorneys who want to be appointed to future cases have to
keep in mind that judges are charged with appointing counsel.30 5
It is my experience that many judges are former prosecutors who
believe that defense attorneys who advocate zealously on behalf of
their indigent clients are wasting the court's time and the people's
money. Again, the inherent problem with a conflict of interest is
that it is only the attorney, and perhaps the judge, who know how
this affects the quality of legal representation in a particular case.
B. State Interference
Defendants are denied effective assistance of counsel when the
state interferes with counsel's ability to make full use of trial proce-
dures.30 6 In Herring v. New York,3 ° 7 the Supreme Court noted that
"the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of coun-
sel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the tradi-
303 N.Y. CouNrrv LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
304 Id.; see also Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 183, at 94.
305 N.Y. CouN-rv LAw § 722(4) (McKinney 1991).
306 See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (holding that denying
counsel's input in deciding if and when a defendant will testify infringes on his or her
constitutional rights); see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding
that denying defendant's counsel the right to ask defendant questions when he took
the stand denied him effective assistance of counsel).
307 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
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tions of the adversary fact finding process . .3.0."0' The critical
factor leading to the presumption of prejudice in state interference
cases flows from the role played by the state in restricting an attor-
ney's representation.3 9 The presumption of prejudice acts as a
protective measure designed to discourage state action that may
preclude effective representation.
New York's scheme for compensating private attorneys
amounts to state interference. This scheme thrusts the state into
the defense attorney's decision making process. Even if courts do
not consider this scheme as establishing a conflict of interest, they
cannot deny that these intrusions are the result of state action.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 18-B prohibits counsel from making full use of trial
procedures by forcing the attorney to run a financial gauntlet
throughout the entire course of a client's representation. This
gauntlet consists of the caps on the total amount an attorney may
receive and the manner in which it is dispensed.31 l These factors
inhibit the attorney in making all of the decisions necessary to pre-
pare and execute a zealous defense. Additionally, when judges
make the appointments of 18-B attorneys, it is obvious that the
state has injected itself into the indigent's defense. Therefore, the
18-B compensation scheme itself denies indigent defendants their
right to effective assistance of counsel.
This article points to what New York attorneys for the indigent
have known for some time: indigent criminal defendants are not
receiving equal protection of the laws. Similarly situated defend-
ants in New York and other state federal courts are receiving quali-
tatively better defense services. This unfair treatment of the
indigent defendant leads to wrongful convictions that pack our
prisons with wrongfully convicted defendants and robs the state of
money that could be spent elsewhere to reduce crime.
The Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause were designed
to protect "a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy" that frequently characterizes government
officials. 311 How much longer will we allow the state to perpetuate
a society where some are more equal than others?
308 Id. at 857.
309 Id. at 857-59.
310 N.Y. Coum'rv LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991).
311 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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THE RIGHT TO WORK AND EARN A LIVING




We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. -That to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed. -That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.'
There is nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy
and strong democracy. The basic things expected by our people
of their political and economic systems are simple. They are:
Equality of opportunity for youth and for others.
Jobs for those who can work.
Security for those who need it.
The ending of special privilege for the few.
The preservation of civil liberties for all.
The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider
and constantly rising standard of living.
2
Every person should have the right to work and to receive a
living wage for their work. It is time for a constitutional change.
As the nation exhibits its legislative unwillingness to support non-
working adults by forcing them off government assistance pro-
grams,' they will meet millions who are already seeking work. Mil-
t Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Gillis W. Long Poverty Law
Center, Loyola University School of Law. J.D., 1977, Loyola University School of Law;
B.A., 1971, Purdue University.
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
2 87 CONG. REc. 46 (1941) (remarks by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in
his State of the Union Address).
3 See, e.g., Barbarda Vobeja, After 60 Years, a Basic Shift in Philosophy, WASH. POST,
Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
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lions more who are working do not earn enough to lift themselves
and their children out of poverty.
Justice, supported by the Declaration of Independence and
the history of this nation, demands change when current economic
and legal arrangements hurt individuals, families, and communi-
ties. This article proposes an amendment to the United States
Constitution to provide every citizen with the right to an opportu-
nity for employment at a living wage. If this nation is serious about
putting everyone to work, then it must guarantee everyone an op-
portunity to work at a living wage. If the United States House of
Representatives can pass a proposed constitutional amendment
banning flag-burning, 4 an amendment ensuring the right to a job
at a decent wage is possible.
It is in the nation's best interest to give everyone who wants to
work the chance to be gainfully employed. This interest is served
by allowing people to contribute to their own well-being, as well as
to their family's and their community's. Likewise, it is in the com-
mon interest that people who work full-time should not remain
poor. Workers who are compensated enough to support them-
selves and their families do not need to rely on support from
others. The opportunity to work should be the right of every per-
son. Work and poverty should not coexist.
Some who oppose full employment argue that it is inflationary
and bad for the nation. These people would accept millions of
non-working adults as the price the nation must pay to maintain
low inflation. But is this true? Is the family helped by heads of
households not being able to work if they are trying to work? Is the
neighborhood helped by people not working? Is the city, or the
state? Clearly not. So, if involuntary unemployment is bad for the
family, the neighborhood, the city, and the state, how can it possi-
bly be good for the nation? Others suggest that government has
no business interfering with economic life. I would imagine that
those who advance this suggestion have not had their own eco-
nomic life assisted by government action.
American political history supports efforts to give everyone the
opportunity to work and to make sure that those who work earn
enough to avoid poverty. Historically, all levels of government
have provided opportunities for work when the private sector was
unable. This century has seen several legislative efforts to create a
right to employment which, while unsuccessful so far, have enjoyed
4 Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves Amendment on Flag Desecration, WASH. POST,
June 29, 1995, at A7.
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broad public support. Public support of such efforts is not surpris-
ing since this nation values work and opportunity.
The United States continually seeks ways to improve the con-
stitutional rights to personal liberty and political participation for
its citizens. Many of these important rights become diluted for the
unemployed and those who are employed but still unable to sup-
port themselves and their families. It is time to recognize the need
for an opportunity for all persons to support themselves. It is time
to create a constitutional right to work for a living wage. The pur-
poses of this proposed amendment are simple: (1) to create an
opportunity to work for the involuntarily unemployed, and (2) to
create an opportunity to earn a decent and livable wage for the
employed. The proposed amendment reflects and reinforces this
nation's commitment to work and opportunity. While the amend-
ment has significant implications for this country's laws and eco-
nomic policies, few would dispute the values it enshrines with
constitutional protection.
This article outlines how such a guarantee of employment
might work. It does not point out exactly how such an amendment
could be implemented because the possibilities are literally limit-
less. For example, it could be implemented through: (1) the pro-
vision of tax incentives to private employers and employees which
would support work creation and retention policies; (2) modifica-
tions of existing labor laws such as raising and indexing minimum
wages; (3) the establishment of a Works Progress Administration
("WPA")-type employment corps for those who are not employed
by the private sector, which could help clean, teach, and police the
nation's communities; and (4) many combinations, as yet, un-
thought. The cost of such an effort would be much less than the
cost the nation is already paying for unemployment and poverty-
level wages. Such an amendment is consistent with the historical
development of this country, and could propel the nation forward
in supporting its citizens as they search for decent work at a decent
wage.
II. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The proposed amendment would contain the provision: Every
person shall have the right to work and to receive a living wage for their
work.
The amendment embodies two principles: a right to work,
and a right for workers to receive a living wage. What these rights
mean exactly will be decided by Congress, the Executive Branch,
1998]
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and the Judiciary.5 However, a brief sketch of what these rights are
intended to mean is in order.
The right to work would be a right of opportunity. "Every per-
son shall have the right to work" simply means that there must be
an opportunity to work for those who seek it. The proposed
amendment does not force anyone to work, nor are the voluntarily
unemployed affected. This is not mere sloganeering, but a real
right to the opportunity to work. As a part of the Constitution,
there would be a legally enforceable right to the opportunity for
employment, and the involuntarily unemployed would be entitled
to enforce this right.
The employed would be entitled, under this amendment, "to
receive a living wage for their work." A living wage means compen-
sation sufficient for workers to meet the needs and demands of
everyday life, lived in a manner consistent with human dignity.6
The precise amount of money due workers will vary over time with
national standards and expectations, but it is intended to cover the
commonly accepted living expenses. Since it is a living wage, and
because it is expected that many workers will be supporting fami-
lies, the needs of those dependent on the worker must also be con-
sidered. A living wage certainly does not mean the statutory
minimum wage,7 which is far below the wages needed for most
workers and their dependents to live in dignity. The right to a liv-
ing wage would become legally enforceable, with all the benefits
that entails.
At the present, there is neither a guarantee of work nor living
wages. The two principles of work and living wages must fit to-
gether. Without the guarantee of a living wage, work loses some of
its appeal; without the real opportunity to work, the promise of
good wages is empty. The guarantees of work and living wages en-
ergize and complement each other. They must remain linked to
create a strong constitutional bond for the people of this nation.
The Constitution enshrines the highest goals of the United
States. This nation values working and earning enough to secure a
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-8; art. H, §§ 1-2; art. III, §§ 1-2.
6 See Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 451 n.4 (1981) [hereinafter Klare, Labor Law as
Ideology] ("[W]lork can and should provide dignity and meaning to life ... it can and
should be a mode of expression, development[,] and realization of the human self
7 The statutory minimum wage in the United States is currently $5.15 per hour.
Small Business Job Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 415(b) (2) (E) (1996).
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dignified living.8 A constitutional amendment guaranteeing every
person the right to work and to earn a living wage simply, yet force-
fully, elevates accepted American principles to the status of consti-
tutionally protected rights.
III. A)MERICAN HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK
AND EARN A LIVING WAGE
Three times during this century a guaranteed right to employ-
ment was seriously considered in the United States. First, in the
early 1930s during the New Deal, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt lead the fight for decent work at decent wages through
exhortation and legislation.' After World War II, a comprehensive
legislative guarantee of employment was considered by Congress.10
Third, in the mid-1970s, Congress and the nation again wrestled
with a way to ensure everyone had the opportunity to work.1
While none of these efforts culminated in an enforceable right to
work, each moved the country closer to that goal and provided in-
sight for those considering a constitutional amendment.
Even before the New Deal, Americans supported the obliga-
tion of public authorities to help the able-bodied jobless become
employed. 12 Furnishing work opportunities for the unemployed
was considered a part of the duty of local officials in England as
early as the sixteenth century.13 Publicly funded work was used as a
8 See, e.g., Keith B. Leffler, Minimum Wages, Welfare, and Wealth Transfers to the Poor,
21 J.L. & ECON. 345 (1978).
9 See infra pp. 108-15.
10 See infra pp. 115-19.
11 See infra pp. 120-23.
12 For a more detailed overview of the history of the right to work, see William E.
Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court
and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STA. L. Riv. 1771, 1793-1804 (1994) (posing a
social and economic citizenship based on roots ranging from postbellum Republi-
cans' discussions of "wage slavery," Gilded Age reformers, the Populist tradition, the
Progressive era, and the New Deal). See also THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 234 (1995).
13 WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 8-9 (5th ed. 1994). See also Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and
Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285
(1994).
A statute enacted in 1530... ordered that the disabled poor be licensed
to beg within their own local area. Those begging outside the permit-
ted area were to spend two days and nights in the stocks, and fed only
bread and water. Moreover, anyone begging without a license was to be
whipped and those "whole and mighty in body, able to labor" were to be
"tied to the end of a cart naked, and be beaten with whips throughout
the same town or other place till his body be bloody by reason of such
whipping."
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means of relief for the unemployed in the United States as early as
1857.14 In the nineteenth century, authorities in cities such as Bal-
timore, New York, Newark, and Philadelphia provided public jobs
at a set minimum wage in response to widespread unemploy-
ment.15 These efforts continued into the twentieth century. Be-
tween 1914 and 1915, over fifty cities used public works such as
laying water-mains, improving roads and parks, and repairing pub-
lic buildings to help relieve unemployment.
16
A. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal
Government creation of public work programs cannot be un-
derstood without some knowledge of the Depression and its effect
on unemployment. During the Depression, unemployment grew
at a frightening rate. In the spring of 1929, there were 2.8 million
unemployed men and women; by January 1930, there were over
four million out of work; in September 1930, five million people
were unemployed; eight million people were jobless by spring
1931; and unemployment peaked at thirteen to fifteen million peo-
ple out of work in the spring of 1933.17
This sanguinary law was amended in 1535 to provide assistance to those
who were truly needy, and to guide the others towards productive work.
Under the amendment, sturdy beggars were made to work, and invalids
were supported by alms collected by the churchwardens and two others
of every parish. This was the first English law to legislate charitable sus-
tenance of the poor.
After the accession to the throne of King Edward, the Henrician laws
were replaced by more severe measures. The Edwardian statute pro-
vided that any loiterer or wanderer who would not work, or had run
away from work, was to be branded with a "V" for vagabond. Further-
more, he was to be a slave for two years to whomever demanded him,
was to be fed bread and water, and forced to do any task "how vile so-
ever it be as he shall be put unto by beating, chaining, or otherwise."
Moreover, if the enslaved beggar ran away, he was to be branded with
an "S" upon the cheek and made a slave for life. If he ran away again,
he was to be hanged.
Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
14 See LEAH HANNAH FEDER, UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF IN PERIODS OF DEPRESSION: A
STUDY OF MEASURES ADOPTED IN CERTAIN AMERICAN CITIES, 1857 THROUGH 1922, at 31
(1936).
15 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 234.
16 FEDER, supra note 14, at 288.
17 JOSEPHINE CHAPIN BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF: 1929-1939, at 64-65 (1940). These un-
official employment estimates were gathered by several organizations since no official
government estimates exist. Id. at 64. See also BONNIE Fox SCHWARTZ, THE CrVIL
WORKS ADMINISTRATION, 1933-1934 (1984).
More than 12.5 million Americans-ten percent of the population-
were living on public aid. Four states alone, Pennsylvania, New York,
Ohio, and Illinois, claimed a third of these persons, and an eighth re-
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What did the unemployed want? Experiences of people in-
volved in administering relief programs in the Depression con-
firmed that what the unemployed wanted was not a handout, but a
job.18 But what did the unemployed receive? Not work, but relief,
public assistance, and handouts. By 1933, relief from state and lo-
cal governments was at unheard of levels: four million families
(i.e., eighteen million people) were receiving some sort of public
relief.19 "In some states [forty] percent of the population [was] on
relief .... .20 Incredibly, one out of every six families in the United
States depended on assistance.2' At the time of the New Deal, eve-
ryone wanted more jobs. This notion remains true today. The dis-
cussion to resolve the crisis centered on how to get jobs to those
who wanted them.
President Herbert Hoover chose to rely on the private market
alone for job creation. For example, in 1930, he created a Presi-
dent's Emergency Committee for Employment (the "Emergency
Committee").22 The Emergency Committee and the rest of the ad-
ministration consistently maintained the position that massive un-
employment was not a problem for the federal government, but an
economic problem, and a local problem to be addressed by local
resources, primarily private agencies.2" The Hoover Administra-
tion joined with business interests in opposing any significant fed-
sided in five cities with a million or more inhabitants. The count in-
cluded over 5.25 million children under sixteen years of age. One
seventh of all youngsters from six to thirteen years old depended on
relief, an experience comparable to school in its impact upon a future
generation. And almost .25 million infants were starting life out on the
dole.
Id. at 3.
18 JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY: 1900-1994, at 53
(1994). "'At least seventy-five percent of the people who came to us,' [the head of a
New York relief agency] told Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, 'wanted just one thing, and
that was work; the last thing they wanted was a charity dole of any kind."' Id
19 BROWN, supra note 17, at 145.
20 BROWN, supra note 17, at 145-46.
21 BROWN, supra note 17, at 146.
During the spring unemployment had reached its peak. Approximately
15 million people were out of work. The fiscal condition of states, coun-
ties[,] and municipalities was becoming more and more serious. In
many places the economic machinery had already collapsed. Essential
public services were being suspended. Thousands of families were los-
ing their homes and their farms. There was no such thing as security,
whether that meant the assurance of a job, a home, a farm, shares of
stock, deposits in banks, or a life insurance policy.
BROWN, supra note 17, at 145.
22 BROWN, supra note 17, at 68.
23 BROWN, supra note 17, at 68.
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eral effort to combat the unemployment of the Depression on
many, now-familiar fears: interference with the cycles of normal
business; an unbalanced budget; higher taxes; large bureaucracy;
and state's rights.
24
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on the other hand, upon ac-
cepting the nomination of the Democratic Party for President,
made his position on the economics issue clear: "We must lay hold
of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are
made by human beings. 25 Once in office, President Roosevelt's
advisors began to consider ways the federal government could dra-
matically reduce unemployment, since the locally administered
work relief programs which delivered public assistance were being
overwhelmed by surging unemployment rates.2 6
"[President] Roosevelt's understanding of New Deal constitu-
tionalism embraced a right to decent, useful work."27 President
Roosevelt's New Deal went forward on two fronts: the creation of
public programs providing jobs for the unemployed and the con-
tinual call for safeguarding the right to a job for all Americans.
While the most well-known of the New Deal public employ-
ment programs is the WPA, it was not the first effort of the
Roosevelt Administration. The WPA actually arose out of the ashes
of two programs enacted in 1933: the Civil Works Administration
(the "CWA") and the Federal Emergency Relief Act ("FERA").28
The CWA was created by President Roosevelt in November 1933 to
provide jobs to the unemployed.2 1 It employed four million peo-
ple at good wages until it was terminated in March of 1934."0
Though it had problems with criticism from the business commu-
nity, in addition to problems in its administration and its politics, it
was very popular with the unemployed who expressed a clear pref-
erence for work rather than relief.31 The CWA, more than any
other New Deal effort, came closest to providing the unemployed
24 BROWN, supra note 17, at 110-18.
25 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, I Pledge You - I Pledge Myself to a New Deal for
the American People, Address Before the Democratic National Convention (July 2,
1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 657 (1938).
26 PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE UNITED STATES 100-01 (1989).
27 Forbath, supra note 12, at 1789.
28 See ScHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 38. The WPA was created in 1935. It was always
known as the WPA even though its name actually changed to the Works Project Ad-
ministration. It became an independent agency in 1939. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at
38.
29 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 38.
30 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 213.
31 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 103-05. The CWA encountered harsh criticism in the
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"real jobs for real wages." 3 2
After the 1934 elections, President Roosevelt, who always con-
sidered both FERA and CWA temporary, decided to "quit this busi-
ness of relief" and dismantled the programs, shifting the
government focus almost exclusively to public employment.3
s Anti-
government forces are fond of quoting President Roosevelt's state-
ment from his 1935 State of the Union Address that "[tihe Federal
Government must and shall quit this business of relief."34 How-
ever, they rarely go on to quote the rest of the speech in which he
declared that government must provide unemployed people with
jobs:
I am not willing that the vitality of our people be further sapped
by the giving of cash, of market baskets, of a few hours of weekly
work cutting grass, raking leaves, or picking up papers in the
public parks. We must preserve not only the bodies of the un-
employed from destitution but also their self-respect, their self-
reliance, and courage and determination.... There are how-
ever an additional three and one-half million employable peo-
ple who are on relief.... The Federal Government is the only
governmental agency with sufficient power and credit to meet
this situation. We have assumed this task and we shall not shrink
from it in the future. It is a duty dictated by every intelligent
consideration of national policy to ask you to make it possible
for the United States to give employment to all of these three
and one-half million employable people now on relief, pending
their absorption in a rising tide of private employment.
3 5
As a result, a two-part strategy developed. First, the people
who were unable to work were to seek assistance from the states.
36
Second, those who could work were to be assigned jobs through
South, where its nondiscriminatory hiring and wage policies interfered with the tradi-
tional race-based work patterns.
A du Pont vice president and family member wrote that, "Five negroes
on my place in South Carolina refused work this spring, after I had
taken care of them and given them house rent free and work for three
years during bad times, saying they had easy jobs with the Government.
... " A North Carolina landlord put it more bluntly: "You can't hire a
nigger to do anything for you.... High wages is ruinin' 'em."
HARvEY, supra note 26, at 104.
32 HARvY, supra note 26 at 99 (footnote omitted).
33 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 170.
34 79 CONG. REc. 95 (1935) (remarks by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union
Address).
35 Id. at 95-96.
36 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOP-HOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 227 (1986).
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the WPA.3 7 Within a year, the WPA succeeded in employing more
than three million people,3 8 mainly those who were already on re-
lief. 9 Despite its size, the WPA still reached only a fraction of the
unemployed. 0 Wages earned by WPA workers were lower than pri-
vate sector wages, but higher than the amount received on relief,
although wages clearly were not as high as they had been in the
CWA.41
While the WPA was criticized for its "make-work" philosophy,
WPA workers did much to build and improve streets, storm sewers,
grandstands, and landing fields.42 Other criticisms of the WPA in-
cluded: its high cost; its infringement into private business and
construction opportunities; and inherent uncorrectable flaws in
any system of public employment.
4 3
As a result, public support for the work programs and the
workers themselves began to erode.44 While the WPA lasted until
World War II, Congress cut its budget nearly in half in 1937, and
again in 1939 when Congress ordered all WPA employees who had
worked for the program more than eighteen months terminated.43
37 Id. at 227. The WPA was set up in 1935 with $1.39 billion in funding, as part of
the $4.54 billion allocated for relief. PAI-rERSON, supra note 18, at 63. See KATz, supra
note 36, at 228-34.
38 KArz, supra note 36, at 228.
39 PATrERSON, supra note 18, at 63-64 (the annual total of WPAjobs reached a high
of 3.5 million people, approximately 30% of the 8 to 10.7 million unemployed).
40 KATrz, supra note 36, at 229.
41 SCHWAR-rZ, supra note 17, at 254-56; see KATz, supra note 36, at 229 (WPA wages,
especially for semi-skilled workers, were often only 65 to 70% of workers' total needs;
in the South, it was as low as 30 to 40% of workers' needs).
42 MARVIN OLAsKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 158-61 (1992). The
WPA was known by its critics as "We Piddle Around" and "We Pay for All." Id. The
author, a severe critic of most contemporary social assistance programs, looks compar-
atively fondly on the WPA, finding evidence that it was both "benefit and boondog-
gle" as he admires its attempts to "stress work and worthiness" over relief, and its
conscious attempts to work within "American values toward work and dependency."
Id. The WPA's "theater, arts, and writers' projects were bold ventures in government
support of cultural activities." PATTERSON, supra note 18, at 63. See KArz, supra note
36, at 230-34 (detailing the criticisms of the supporters and detractors of the work
relief programs). The administrative problems of putting millions of people to work
in a very short time with no prior programs to learn from was an incredible challenge.
The goals of the programs were mixed, including immediately putting people to
work, many of whom were unskilled, but also employing people for constructive pub-
lic projects, which demanded planning and skilled workers. KA-rz, supra note 36, at
230-31. Since all could not be helped, should the programs help those most desper-
ate and least skilled, or those with skills who needed but a temporaryjob? KATZ, supra
note 36, at 231-32. Wages had to be above relief levels but could not politically chal-
lenge private wage levels. KATz, supra note 36, at 232-33.
43 See PATTERSON, supra note 18, at 65-66.
44 PATTERSON, supra note 18, at 45-55.
45 KArz, supra note 36, at 229; see Patterson, supra note 18, at 57.
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A 1933 companion program, the CCC, put unemployed young
people to work.46 By 1939, 800,000 young Americans were working
for the National Youth Administration (the "NYA") and the CCC,
and another 2.3 million workers were employed through the
WPA.47 Eventually, the WPA folded into a new Federal Works
Agency. 48 Congress terminated the CCC in 1942, and President
Roosevelt called for the end of the WPA after the 1942 elections.4 9
Though the public employment projects of the New Deal did
not become permanent, they helped millions of people in one of
the worst economic periods in American history. Subsequent ef-
forts to guarantee employment through the legislature have never
matched the success of the New Deal programs." Likewise, the
national government is popularly seen to be responsible for main-
taining low rates of unemployment and, if necessary, becoming the
employer of last resort.
In addition to the creation and administration of these pro-
grams, President Roosevelt and those who worked with the New
Deal made significant contributions to the discussion over whether
people should have a right to a job and a right to earn decent
wages. For example, in 1934, President Roosevelt created the
Committee on Economic Security ("CES") to develop a compre-
hensive workable social security program.51 CES quickly outlined a
two-pronged social policy to combat the economic misfortunes:5 2
(1) income assistance for the needy who could not work; and (2)
employment assurance for those who could.5" The income assist-
ance for the needy was formulated into programs. The economic
assurance part of the equation was to provide work opportunities
to make people self-supporting.5 4 Unfortunately, only the income
assistance programs were made operable.55
Despite the novelty of the idea that the government become
46 KATz, supra note 36, at 224.
47 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 169.
48 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 172.
49 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 175.
50 ScW-rwAT-z, supra note 17, at 260-76 (providing a concise overview of legislative
efforts to guarantee employment from the CWA to the Comprehensive Employment
Training Act ("CETA")).
51 TRAarNER, supra note 13, at 289 (indicating that the committee consisted of four
cabinet members and the head of FERA).
52 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 20 (labeling this a two-legged policy which ultimately
lost one of its legs).
53 HAvEY, supra note 26, at 20.
54 -ARvY, supra note 26, at 20.
55 -ARWy, supra note 26, at 20 ("Since then we have tried to walk on one leg only,
to hobble along with half a social welfare system.").
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the employer of last resort, a poll by Fortune magazine found over-
whelming support for the principle that "government should see to
it that every man who wants to work has a job.
56
President Roosevelt kept the idea of government guaranteed
opportunity to work for fair wages on his agenda. In 1937, in an
address to Congress, he said:
The time has arrived for us to take further action to extend
the frontiers of social progress .... Our Nation so richly en-
dowed with natural resources and with a capable and industri-
ous population should be able to devise ways and means of
insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair
day's pay for a fair day's work. 7
As World War II approached, President Roosevelt and his advi-
sors recognized that the declining unemployment rate of the mid-
1930s, which was a result of the war production effort, might rise
again after the war. Accordingly, in November 1940, President
Roosevelt instructed the National Resources Planning Board
("NRPB") to formulate detailed plans for economic and social poli-
cies for the postwar period. 8 The NRPB issued several reports in-
cluding one with 640 pages and 400,000 words, entitled Security,
Work, and Relief Policies.59 In this report, the NRPB proposed a
"New Bill of Rights," which included:
1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the pro-
ductive years.
2. The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities
and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift and
other socially valuable service.
3. The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical
care.
4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age,
want, dependency, sickness, unemployment and accident.
5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from
compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public
authority and unregulated monopolies.
6. The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from
the spyings of secret political police.
7. The right to equality before the law, with equal access to
justice in fact.
56 The Fortune Survey, FORTUNE, July 1935, at 67.
57 81 CONG. Ric. 4960 (1937) (statement of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
asking for the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
58 STEPHEN KEMP BAME, CONGRESS MAKES A LAw, THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOY-
MENT" ACT OF 1946, at 26 (1950).
59 Id.; see SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 173.
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8. The right to education, for work, for citizenship and for per-
sonal growth and happiness.
9. The right to rest, recreation and adventure, the opportunity
to enjoy and take part in an advancing civilization.
60
The NRPB also called for the assurance of economic security
as a right of every American citizen. Thus, the federal government
should provide jobs when private economy cannot.6" The NRPB
spelled out this strategy for full employment in detail:
To guarantee the right to a job, activities in the provision of
physical facilities and service activities should be supplemented
by:
(1) Formal acceptance by the Federal Government of re-
sponsibility for insuring jobs at decent pay to all those able
to work regardless of whether or not they can pass a means
test.
(2) The preparation of plans and programs, in addition to
those recommended ... for all kinds of socially useful work
other than construction, arranged according to the variety
of abilities and location of persons seeking employment.
(3) Expansion of the functions of the [U.S.] Employment
Service, strengthening its personnel to the end that it may
operate as the key mechanism in referring unemployed
workers to jobs, whether public or private.
(4) Establishment of a permanent "Work Administration"
under an appropriate Federal agency to administer the pro-
vision of jobs of socially desirable work for the otherwise
unemployed. 62
The NRPB proposed the establishment of a national employ-
ment service to gather information, administer all work and train-
ing programs, and unemployment compensation.63 While no
specific action was taken on this report, its suggestions lay the
groundwork for the 1945 Full Employment Bill. Meanwhile, Presi-
dent Roosevelt continued to proclaim the need to guarantee eco-
nomic opportunity and security for all people. In his January 1941
State of the Union Address, President Roosevelt announced that these
principles were necessary to support the very bedrock of the Ameri-
can system:
60 The 'New Bill of Rights,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1943, at 12.
61 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 174 (indicating that the NRPB, like previous New
Dealers, "regarded public works and public employment as the solutions to the unem-
ployment problem").
62 HARvEy, supra note 26, at 106.
63 SKocPOL, supra note 12, at 173-75.
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There is nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy
and strong democracy. The basic things expected by our people
of their political and economic systems are simple. They are:
Equality of opportunity for youth and for others.
Jobs for those who can work.
Security for those who need it.
The ending of special privilege for the few.
The preservation of civil liberties for all.
The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and
constantly rising standard of living.
6 4
He also pointed out the four freedoms he hoped would come
about in the United States and world-wide: freedom of speech and
expression; freedom of worship; freedom from want; and freedom
from fear.6 5
In his January 1944 State of the Union Address, President
Roosevelt looked beyond the end of the World War II effort and
enunciated the substance of the economic bill of rights:
It is our duty now to begin to lay the plans and determine
the strategy for the winning of a lasting peace and the establish-
ment of an American standard of living higher than ever before
known. We cannot be content, no matter how high the general
standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people-
whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth-is ill-fed, ill-
clothed, ill-housed, and insecure.
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present
strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political
rights-among them the right of free speech, free press, free
worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.
As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however-as
our industrial economy expanded-these political rights proved
inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.
64 87 CONG. REc. 46 (1941).
65 Id. at 46-47.
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon four essential freedoms. The first is freedom of
speech and expression everywhere in the world. The second is freedom
of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want, which, translated in world terms,
means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world. The
fourth is freedom from fear-which, translated into world terms, means
a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thor-
ough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of
physical aggression against any neighbor-anywhere in the world.
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We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence. "Necessitous men are not freemen." People
who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictator-
ships are made.6 6
President Roosevelt also proposed a "second Bill of Rights,"
where a new basis of security and prosperity could be established
for all Americans.6" This "second Bill of Rights" included: "[t]he
right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or
farms or mines of the Nation [and] the right to earn enough to
provide adequate food and clothing and recreation.... "6 8
During this period in American history, the federal govern-
ment became the employer of last resort, and millions of people
and their families survived massive unemployment. Economic in-
dependence, secured through the right to a decent job at decent
pay, became more than just a slogan. It became part of the Ameri-
can dream.
B. The Employment Act of 1946
"Our American system owes no man a living but it does owe
every man an opportunity to make a living. That is the proper in-
terpretation of the 'right to work.'"69
While the New Deal reforms made progress combating unem-
ployment, as late as 1939, eight or nine million people remained
66 90 CONG. REc. 57 (1944) (remarks by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union
Address).
67 Id.
68 Id. The complete "second Bill of Rights" proposed by President Roosevelt
includes:
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which
will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every business man, large and small, to trade in an atmos-
phere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopo-
lies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and
enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment; [and]
The right to a good education.
Id.
69 91 CONG. REc. 381 (1945) (remarks of Senator James E. Murray (D-Mont.) in-
troducing the proposed Full Employment Act of 1945).
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jobless.7" World War II solved the vast unemployment problem of
the Depression.
With the nation concerned aboutjoblessness rising again after
World War II, full employment was the campaign cry of both Dem-
ocrats and Republicans alike. During the 1944 National Conven-
tion, Republican presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey strongly
stated:
Government's first job in the peacetime years ahead will be to
see that conditions exist which promote widespread job oppor-
tunities in private enterprise.... If at any time there are not
sufficient jobs in private employment to go around, then Gov-
ernment [can and must create] job opportunities, because there
must be jobs for all in this country of ours .... [I]f there is one
thing we are all agreed upon, it is that in the coming peacetime
years we in this country must have jobs and opportunity for all.
That is everybody's business. Therefore it is the business of
Government.
7 1
By late 1944, a coalition of senators, interest groups, and vari-
ous governmental agencies began drafting a full employment bill.72
The original draft of the bill (the "Murray Bill") 7 1 called for a spe-
cific right to full employment: "the Congress hereby declares that
all Americans able to work and willing to work have the right to a
useful and remunerative job in the industries, or shops, or offices,
or farms, or mines of the nation."74 After extensive discussions
over what constituted full employment, how government economic
analysis should be conducted, what political considerations were
necessary for passage, and the role of Congress, a final draft
emerged, with a little less than a full guarantee of a right to ajob.75
Section 2(b) of the Murray Bill stated:
All Americans able to work and seeking work have the right to
useful, remunerative, regular, and full-time employment, and it
is the policy of the United States to assure the existence at all
times of sufficient employment opportunities to enable all
70 BAILEY, supra note 58, at 8; see Helen Ginsburg, Full Employment as a Policy Issue, in
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS POLICY 15 (Charles Bulmer &John L. Carmichael,
Jr. eds., 1980) (stating that unemployment was out of control after the Depression).
Beginning at 3% in 1929, it soared to 25% in 1933, and averaged 19% from 1931 to
1940. Id.
71 Gov. Dewey's Address in San Francisco Asking for Political Freedom With Security, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1944, at 12-13.
72 BAILEY, supra note 58, at 39-59.
73 Full Employment Act of 1945, S. 380, 79th Cong. § 2(b) (1945).
74 S. 380, 79th Cong. (1945).
75 BAILv, supra note 58, at 45-59.
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Americans who have finished their schooling and do not have
full-time housekeeping responsibilities freely to exercise this
right.
7 6
The Murray Bill called for the President to propose an annual
National Production and Employment Budget which would esti-
mate the number of jobs needed during the coming year, and to
also propose a plan to raise the economy to full-employment
levels.77 While the Murray Bill did not specifically guarantee ajob
to everyone who wanted one, its goal, was to assure that there were
enough jobs for everyone.
78
Support for the Murray Bill came from groups such as the
American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zation, the American Veterans Committee, the Young Women's
Christian Association, the National Council of Jewish Women, the
National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Lawyers
Guild, the Union for Democratic Action, and the National Farmers
Union.
79
76 S. 380, 79th Cong. § 2(b) (1945); see BAILEY, supra note 58, at 243 (discussing
text of bill).
77 See HARvEY, supra note 26, at 107-08 (explaining the Murray Bill as a reflection
of the growing ascendancy of more conservative Keynesian economists over the lib-
eral New Deal strategies contained in the NRPB plan (i.e., "Postwar Keynesianism
promised full employment without the need to tamper with the microeconomic struc-
ture of the economy.")). See HARvEv, supra note 26, at 108.
78 91 CONG. REc. 380-81 (1945). Senator Murray further commented that the bill
recognizes that these Americans:
are entitled to opportunities for "useful, remunerative, regular, and full-
time employment." The right does not mean guaranteeing John Jones
a given job carrying a set salary and a definite social standing. It is not
the aim of this bill to provide specificjobs for specific individuals. How-
ever, I believe nobody will deny that our economic system of free enter-
prise must offer opportunities for jobs for all who are able and want to
work. Our American system owes no man a living but it does owe every
man an opportunity to make a living. That is the proper interpretation
of the "right to work."
Id. at 381.
79 BAILEY, supra note 58, at 86-87. Unfortunately, the support of organized labor
was initially less than totally enthusiastic due to concentration on other issues such as
minimum wage, unemployment compensation, and the continuation of the Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission. BAILEY, supra note 58, at 82, 92-96; see HARvEY, supra
note 26, at 108-09. Furthermore, the rest of these groups had little political ability to
organize the grass roots support the bill needed for passage.
No nation-wide polls were taken on S.380, but an extremely interesting
local poll was taken of the 2d Congressional district in Illinois during
July, 1945, seven months after the bill had been introduced. The ques-
tion was asked, "Have you heard of any bill before Congress that will
plan for enough jobs for everyone after the war?" The response, in per-
cent, was as follows:
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There was also considerable opposition. A coalition of con-
servative Democrats and Republicans, who feared increasing power
in the executive branch already dominated by President Roosevelt,
opposed the bill. They "warned demagogically of a vast state bu-
reaucracy that would compel everyone to work and determine what
jobs they could have."' Some employers feared that a high-em-
ployment economy would "raise labor costs and make it difficult to
find workers for menial jobs, such as seasonal farm work."8 Orga-
nizations including the National Association of Manufacturers,
Chambers of Commerce, and the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion shared these fears. 2 Opponents of the Murray Bill argued,
among other things, that full employment: (1) cannot be guaran-
teed in a free society; (2) would kill private initiative; and (3)
would lead to runaway inflation. 3 Moreover, opponents argued
that government spending undermined business confidence.8 4
Opponents were helped by the postwar economic and political cli-
mate. The anticipated postwar depression had not occurred, and
anti-labor opposition was energized by a wave of postwar strikes.
8 5
By the time the Employment Act of 1946 (the "Employment
Act") was enacted, 6 the short, direct promise of full employment
was gone. In its place was the following:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy
and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practica-
ble means consistent with its needs and obligations and other
essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance
No, have not heard 69
Have heard, but have no idea what it is 19
BAILEY, supra note 58, at 180-81 (footnotes omitted).
The pollsters then asked a follow up question, loosely based on the bill.
What would you think of a bill like this?
First, the President would find out each year how many jobs there
are going to be for the coming year. Then, if there are not enough jobs
for everyone, Congress would give financial help to private business so
that it could provide more jobs. Then, if there were still too few jobs,
the government would give contracts to private business to build public
works to help make up the balance of jobs needed.
BAILEY, supra note 58, at 181 (footnote omitted).
The response was 83% for, 12% against, 5% doubtful. BAILEY, supra note 58, at
181.
80 ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM, NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR 262 (1995).
81 Id.
82 Id. See also BAILEY, supra note 58, at 129-49.
83 BAILEY, supra note 58, at 130-31.
84 BAILEY, supra note 58, at 130.
85 Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 17.
86 Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 304 (1946).
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and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and
local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, func-
tions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintain-
ing, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free
competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions
under which there will be afforded useful employment opportu-
nities, including self-employment for those able, willing, and
seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, pro-
duction, and purchasing power.
8 7
While the Employment Act did create the President's Council
of Economic Advisers,88 it made minimal progress toward the right
to a decent job at a decent day's pay. The Employment Act en-
dorsed maximum rather than "full" employment, and backed off
from the promise of institutionalized planning.89 What survived
was a commitment to the more vague goal of "maximum employ-
ment."9 ° This effort for full employment has been aptly called "the
last great battle for the New Deal."'" A battle that began with lofty
hopes, dilution by its supporters, and ultimate compromise in or-
der to gain passage, suggested "the outlines of the post war liberal
world."92
The Employment Act did not go as far as its supporters hoped,
but was nonetheless a milestone in American economic and polit-
ical history. It was the first explicit national commitment to the
promotion of maximum employment.
93
87 Id. at § 2.
88 Id. at § 4.
89 Id. at § 2.
90 Id. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 17; SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 231. See
also HARvY, supra note 26, at 109-10 (noting the comment of Senator Robert Taft (R-
Ohio), a leader of the opposition to the Murray Bill, that Republicans need not fear
voting for the bill because the bill was no more).
91 BRINKLEY, supra note 80, at 264.
92 BRINKLEY, supra note 80, at 264 (calling the ultimate law an "evisceration" of the
commitment to full employment contained in the first bill). But see Leon H.
Keyserling, The New Deal and Its Current Significance In Re National Economic and Social
Policy, 59 WASH. L. REv. 795, 824-30 (1984). Keyserling, who chaired the Council of
Economic Advisers from 1949-1953, said there were serious efforts to follow the Em-
ployment Act of 1946 and design policies to achieve full employment until a new
Administration appointed a new Council of Economic Advisers whose prime, and al-
most exclusive, focus was switched to fighting inflation. Id. at 795, 824-25, 829-30.
93 The Employment Act of 1946 is generally looked upon as a milestone in the
economic history of the United States. See, e.g., Harvey L. Schantz & Richard H.
Schmidt, Politics and Policy: The Humphrey-Hawkins Story, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR-
RELATIONS POLICY 25, 26 (Charles Bulmer & John L. Carmichael, Jr. eds., 1980).
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C. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
Between 1946 and the mid-1970s, legislation to combat unem-
ployment focused on job training and, to a lesser degree, public
employment programs.94 Interest in full employment was revived
in the 1970s by a broad coalition of civil rights,9 5 women's, reli-
gious, labor, and senior citizens' organizations who sought full em-
ployment to "replace the policy of maintaining unemployment at
politically tolerable levels.... 96 Unemployment, nationally, aver-
aged 4.7% from 1962 to 1973, 5.2% in June 1974, 6.6% in Novem-
ber 1974, and 8.2% in January 1975, while unemployment among
African-American youths reached 41.1% in 1974.97
The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act ("FEBGA") 98
was conceived, at least by some of its drafters, as a sequel to or an
amendment of the Employment Act.99 The bill proposing the Act
(the "Humphrey-Hawkins Bill") was formally introduced in June
94 There were a number ofjob-training and employment service programs on the
federal level. These programs, like the 1962 Manpower Development Training Act
("MDTA"), the 1973 CETA, and the 1982 Job Training Partnership Act ('ITPA"),
unfortunately, evidenced little substantial impact on employment. Rebecca M. Blank,
The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase Work and Earnings, in CONFRONTING
POVERTY 168, 188-91 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994).
The 1962 MDTA was designed to train and educate workers in order to gain
private sector employment. From 1963 to 1968, MDTA reportedly enrolled nearly
700,000 persons in training; of these, about 450,000 people completed the training,
and about 400,000 of those people secured employment within a year of training.
Timothy A. Canova, Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions: A Comparison of
Mandatory Bargaining Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257, 263,
263 n.23 (1990-91).
CETA focused on the economically disadvantaged, the unemployed, and the un-
deremployed. CETA provided job training, education, counseling, and public service
jobs. CETA's impact on unemployment was slight but symbolic. "During its years of
operation, CETA funding averaged between 0.3 and 0.4[%] of the [gross national
product]; at its height, CETA served only about one-sixth of the six million officially
jobless." Id. at 77.
Mere participation in CETA was not necessarily, of itself, a positive accomplish-
ment. CETA participants thought little of the program and its impact on their lives.
Mary K. Marvel, The Social and Political Consequences of Manpower Training Programs: The
Case of CETA, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR-RELATIONS POLICY 41, 56-57 (Charles Bulmer
& John L. Carmichael, Jr. eds., 1980).
95 See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? 163 (1967). Dr. King asked for a "contemporary social and economic
Bill of Rights" that included "full employment." Id. at 199-200.
96 Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 21.
97 Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 26.
98 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat.
1887 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3152).
99 Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Draft-
ing the Wagner Act, 42 U. MiAMi L. REv. 285, 318 (1987). Keyserling is described as the
"ghost writer" for many of the amendments to the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. Id. at 296.
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1974 by Representative Augustus Hawkins (D-Cal.), who described
the goal of full employment not as the number-driven goal of prior
legislation, but as an enforceable right to work at fair pay. Repre-
sentative Hawkins called it "an authentic full employment policy[]
reject[ing] the narrow, statistical idea of full employment mea-
sured in terms of some tolerable level of unemployment-the per-
centage game-and adopt[ing] the more human and socially
meaningful concept of personal rights to an opportunity for useful
employment at fair rates of compensation."1 0
The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was designed "to establish a na-
tional policy and nationwide machinery for guaranteeing to all
adult Americans able and willing to work the availability of equal
opportunities for useful and rewarding employment."10 1 Senator
Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) noted that the goal of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was to reduce "unemployment to [three]
percent of the adult labor force as promptly as possible, but within
no more than [four] years after the date of enactment of this
act."1 0 2 The key provision of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was Sec-
tion 102, which amended section 2(b) of the Employment Act as
follows: "[t]he Congress declares and establishes the right of all
adult Americans able, willing, and seeking work to opportunities
for useful paid employment at fair rates of compensation." 10 3 The
federal government would, once again, become the employer of
last resort.
10 4
Opponents of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill stressed that full
employment, or any reduction of unemployment to minimal levels,
would have an inflationary impact on the economy.'0 5 Republicans
publicly attacked the bill, saying it would cost thirty billion to sixty
100 120 CONG. REc. 21278 (1974). The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was initially called
the Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill. See statement of Rep. Augustus F.
Hawkins describing the goal of the bill. Id. Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.)
sponsored an identical bill in the Senate. 122 CONG. REc. 6610 (1976). The two
versions became known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill.
101 122 CONG. R c. 6610 (1976) (statement of Senator Hubert Humphrey).
102 Id. at 6611.
103 Id. at 6616.
104 Section 104 of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill proposed to mandate "priority poli-
cies programs that comprise a full employment program." Id Section 201 of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill established "employment policies to create jobs in both the
private and public sectors of the economy ...." Id. at 6617. Section 206(d) of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill guaranteed that "[i]nsofar as adult Americans able, willing,
and seeking work are not provided with job opportunities [under other provisions of
this Act], such opportunities shall be provided by the President through reservoirs of
federally operated public employment projects and private nonprofit employment
projects approved by the Secretary of Labor." Id. at 6619.
105 See Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 27-28.
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billion dollars annually. 10 6 Even Carter Administration economic
experts testified that four percent unemployment would most
likely be inflationary. 10 7 After extensive changes by its sponsors to
meet the objections of Humphrey-Hawkins opponents, FEBGA
passed the House on March 16, 1978 and the Senate on October
13, 1978."8 Within five years of enactment, FEBGA aimed to re-
duce the unemployment rate of individuals over twenty years of
age to three percent, and four percent for those sixteen years of
age and older.10 9 Unfortunately, these goals were not binding.
110
Congress declared FEBGA's goal as "the fulfillment of the right to
full opportunities for useful paid employment at fair rates of com-
pensation of all individuals able, willing, and seeking to work."'
111
FEBGA section 4(b) (1) stated that the unemployment rate was to
be reduced to four percent within five years." 2 Section 4(c) (1)
sought full employment and a balanced budget "as soon as practi-
cable."' 1 3 FEBGA also aimed to reduce inflation and increase real
income. 1 4
FEBGA's purpose was "to require the President to initiate, as
the President deems appropriate, with recommendations to the
Congress where necessary, supplementary programs and policies to
the extent that the President finds such action necessary to help
achieve these goals."" 5
Thus, gone was the individual's right to employment, and
gone was the government as employer of last resort. Like its prede-
cessors, FEBGA bolstered lofty goals, but lacked real authority or
systemic change to achieve its goals. 1 6 As two sympathetic com-
mentators noted, "[p] assage of [FEBGA] ... has not resolved, even
106 Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 30.
107 Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 29.
108 The legislative history of Humphrey-Hawkins is summarized in Schantz &
Schmidt, supra note 93, at 27-34.
109 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, § 104, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1022(b)(1) (1994).
110 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 232.
III H.R. 15476, 94th Cong. § 102(b) (1978).
112 Id. at § 4(b)(1).
113 Id. at § 4(c)(1).
114 Id. at § 2(c).
115 Id. at § 201.
116 In fact, almost immediately after FEBGA was passed by Congress, President
James E. Carter announced a new anti-inflationary policy. He called for voluntary
wage and price guidelines, cutbacks in federal hiring, and projected an increase in
unemployment to 6.2%. See Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 36 (argument by
Congressman Hawkins that FEBGA violated the intent of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
and would make it virtually impossible to reach the goals of the five year plan to
reduce unemployment).
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temporarily, differences over the direction of national economic
policies. Although a major piece of goal-setting legislation has
been placed on the statute books, the essential economic debate
continues.""'
FEBGA was the most recent legislative attempt to address the
right to employment at decent wages. 1 8 While its ultimate result
was disappointing, its passage represents another step forward in
the search for an enforceable right to work at a living wage.' 19
The search during this century for the right to work, for a liv-
ing wage, and for full employment, is recognized as a vital part of
the American political dynamic. The search will continue to
clamor for action as long as Americans value work and
opoortunity.
Choosing to work for national employment assurance ap-
pears likely to remain a potentially popular political choice,
although it remains to be seen if any political leadership will
soon be forthcoming to devise both the policies and the suitably
universalistic political alliances needed to work for this goal.
Nevertheless, even if little happens soon, the goal of full employ-
ment assurance itself-so clearly articulated in 1935 by members
of the [Committee on Economic Security]-seems unlikely to
fade away. For employment assurance accords with longstand-
ing American values, and it would address the distresses of many
groups and regions in our presently unsettled national econ-
omy. Sooner or later, therefore, a politics of employment assur-
ance-rather than one of welfare-will surely reappear on the
American political scene.120
IV. SUPPORT FOR A RIGHT To WORK
Unless public policy ensures work for all, it is a cruel hoax to
rely on the "discipline of the market" to inculcate the citizenly vir-
tues of self-reliance and responsibility. 2 Work can provide mean-
ing and dignity to life.1 22 Some say "the history of the world is the
117 Schantz & Schmidt, supra note 93, at 36.
118 Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 21 (FEBGA "makes full employment a national pol-
icy and establishes the right of all Americans able willing and seeking to work oppor-
tunities for useful employment at fair wages.").
119 Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 21 (noting that for the first time, a process was estab-
lished for formulating national economic policy openly and in a comprehensive, co-
ordinated, and consistent manner).
120 SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 249.
121 Forbath, supra note 12, at 1789.
122 Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 6, at 451 n.4.
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history of work."' 23 The opportunity to work is precious and once
lost, even for a day, it can never be reclaimed. 121 Work is essential
to a person's self-definition. The community also defines a per-
son's value by their employment or lack of employment.
125
Currently, there is only the right to look for work, and to en-
gage in enormously unequal bargaining over the terms of work. 1 6
Refusal to work because ajob is too dangerous or too low-paying is
considered un-American and even immoral. 127 Economicjustice is
123 David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. Riv. 119, 119-20 (1988).
The history of the world is the history of work. It is a history first elo-
quently told in the Torah, as the Jews moved from the toil of slavery in
Egypt to the dignity of meaningful work as free people in a free land. In
the New TestamentJesus continued to dignify work. Unfortunately, for
much of humanity the world of work historically has been debased and
denied in alienation. This is the tragedy of labor; tragic because aliena-
tion is unfair, undeserved, and remarkably intractable.
Id.
124 Otto Nathan, Favorable Economic Implications of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 5 LAW
& CONrEMP. PROBS. 416, 417 (1939) ("Human labor is the most perishable commodity
that exists; if it cannot be sold instantly, it will be lost forever.").
125 PETER KELVIN AND JOANNA E. JARREr, UNEMPLOYMENT: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL EFFECTS 1 (1985). The authors point out that unemployment, among other dele-
terious effects, tends to ostracize those without work who feel stigmatized and who in
turn withdraw from social activities. Id. at 53.
Unemployment brings a loosening and disintegration of a number of
previously crucial fixed points in the individual's social environment.
The most obvious of these are the loss of an active occupational role,
and the fading of many job-related friendships; less tangibly, but none
the less disturbingly, there is a general sense of loss of status; and be-
yond this, the individual may come to doubt whether he can still truly
claim to belong to work-related organi[z]ations such as a particular
trade union or professional association, which may once have been an
important reference group.
Id. at 55. See also KATHRYN MARIE DUDLEY, THE END OF THE LINE: LOST JOBS, NEW
LrEs IN POSTINDUSTRiAL AMERICA (1994) (describing the impact on the individual
and community of the 1988 closing of the Chrysler plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin
which cost the area 6,000 jobs).
126 Howard Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor Law,
32 BUFF. L. REv. 833, 845 (1983); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1911) (the
Supreme Court stated that "in all respects employer and employee have equality of
right" in that they are both free to enter or not enter into an employment contract).
The Supreme Court would distinguish the coercion inherent in such an unequal rela-
tionship as public or private. "This approach makes critical a distinction between
private and public power: public pressure on choice is coercion, private pressure is
freedom." Lesnick, supra, at 845.
127 Lesnick, supra note 126, at 850 ("The moral obligation to be employable implies
that one unable to get the job he or she wants will take any job he or she can get.
That is to say, one's willingness to take a job that is available is itself a moral test.").
The prevailing consciousness rests on a world-view that denies that
work can be made to be life-affirming. The "Curse of Adam" is a meta-
phorical expression of this notion. It was not by being set to work that
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built on opportunity, and the opportunity for every person to work
must be included. 28 A right to an opportunity to work for a living
wage would economically and socially enfranchise all citizens., 29
A. Popular Opinion
Popular opinion has continuously supported the right of every
person to work, even if government has to provide a job for every
person who wants to work. In 1935, Fortune magazine surveyed the
American people and asked the following question: "Do you believe
that the government should see to it that every man who wants to work has
ajob?""'3  The survey reported 76.8% answered "yes." '  The survey
concluded that "public opinion overwhelmingly favors assumption
by the government of a function that was never seriously contem-
plated prior to the New Deal .... [T]he country has definitely ac-
cepted the theory of state responsibility for an opportunity to earn
a living. '
Several surveys indicated that public support for the proposi-
tion that "[t]he government in Washington ought to see to it that
everybody who wants to work can find a job," grew from fifty- six
Adam was cursed: "Cursed be the ground," Genesis says, "for your sake;
in sorrow you shall eat of it; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth all
your life." In other words, humankind will be cursed by scarcity and low
productivity. Work will be just barely able to sustain life. That is the way
it is, that is the way it is supposed to be; the only issue is how we deal
with that reality.
Lesnick, supra note 126, at 851 (footnotes omitted).
128 Keyserling, supra note 92, at 806.
The enlargement of economic justice has always been and still is one of
the great purposes of the American society. Perfectjustice is unattaina-
ble, and cannot even be defined. But rank injustice is easy to define
and easy to observe, and it is all around us. Failing to give sufficient
attention to economic justice is not only a social and moral error, it is
an economic error as well. There is no way to avoid massive, idleness of
workers and other production resources so long as scores of millions of
Americans are not brought up to much higher standards of living.
Keyserling, supra note 92, at 806. See Gregory, supra note 123, at 119.
129 See, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 126, at 856.
Seeing the utility of work as not wholly external to the worker, and its
meaning as more than a means toward self-sufficiency, would tend to
legitimate the issue of work restructuring-the desire to make the work-
place consonant with the values of a democratic social order and a fully
enfranchised citizenry, and to make work consonant with the values of
the individual worker.
Lesnick, supra note 126, at 856.
130 FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 67.
131 FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 67.
132 FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 67.
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percent in 1956 to seventy percent in 1976.133 Later, the polls indi-
cated overwhelming public support for a guarantee of work at a
living wage. 1
34
In November 1987, a New York Times/CNN poll found sev-
enty-one percent of the American public supported the proposi-
tion that "the Federal Government should see to it 'that everyone
who wants ajob has ajob.'" 3 5 Public support for the opportunity
to work is not surprising; Americans are committed to the ideals of
work and opportunity.
136
B. Problems Finding Work
Unemployment is bad for those thrown out of work, who
lose income and the nonpecuniary benefits of work. It is bad
for society in general, because of the loss in production. It saps
people's confidence in the economic system when, as often hap-
pens during a depression, idling plants and unemployed work-
ers coexist. 
1 3 7
Encouragement and support of work are currently being un-
dercut by two forces: lack of opportunity to work due to unemploy-
ment or underemployment, and declining wages for those who do
work. This section will focus only on unemployment.
There are millions of people who are unemployed, many ap-
133 Robert Y. Shapiro et al., Report: Employment and Social Welfare, 51 PUB. OPINION Q.
268, 274 (1987) (supporting the proposition that the government should find em-
ployment for those who could not gradually rose from 1956 to 1976: 56% in 1956;
57% in 1958; 58% in 1960; 70% in 1976).
134 In June 1968, the pollsters asked: "As you may know, there is talk about giving every
family an income of at least $3,200 a year, which would be the amount for a family of four. If
the family earns less than this, the government would make up the difference. Would you favor
or oppose such a plan?" 3 DR. GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION,
1935-1971, at 2133. This was rejected by 58% and accepted by 36% in June 1968. Id.
at 2133. In January 1969, 62% said no and 33% said yes. Id. at 2177. The second
question was: "Another proposal is to guarantee enough work so that each family that has an
employable wage earner would be guaranteed enough work each week to give him a wage of about
$60 a week or $3,200 a year. Would you favor or oppose such a plan?" Id. at 2133. This was
supported by a ratio of 78% to 18% inJune 1968, and by 79% to 16% inJanuary 1969.
Id. at 2133, 2177.
135 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Poll Finds Reagan Support Down But Democrats Still Lacking Fire,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1987, at Al.
136 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 92-93
(1991) ("Both the dignity of work and the public obligation to work are almost uni-
versally preached. Seventy-five percent of the American public think that there is
something wrong with not wanting to work. A good citizen is an earner, because
independence is the indelibly necessary quality of genuine, democratic citizenship.").
137 Jon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
WELFARE STATE 53 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
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parently permanently.1 3 8 For example, since the mid-1970s, over
ten percent of African-American adults have been unemployed,
about twice the rate of whites. 1 9 In the mid-1990s, the overall un-
employment rate leveled off at 5.6%.14 °
Unemployment has been a consistent problem in the United
States. This nation has achieved an annual unemployment rate of
two percent or less in only seven years of the past hundred. 4 ' In
contrast, Sweden's median unemployment rate between 1959 to
1986 was close to two percent, West Germany's median unemploy-
ment rate was 1.5%, and Japan's median unemployment rate was
1.6%.142 Despite this data, conventional wisdom continues to cling
to the notion that there is plenty of work, if only the unemployed
would get out and hustle to find it.'43 However, the facts are:
Lack ofjobs has been endemic in peacetime during the past fifty
years of American history .... [W] e need to face the fact that
our economy and our institutions will not provide jobs for every-
one who wants to work. They have never done so, and as cur-
rently structured, they never will. When it comes to
unemployment, we are consistently the industrial economy with
the worst record.
14 4
The widespread negative impact of unemployment on society
exceeds the damage done to the unemployed individuals. For ex-
138 Gregory, supra note 123, at 124 ("When the underemployed and those not statis-
tically recognized are added, such as the disheartened who have abandoned the
search for work, and the homeless, perhaps one-eighth of the work force is directly
affected adversely by unemployment.").
139 Blank, supra note 94, at 170.
140 Stuart Silverstein, Huge Layoffs May Now Be in Decline, but Worries Linger, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at Al.
141 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 14.
142 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 13, tbl. 1.1.
143 KATz, supra note 36, at 6 ("The availability of work for every able[-] bodied per-
son who really wants ajob is one of the enduring myths of American history.").
144 LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 203 (1980).
Controlling inflation without idle capacity is essential since we now start
from a position where there simply aren't enough jobs, good or bad, to
go around. The problem is not just peculiar to this period of stagfla-
tion.... Review the evidence: a depression from 1929 to 1940, a war
from 1941 to 1945, a recession in 1949, a war from 1950 to 1953, reces-
sions in 1954, 1957-58, and 1960-61, a war from 1965 to 1973, a reces-
sion in 1969-70, a severe recession in 1974-75, and another recession
probable in 1980. This is hardly an enviable economic performance.
While monetary and fiscal policies could be used to stimulate the econ-
omy to the degree that it would provide good jobs for everyone able and
willing to work, macroeconomic policies will not be used for this
purpose.
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ample, joblessness creates costs to implement unemployment pro-
grams; goods and services are lost, which could have been
produced by the non-working; and the unemployed individual and
family suffer a social cost.145 Twenty years ago, it was estimated that
every one percent rise in the jobless rate led to a sixteen billion
dollar increase in the federal deficit.
146
Some suggest the economy could respond to globalization and
growth in information technology by an increase in the number of
people permanently without access to jobs. 147 Since this nation val-
ues work and opportunity, it is again time to consider creating a
legally enforceable right to the opportunity to work. Valuing work
and even demanding work is not enough. The opportunity to
work must be provided. Otherwise, the commitments to work and
opportunity ring hollow.
We consistently preach that work is the only "ethical" way to re-
ceive income. We cast aspersions on the "welfare" society.
Therefore we have a moral responsibility to guarantee full em-
ployment. Not to do so is like locking the church doors and
then saying people are not virtuous if they do not go to
church.
14 8
V. SUPPORT FOR A RIGHT TO A LIVING WAGE
"Our Nation so richly endowed with natural resources and
with a capable and industrious population ,] should be able to de-
vise ways and means of insuring [sic] to all our able-bodied work-
ing men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's work."' 49
A full-time worker should not be left in poverty. A living wage
should ensure that work pays off, otherwise some of the incentive
to work is lost.150 Yet, the term "working poor" exists.' 5 1 Over six
145 HAvEY, supra note 26, at 51-53 (suggesting the costs for the income mainte-
nance programs for the unemployed are $1,000 per household per year; another
$1,600 per household annually in lost production; and an incalculable amount for
the suffering resulting from lack of work).
146 Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 20 (citing ALBERT H. CANTRIL & SUSAN DAVIs CAN-
TRIL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
20 (1978)).
147 HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTI-
POVERTY POLICY 133 (1995).
148 THUROW, supra note 144, at 203-04.
149 81 CONG. REc. 4960 (1937) (statement by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
in his message asking for the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
150 Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
245, 251-56 (1995). There is substantial evidence that adequately paying jobs would
decrease reliance on public assistance. Rather than the current proposals to "push"
people on public assistance into low wage jobs (where most are already working and
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and one-half million workers in the labor force lived in families
whose income fell below the poverty level. 52 For about 3.4 million
full-time wage and salary workers, the earnings were not enough to
bring their families' incomes above the poverty level.
15 3
The average employee's hourly earnings declined over the
past twenty years. Such a decline had not occurred in America
since the Depression.154 Also, less-skilled male workers exper-
ienced the sharpest decline in inflation-adjusted wages in the last
twenty years. 155 In the 1990's, young men with high school degrees
or less can expect to earn less than their fathers earned twenty
years ago. 156 While women without high school degrees have not
seen the same decline, they earn fifty-eight percent of the salaries
of their counterparts. 57
The present minimum wage structure clearly does not provide
a living wage. 158 By 1989, the value of the minimum wage had
eroded significantly, falling over thirty percent from a 1979 real
value (in 1992 dollars) of $5.50.151 Contrary to conventional wis-
dom, minimum wage jobs are held neither exclusively nor over-
not making it thus also living, in many cases illegally, on public assistance as well),
living wages would "pull" recipients into the labor market. Id. at 254.
151 The working poor are defined as "persons who devoted more than half of the year to
working or looking for work and who lived in families with incomes below the official poverty
level." Bruce W. Klein & Philip L. Rones, A Profile of the Working Poor, 112 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 3, 6 Ex.1 (Oct. 1989) quoted in Jennifer M. Gardner & Diane E. Herz, Work-
ing and Poor in 1990, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 20 (Dec. 1992). They identified three
major labor market problems that help create the numbers of working poor: unem-
ployment, involuntary part-time work, and low earnings. Id. at 3-5.
152 Jennifer M. Gardner & Diane E. Herz, Working and Poor in 1990, 115 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 20, 20 (Dec. 1992).
153 Id. at 23.
154 Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions For the Law of the Workplace, 102 YALE
L.J. 1907, 1909 (1993).
155 Blank, supra note 94, at 172-73. ("There is widespread agreement within the
research community that inflation-adjusted wages have fallen among less-skilled male
workers. Employed white men between the ages of eighteen and sixty five who had
less than twelve years of education earned 15.8[%] less per week in 1989 than in
1979.").
156 Blank, supra note 94, at 172-73.
This wage decline is not the result of the shift of low-skill jobs from the
manufacturing sector to the service sector. Real wages have declined
for both manufacturing jobs and service sector jobs, so that even less-
skilled workers who find jobs in manufacturing industries in the 1990s
face reduced wage opportunities.
Blank, supra note 94, at 173.
157 Blank, supra note 94, at 173.
158 See William P. Quigley, "A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work": Time to Raise and
Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 513 (1996).
159 Jared Bernstein & Lawrence Mishel, The Growth of the Low-Wage Labor Market:
Who, What and Why, 3 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 12, 23 (1994).
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whelmingly by teenagers. In fact, over seventy percent of
minimum wage workers are adults, many the sole wage earners of
their families. 16' For example, millions of workers are still exempt
from minimum wage protection under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"). Of those people, it is estimated that more than one
million earned less than the minimum wage in the last decade. 161
Despite this, some still argue that minimum wage levels affect the
poverty status of relatively few workers, and even fewer families.'6 2
The history of the FLSA supports the position that the ideal of
the minimum wage was to be a living wage.1 6' The Conference
Committee Report indicated minimum wage protections were
needed because of "labor conditions detrimental to the mainte-
nance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health, ef-
ficiency and general well-being .... ,,164 Contemporary
commentators recognized FLSA's aim to protect the living condi-
tions of the lowest-wage workers.1
65
160 See 1 REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION 8-12 (May 1981) (profil-
ing minimum wage workers in the 1980s). The report found them to be in all seg-
ments of the population, but disproportionately concentrated among those groups
who are traditionally poor: 18% of all working women earned minimum wages or less
versus 8% of all working men; 44% of those 16 to 19 earned minimum wages or less as
did 38% of those over 65; while whites accounted for over three-quarters of those who
earn minimum wages, 18% of all Black workers earned minimum wages or less while
11% of white workers did; surprisingly, 70% of all minimum wage workers were adults
20 or older and over 50% were 25 or older. Id.
161 See Earl F. Mellor & Steven E. Haugen, Hourly Paid Workers: Who They Are and
What They Earn, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 20, 23 (Feb. 1986) (stating that in 1984, 1.8
million people estimated to be employed in industries such as outside sales work, low-
volume retail trade and service firms, and seasonal amusement establishments earned
less than the minimum wage).
162 See, e.g., Gardner & Herz, supra note 152, at 20; LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW
POLITICS OF POVERrY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA 70 (1992) (acknowledging
that 45% of minimum wage workers without other workers in the family were poor,
making the "rhetoric of minimum wage" an increasingly irrelevant problem since only
710,000 people fit that category). See also Ralph E. Smith & Bruce Vavrichek, The
Minimum Wage: Its Relation To Incomes and Poverty, 110 MONTHLY LAB. Rv. 27, 27-29
(June 1987) (arguing that about five million workers were paid at or below the mini-
mum wage in 1985 and concluding that after teenagers, two-earner families, part-time
workers, and the self-employed are deducted from the working poor that only 1.1
million of minimum wage workers were poor); Timothy J. Eifler, Comment, The
Earned Income Tax Credit as a Tax Expenditure: An Alternative to Traditional Welfare Re-
form, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 701, 737 (1994) (arguing that over 98% of workers who
would benefit from minimum wage increases would not be poor, leaving "only 1.8%
of full-time, year-round workers in occupations covered by the minimum wage [who]
were poor").
163 Quigley, supra note 158, at 529.
164 H.R. REP. No. 2738, at 28 (1938).
165 See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 124, at 416.
The most favorable implication of the Fair Labor Standards Act is
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There is disagreement concerning whether or not government
should intervene to sustain adequate pay levels for low-wage work-
ers. Some suggest that minimum wages reduce overall employ-
ment, 166 particularly for less-skilled workers, 167 and drive jobs away
to other countries.
168
The value of the minimum wage continues to erode. The
Congressional Research Service estimated that the minimum wage
would had to have risen to $6.75 an hour in 1996 to equal the
purchasing power it had in 1978.169 When compared with years
past, the minimum wage is relatively lOW.1 70 When adjusted for in-
flation it is even lower - lower than in the 1950s, 1960s, or
1970s. 171 In order to set the minimum wage at the poverty thresh-
old for a family of three, the minimum hourly wage needed to be
raised to $5.92 for 1994.172 Indexing it to a family of four would
demand a minimum hourly wage of $7.12.1 7' To become a living
wage, the minimum wage should be elevated to 1960-1970 levels, at
least to coincide with the poverty threshold for a family of three,
the federal statutory recognition of the fact that the living conditions of
those in the lowest income group should not be determined solely by
the anonymous forces of the market mechanism. The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act is a denial of the thesis that a competitive market without any
regulatory interference will result in the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. It postulates the necessity of considering human la-
bor no longer as a "commodity" which is subject only to the iron laws of
the market mechanism.
Nathan, supra note 124, at 416.
166 Leffler, supra note 8, at 345 n.2 ("The real tragedy of minimum wage laws is that
they are supported by well-meaning groups who want to reduce poverty. But the peo-
ple who are hurt most by higher minimums are the most poverty stricken.").
167 Minimum wage laws tend to cut off the bottom rungs of the economic
ladder. The plain truth is there should be no minimum wage law, pe-
riod, in this great land of free enterprise. Minimum wage laws keep
people in poverty.., by keeping workers from ever getting that foot on
the bottom rung of the economic ladder.
Lefler, supra note 8, at 345 n.2. 135 CONG. REc. S5475 (daily ed. May 17, 1989) (state-
ment of Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) opposing the FLSA amendments).
168 See Daryl Marc Shapiro, Comment, Will an Increased Minimum Wage Help the
Homeless?, 45 U. MIAMi L. REv. 651, 698 (1991).
169 139 CONG. REc. S2779 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement of Senator Paul Well-
stone (D-Minn.)).
170 Blank, supra note 94, at 194.
171 Blank, supra note 94, at 194. See Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 162, at 26; Sha-
piro, supra note 133, at 659 (graph 3).
172 See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,614-27 (1994) (calculating the poverty threshold for a family
of three in 1994 as $12,320). A minimum wage of $5.92 per hour was computed by
dividing the poverty threshold for a family of three by forty hours per week, fifty-two
weeks per year.
173 In 1994, the poverty threshold for a family of four was $14,800. Id.
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and indexed to prevent erosion from inflation.'7 4 The politics of
indexing minimum wages in order to allow them to keep up with
inflation are what most observers would expect: unions favor in-
dexing and business opposes it. Congressional action fluctuates
accordingly.
7 5
While progress on a living wage has been slow, the need re-
mains critical. "The fact that 1.7 million prime-aged workers
worked full-time, year-round in 1992, yet remained poor, begins to
suggest the serious nature of the problem."176 It is time to recog-
nize the need for a living wage. It is also time to respond to the
opponents of a living wage.
VI. WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?
A constitutional amendment is the most binding and direct
way to ensure that all people have a right to work and earn a living
wage. While it may be argued that the Constitution already con-
tains support for the right to work and to earn a living wage, no
court has yet said so. Scholars have argued, albeit unsuccessfully,
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should
establish a liberty interest in the right to work for a living wage.
1 7 7
174 WALLACE E. HENDRICKS & ]LAWRENCE M. KAHN, WAGE INDEXATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: COLA OR UNCOIA 15, 28, 65 (1985). Since World War I, federal agencies
including the National War Labor Board and the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment
Board, and state minimum wage boards have relied on cost-of-living as one criterion
for wage adjustments. Id. Indexing has also been used in many union contracts since
1910. Id. Since 1919, the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics has been publishing its cost-of-living index. The most commonly used inflation
index, the cost-of-living allowance ("COLA"), triggers raises in union contracts, Social
Security payments, and home mortgages in response to increases in the consumer
price index ("CPI"). Id. See Edi Karni, On Optimal Wage Indexation, 91J. OF POL. ECON.
282 (Feb.-Dec. 1983).
175 123 CONG. REc. 32,696 (1977) (indicating that Congress ordered indexing and
its effects on the minimum wage analyzed as part of the 1977 amendments to the
FLSA). See also REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 160, ch.
4 (containing the commission's findings and conclusions about indexing). Despite
these findings and recommendations, indexing of minimum wages has not yet come
into existence.
176 Bernstein & Mishel, supra note 159, at 13.
177 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90
HARv. L. Rv. 1065, 1065-66 (1977) ("I am convinced that, despite its difficulties, a
doctrine will ultimately emerge that recognizes under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments constitutional rights to decent levels of affirmative governmental protec-
tion in meeting the basic human needs of physical survival and security, health and
housing, employment[,] and education.").
The fact that there is a need for a constitutional amendment to create a right to
work and a right to work for a living wage would come as no surprise to Leo Charland
of Muskegon Heights, Michigan. Charland worked for Norge in its Muskegon
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Some have looked, with no success, for a constitutional right to a
subsistence or minimum income.' 78 Still others have looked, also
unsuccessfully, for economic rights, like the right to a job, under
the heading of fundamental values.
179
Thus, a constitutional amendment is in order.18 0 Article V of
Heights plant for 30 years. In 1961, when he was 55, Norge decided to move out of
Michigan to Fort Smith, Arkansas. Charland'sjob was gone and all he received was an
offer of $1,500 in termination pay. Norge's contract with the plant's union did not
give the employees any rights to their jobs when the company moved to Arkansas.
Charland could apply for ajob as a new employee in Arkansas, but Norge had already
indicated a preference for hiring local employees. Charland sued both Norge and his
union asserting he had a property right to his job under the U.S. Constitution. Char-
land fought hard and even became ill while his case went through the courts. His wife
was allowed to argue on his behalf in the district court and the court of appeals.
While the appellate court sympathized with his predicament and his arguments, they
concluded that "[w]hatever the future may bring, neither by statute nor by court deci-
sion has appellant's claimed property right been recognized to date in this country."
Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 927.
178 See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989) (indicating that chronic unemployment and poverty is tanta-
mount to a denial of equal citizenship); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 573 (1978); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969);
Charles Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103 (1986) (discussing the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the
Constitution and the Ninth Amendment); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our
Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987) (discussing sub-
stantive due process and equal protection); and Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1977). But see RALPH K. WINTER, JR., SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1972).
179 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 58-59 (1980).
Experience suggests that in fact there will be a systematic bias in judicial
choice of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of
the upper-middle, professional class from which most lawyers and
judges, and for that matter most moral philosophers, are drawn. People
understandably think what is important to them is what is important,
and people like us are no exception. Thus the list of values the court
and the commentators have tended to enshrine as fundamental is a list
with which readers of this book will have little trouble identifying: ex-
pression, association, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the
home, personal autonomy, even the right not be locked in a stereotypi-
cally female sex role and supported by one's husband. But watch most
fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when some-
one mentions jobs, food, or housing: these are important, sure, but they
aren't fundamental
Id. (footnotes omitted).
180 Questions about the process of amending the Constitution under Article V are
the subject of many inquiries and are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988); David Dow, Wen Words
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the United States Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-
eral States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress .... 181
Amending the Constitution is an arduous, time-consuming,
and politically challenging task.'8 2 Waiting for the Supreme Court
to recognize a constitutional right to work will be fruitless. While
there is international support for these basic human rights, 8 3 pro-
gress in the United States Supreme Court in the near future ap-
pears unlikely."8 4
Absent a constitutional amendment providing a right to em-
ployment at a living wage, what can we realistically expect? Most
people thinking about reversing trends in unemployment, under-
Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IoWA L. REV. 1 (1990); and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V. The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993).
181 U.S. CONST. art. V.
182 See generally Dow, supra note 180, at 41 (discussing the effort in the 1960s to
overturn the one-man one-vote decisions of the Supreme Court and that after Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), thirty-two
states, only two fewer than necessary under Article V, petitioned Congress to call a
convention for the purpose of overruling the decisions); Judith L. Elder, Article V,
Justiciability, and the Equal Rights Amendment, 31 OKLA. L. RE-v. 63 (1978); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Observations: Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57
TEX. L. REv. 919 (1979).
183 See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, ON HUMAN WORK (1981).
184 Historically, constitutional and human rights have focused on civil and political
rights, and not on economic and social rights, which have been the focus of socialist
and developing countries.
What is at stake here is the different perceptions of human rights that
seem to prevail in the North and the South. Westerners tend to afford
special prominence to civil and political rights-at the expense of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights and of the right to development. Civil
and political rights are the ones that were initially identified by Western
political philosophers. They were the rights that were known when the
United States was established and which found their way into the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights. Economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other
hand, traditionally received special emphasis in socialist countries
and-to add to Western skepticism-are often referred to as "red
rights."
Johan D. van der Vyver, Kathleen E. Mahoney's & Paul Mahoney's Human Rights in the
Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 787 (1993) (book
review).
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employment, and employment at declining wages, propose several
strategies: improve education for children so present trends can be
reversed; eliminate social programs for those who do not work; in-
crease minimum wages and/or income support for those who
work; train unemployed adults; offer incentives for private employ-
ers to hire the unemployed; enhance enforcement of civil rights
laws in the area of housing and hiring; and increase public employ-
ment." 5 While these strategies have some merit, they are all, to
some extent, already in place and, unfortunately, they have failed
to make significant progress in combating the lack of work at de-
cent wages.
What then is the prospect for a full-employment economy if
these efforts have already been tried with only modest success?
With a constitutional right to work at a living wage, the nation
would have to seriously re-examine these past efforts. The nation
would also be forced to evaluate whether some of these efforts
need to be terminated, intensified, expanded, or blended in order
to meet the shared national goal. Thus, if the right to work and to
earn a living wage is worth the struggle, now is the time to start the
process of amending the Constitution. There is no option but to
give the right to an opportunity to work for a living wage constitu-
tional protection.
VII. How WOULD/COULD A CONSTrrUTIONAL
AMENDMENT WORK?
How would a constitutional right to a job at a living wage be
implemented? Would it demand that Congress create new corpo-
rations? Would judges mandamus the national economy? Would
the President nationalize industries that lay off workers?
Fortunately, others have given consideration to similar rights.
Professor Charles Black makes some observations about these is-
sues in the context of his argument for a constitutional justice of
livelihood:
I rather guess that my self-chosen task, for the rest of my years as
a constitutionalist, is going to be arguing, in all weathers, the
case for the proposition that a constitutional justice of liveli-
hood should be recognized, and should be felt by the President
and Congress as laying upon them serious constitutional duty.
In the early phases of this work, I find I am most often asked the
question, "How much?" or "Where will you draw the line?" I
185 See Blank, supra note 94, at 200-04; GANS, supra note 147, at 135-47; WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 157 (1987).
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think it well to try to suggest, at the beginning, that the establish-
ment of a duty is one thing, while the specification of prudent
quantities and means is another-though it must be
remembered as well that the decently eligible range of means
and measures is one thing when you are under no duty at all to
act, and quite another when you are under a serious duty to act
effectively. 186
The first step to a constitutional amendment is the establish-
ment of the right itself. How would such a right be protected or
implemented? The implementation of a right to work at a living
wage would operate the same as with all other constitutional obli-
gations: with considerable care, deference, and judgment." 7
As with all other constitutional obligations, where the initial
steps are the responsibility of the legislative bodies, Congress is ex-
pected to craft appropriate implementation laws.1 8 The executive
branch, in turn, would be called upon to carry out these laws. The
judiciary would fulfill its traditional role of evaluating the legisla-
186 See Black, supra note 178, at 1113.
187 See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. Ri-v. 1
(1988) [hereinafter Karst, Citizenship] (addressing how all branches of the govern-
ment might address a judicially-developed right to equal citizenship for the poor).
I do not claim that courts can abolish poverty by judicial decree, and I
am not nominating King Canute for the Supreme Court. Beyond any
judicial declaration will lie the crucial questions of remedy. Just as the
remedies for segregated schools originated with desegregation plans
filed by school boards, remedies that address the harms of ghetto unem-
ployment and welfare dependency should find their initial definition in
the proposals of elected officials.
Id. at 43.
The author recognizes the difficulty of these questions, but acknowledges that it is the
burden and genius of government to address these and similar questions:
There is challenge in questions like these, but the challenge is no
greater than those presented by other constitutional issues that have a
more familiar ring. What kinds of police behavior amount to unreason-
able searches and seizures? How much government regulation of the
use of property is allowable before the regulation amounts to a "tak-
ing"? Constitutional questions normally turn on matters of degree; the
challenge in all these questions is the challenge of judgment. No one
thinks the courts alone are capable of solving the problem of marginal-
izing poverty. Yet they do have a role in keeping pressure on govern-
ment to fulfill the responsibility we all share for affording every citizen
the resources necessary to be a participating member of our society.
Id. at 45.
188 Id. at 43 (arguing for a constitutional understanding of citizenship that would
address various aspects of poverty and speaking to the question ofjudicial remedy in a
manner that would also likely apply to a constitutional amendment such as the one
advocated here: "Any such remedies will be partial.... So, no one should expect
miracles from the judges who seek to protect equal citizenship against the worst
ravages of material want. Modest beginnings hold the most promise.").
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tion in purpose and practice, and ensuring its constitutionality. 189
While judicial interpretation and enforcement of a constitutional
right to work for a living wage would be unprecedented in their
particulars, the process engaged in by the judiciary would remain
the same as for other constitutional rights. Legal scholars point
out that enforcing social rights requires the same degree ofjudicial
action as enforcing civil rights.' 90
There are many practical questions about implementing legis-
189 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REiv.
1281 (1976) (arguing that in an increasingly regulated society, the involvement of the
court in public law litigation is both workable and inevitable). The role of the court is
not so unusual, in fact there is quite a bit of precedent for this type of involvement.
"In enacting fundamental social and economic legislation, Congress is often unwilling
or unable to do more than express a kind of general policy objective or orientation.
Whether this be legislative abdication or not, the result is to leave a wide measure of
discretion to the judicial delegate." Id. at 1314.
190 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1207, 1210 (1992) (noting that many of the
problems of interpreting and enforcing economic or social rights are the same as
those involved in interpreting and enforcing the civil rights of the reconstruction
era).
It has been contended that social rights are different. They often seem
to require social provision; governments cannot simply stand aside, but
must take positive steps to assure that rights to shelter, food[,] and work
are honored. Yet, although courts are well positioned to protect civil
rights, they are ill-suited to enforce social rights; courts cannot devise
effective methods of ensuring that shelter, food[,] or jobs are available
to citizens.
Id. at 1211 (citation omitted).
I believe the foregoing claims are wrong. First, civil rights are not in
fact absolute in any interesting sense; that social rights cannot be abso-
lute, therefore, does not distinguish them from civil rights. Second, en-
forcing both civil and social rights requires the same degree of judicial
action, whether the action be a lot or a little.
Id. at 1211-12 (citation omitted).
Finally, consider the objection that "government in the large" may
perhaps determine the distribution of food, jobs[,] and housing by
structuring markets, but courts should not. Courts may be appropriate
institutions to define civil rights, but they are inappropriate institutions
to define social rights. Yet the distinction between civil and social rights
is thinner than its proponents claim. Civil rights include the right to
own property, to act freely subject to ordinary liability rules[,] and to
enter into contracts. The manner in which those rights are defined de-
termines how the interests protected by social rights are distributed.
For example, if a society defines the right to dispose of property to
include a factory owner's power to shut down the plant whenever he or
she wants, jobs may be more at risk than if the property right is defined
so as to permit a shutdown only if certain conditions are met. There is
nothing in the nature of the concept of property, or other civil rights,
that forecloses the second definition of property. Yet, of course, the two
definitions have quite different implications for the protection that soci-
ety accords work. If we want to assure a certain distribution of jobs,
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lation, but there are also innumerable combinations of ways to
bring this about. 9 ' The government would likely, again, become
the employer of last resort. However, if other creative ways of en-
suring an opportunity to work for a living wage arose, Congress
would no doubt attempt to implement them. The United States
has not yet perfected any other well-established constitutional
rights, therefore full realization of this right will undoubtedly take
time.
As least one economist says it can be done by creating "a so-
cialized sector of the economy designed to give work opportunities
to everyone who wants them but cannot find them elsewhere." '192
Such a major restructuring would fundamentally alter the role of
labor and economy. Under this view, "real economic competition
would almost certainly increase."'193 The essential characteristics of
a viable guarantee of employment include: decent, non-minimal
wages; opportunity for promotion; availability of employment to
those able and willing to work despite age, race, gender or educa-
tion. While some of the jobs may be temporary, the guarantee of
employment is permanent. 194
A New Deal-like Employment Assurance Policy ("EAP") for
making a right to employment workable has been espoused by
some.1 95 The EAP would distinguish between those who are un-
able or not expected to work, and those who need public assistance
because they have no work. The unemployed would be recipients
of income assistance programs.196 Those who could work would
not receive income assistance, but would be entitled, by law, to a
public sector job paying market wages.197 Unskilled workers would
shelter[,] and food, we can reach that goal by a careful definition of
property rights.
Id. at 1217 (citations omitted).
191 See, e.g., RichardJ. Arneson, Is Work Special? Justice and the Distribution of Employ-
ment, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1127, 1144-45 (1990). The work provided should reflect
the following principles: no make-work; stable employment, not temporary stop-gap;
opportunities for promotion; low skill requirements; careful monitoring of equality;
respectful supervision; on the job training; choices of entry level jobs; and wages and
benefits that do not pull people out of decent private employment. Id See Elster,
supranote 137, at53; HARVEy, supranote 26, at 115. See also WILSoN, supranote 185, at
157 (proposing a full employment policy as a solution to present poverty and a substi-
tution for traditional public assistance).
192 THUROW, supra note 144, at 206.
193 THUROW, supra note 144, at 204.
194 THUROW, supra note 144, at 200-07.
195 See generally HARVEY, supra note 26.
196 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 22.
197 HARWvv, supra note 26, at 30 (explaining that since the minimum wage has dete-
riorated so much in recent decades, paying the minimum wage is not part of the
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be offered special training with ajob guarantee utilizing their skills
upon completion of the training.1 98 The entire process could be
funded by an increase in Social Security taxes. 9 An increase of
twelve percent would provide suitable funding and a feasible
framework for the proposed EAP.2 °°
Will such an amendment cause problems? Absolutely. Pro-
gress is problematic. 2 1 Traditional thought analyzes the implica-
tions of a right to ajob by merely superimposing the right to work
on the current situation and focuses on all the difficulties it can
create. 2  Some have already concluded that a right to work, with-
out a corresponding guarantee of a living wage, would create more
harm than good. Particularly, this would disrupt current em-
ployer/employee, citizen/government, and business/government
relationships.
2 3
However, fair analysis must start with an acknowledgment that
the current system does not work for millions of people. The anal-
ysis must then review the possible implications of a constitutional
right to work in a society that would be directing a portion of its
energy into creating employment rather than merely decrying the
current victimization of millions. These rights, like the minimum
wage, environmental protection, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
solution; rather, there should be a guarantee that at least poverty threshold wages
would be paid).
198 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 36.
199 HARvEy, supra note 26, at 43-44 (explaining that this increase not only includes
the cost of the EAP jobs program, but also is offset by the savings from eliminating
income support programs for the currently unemployed).
200 HARVEY, supra note 26, at 50.
201 There will be cries of "pain" of economic sorts. Creating such rights will make a
"mess" of current economic relationships. These are familiar objections, heard in
response to all efforts to improve society. SeeJames Gaffney, She Who Laughs Last: The
Gender-Inclusive Language Debate, AMERICA, Aug. 26-Sept. 2, 1995, at 8, 12 ("The moral
aberrations of culture have never been corrected without pain and mess.").
202 Bki.'Y, supra note 58, at 6 (quoting President Warren G. Harding, "There has
been vast unemployment before and there will be again. There will be depression
and inflation just as surely as the tides ebb and flow. I would have little enthusiasm
for any proposed remedy which seeks either palliation or tonic from the Public Treas-
ury." (citation omitted)).
203 See Elster, supra note 137, at 72-74. For those already employed in private indus-
try, the effect would differ depending on whether the worker was a good or bad em-
ployee. The effect would create a workplace environment where the under-motivated
and less-industrious would ease off, confident in their right to a government job,
while good workers could demand better compensation as a condition of staying ac-
five. Further, whenever public workers received a raise, private workers would have
to be better compensated as well. A right to work could not function in a capitalist
economy because the end result of all these dynamics would be a constant enlarge-
ment of public employment and a constant diminishing of private employment con-
cluding in the state employing all labor. Elster, supra note 137, at 72-73.
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ance Corporation, would interfere with unfettered supply and de-
mand. Would capitalism be able to adapt? Absolutely.
Human beings have created the current system, which works
very well for some and not so well for others, and humans can mod-
ify it.20 4 The operation and inequity of the present system is a natu-
ral consequence of what has been created by America's choices.
20 5
Legal realists argue that "the market itself, and therefore every-
thing that flow[s] from market transactions, [is] structured by gov-
ernment."20 6 No one may argue that present governmental and
legal actions do not already have impact on the creation, retention,
elimination, and compensation of jobs. This proposed amend-
ment would refocus the direction of those laws and policies toward
creating jobs. Government policy already shapes employment in
issues such as location, participation, and even the expansion and
contraction of the total number of jobs.20 7
204 Indeed, as legal realists taught us long ago, the hand of government is
present in any market. The law, by protecting some claims to property
rights but not others, and by enforcing some contracts but not others,
determines whether a market will exist. Since the New Deal era, the
constitutional power of government to make those determinations has
gone virtually unchallenged. It is at least half a century too late for any-
one to say that law and government merely provide a neutral playing
field on which "market forces" contend. Government in America has
always influenced significantly the distribution of goods, and politics
typically has been the province of the "haves."
Karst, Citizenship, supra note 187, at 22 (citation omitted).
205 Material and cultural poverty in American life is not like cancer or heart
disease; still less is it like the winds and the tides. It is a result of our
institutions, economic, social and-I am sorry to say-legal. There
would be enough money in our society to provide for everyone's needs
if we did not choose to spend it on other things. There would be
enough to do in our society to keep everyone productively occupied if
we did not choose to get it done in other ways. Poverty and unemploy-
ment are human artifacts as surely as highways and bridges-as surely as
deforestation and acid rain .... [T]he same institutions that support
our own prosperity are the ones that impoverish the poor among us.
Whatever good there is in our laws and institutions-and there is a
great deal-has a price, and the poor in our society are the ones who
pay it.
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert E. Rodes, Jr., A Christian Theology for Roman Catholic Law
Schools, 14 U. DAYrON L. Rxv. 5, 15 (1988) (citation omitted).
206 Tushnet, supra note 190, at 1210 (citation omitted).
207 Edelman, supra note 178, at 45-46 (noting that specific governmental policies
and decisions in issues ranging from urban renewal and highway construction to farm
policy and public education directly influence where people work and the physical
access people have to different kinds of jobs).
[G]overnment shapes the total number and quality ofjobs available in
the economy and the take-home pay of those who have work. Fiscal,
monetary, and trade policies all affect the total number ofjobs and the
tax bites on those who do work. When the Federal Reserve decides on a
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Many who claim that government has no business interfering
in the marketplace in reality mean that they are satisfied with the
present level of government interference. Those who benefit from
government interference do not want to change its position in the
marketplace to benefit others. 20  Some suggest that politics and
law are the subject of a public sphere of influence.20 9 It is further
suggested that this influence is distinct from economics and busi-
ness, which are in a private sphere.210 This is little more than a
policy of high-interest rates to fight inflation, and there is no concomi-
tant Congressional response to aid the people who lose their jobs as a
consequence, the new recruits to the ranks of the poor are there be-
cause of government policy.
Edelman, supra note 178, at 46.
208 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927)
(concerning the need to subject the profit motive to the higher demands of wisdom
and justice, by first recognizing the role that economic power already plays in political
decision-making, and by recognizing the need for government action to temper eco-
nomic interests).
Utterly unreal is all talk of men being robbed of their power of initiative
because the state undertakes some service, e.g. to build a bridge across a
river. Men are not deprived of opportunities for real self reliance by
having their streets lighted at night, by filling up holes in the pave-
ments, by removing other dangers to life and limb and by providing
opportunities for education to all. The conditions of modern life are
complex and distracting enough so that if we can ease the strain by
simplifying some things through state action we are all gainers by it.
Certain things have to be done in a community and the question
whether they should be left to private enterprise dominated by the
profit motive or to the government dominated by political considera-
tions, is not a question of man versus the state, but simply a question of
which organization and motive can best do the work. Both private and
government enterprise are initiated and carried through by individual
human beings.
Id. at 27.
209 See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1358, 1417 (1982).
210 The essence of the public/private distinction is the conviction that it is
possible to conceive of social and economic life apart from government
and law, indeed that it is impossible or dangerous to conceive of it any
other way. The core ideological function served by the public/private
distinction is to deny that practices comprising the private sphere of
life-the worlds of business, education and culture, the community, and
the family-are inextricably linked to and at least partially constituted
by politics and law. Denying the role of politics-the processes by
which communities organize and institutionalize their self-directive ca-
pacities-in constituting the forms and structure of social life is a way of
impeding access to an understanding of the role of human agency in
constructing the world. The primary effect of the public/private dis-
tinction is thus to inhibit the perception that the institutions in which
we live are the product of human design and can therefore be changed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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wish to avoid changing the status quo and the interdependent rela-
tionship between public and private, law and economics, and poli-
tics and business.
Such criticisms have been leveled at every effort to make the
economic system more human. It is not enough to say a proposal
interferes with the market. The questions, rather, are whether in-
terference is within the public interest and will it work? In order to
consider how such an amendment might work, it is necessary to
think about economics, justice, and law in new ways.
21'
Undoubtedly, some critics will say an effort to guarantee every-
one the right to a job will reduce the number of jobs available.
Historically, labor has been unpersuaded by the arguments of busi-
ness leaders that other efforts, like increased minimum wage pro-
tections for low-wage workers, would hurt the cause of workers.21 2
Ultimately, the effect of an amendment guaranteeing every-
one a right to ajob and a living wage will depend on how Congress
chooses to legislate the implementation of these rights, and how
the judiciary chooses to evaluate these rights and their implemen-
tation. Current legal and economic arrangements leave millions
unemployed and millions more working, yet still poor. A constitu-
tional amendment guaranteeing the right to an opportunity to
work and to receive a living wage is worth undertaking the tedious
and uncertain process of legislative, executive, and judicial imple-
mentation. Millions would certainly agree.
VIII. CONCLUSION
"If we continue to frame political debate about jobs, health
care, and other aspects of equal citizenship only in terms of 'the
budget' and 'sound policy,' it seems safe to expect the status quo
will go largely undisturbed." " During the Depression, when un-
employment nationwide was not as high as it is in today's inner
cities, there was an effort to change the status quo and make gov-
ernment and economics more responsive to the needs of citizens.
It was an effort of optimism and confidence that together, the citi-
zens, the business community, and the government could change
the present calamities and improve the daily lives of millions of
211 "The mission of all critical social thought is to free us from the illusion of the
necessity of existing social arrangements." Klare, supra note 6, at 482.
212 See van der Vyver, supra note 184, at 326 (observing that in 1939, when labor
rejected the concerns of business that minimum wage protection was not in workers'
economic interests, "however horrible a situation might be brought about by interfer-
ence with economic laws, the workers could hardly by any the worse off').
213 Forbath, supra note 12, at 1805.
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people who were suffering.214 Similar efforts were launched in the
mid-1940s and again in the mid-1970s.
Business interests will undoubtedly continue their historical
opposition to the right to a job at a living wage. Those who would
most benefit, the unemployed and low-wage workers, will remain
relatively weak politically. However, there is still reason to hope for
change, so long as America values work and opportunity. Contem-
porary America recognizes a duty to work, and recognizing the
right to an opportunity to work for a living wage is not far removed.
The right to a job at a living wage has remained a popular
concept to the general public for decades.2 15 There is reason to
believe that the spirit of the New Deal, which combined economic
self-interest of the nation with the moral demands of full citizen-
ship, will again call for the right to a job at a living wage. 6 Until
then, "part of a theorist's job is to imagine the furthest possibilities
lying fallow in the present and the past and the Constitution of a
future that brings them to light."217 This proposed constitutional
214 In the darkest days of our worst domestic calamity, the greatest words of
[President Roosevelt] were not that "the only thing we have to fear is
fear itself." His greatest words were "[w]e are stricken by no plague of
locusts." Even more so today, there is no plague of locusts. There is
only the self-inflicted plague of underestimating our own capabilities to
reduce social ills. While today's leadership has made a laudable attempt
to win business confidence, this is not enough. Our leadership must
also regain its confidence in itself, in the American economy, and in the
about 113 million people in our civilian labor force.
Keyserling, supra note 92, at 800 (citations omitted).
215 See, e.g., MicKEv KAus, THE END OF EQuALIrry 137 (1992).
A WPA-type jobs program would, quite literally, set the underclass and
anyone else who needed a job to work rebuilding the public sphere
rather than destroying it-planting trees, if you will, rather than lurking
behind them.... With a neo-WPA maintaining highways, schools, play-
grounds, and subways, with libraries open every evening and city streets
cleaned twice a day, we would have a common life more people would
find worth reclaiming.
Id.
216 See, e.g., SHIU.AR, supra note 136, at 63 ("Modern citizenship is not confined to
political activities and concerns. Important as governing, voting, military service, and
taxpaying are, they are not nearly as significant as the endeavors that constitute what
Hegel called "civil society."') (citation omitted).
The right to earn should not be based on personal responses, such as
loss of self-respect among the unemployed, but on loss of public re-
spect, the reduction of standing and demotion to second- class citizen-
ship, to which the public ethos, overfly and traditionally, condemns
them. It is not a right to self-respect, but a right not to be deprived of
one's standing as a citizen, that is at stake here.
SHLAR, supra note 136, at 100-01.
217 Forbath, supra note 12, at 1805.
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amendment will finally guarantee the right to an opportunity for
employment at a living wage.





This Note1 attempts to add to those voices currently critiquing
the new reproductive technologies by suggesting a two-step analysis
which (1) analyzes how a specific reproductive technology can cre-
ate inequitable power structures for women who turn to it, and (2)
places that reproductive technology within a larger pattern of con-
trolling all women's reproductive autonomy. While step one may
be a familiar one to writers critiquing reproductive technologies,
step two-taking the analysis, placing it as part of a larger pattern
of control, and then reevaluating the analysis-may be a newer but
necessary approach. Placing the reproductive technology within a
larger pattern of control is necessary since simply critiquing the
inequality within a reproductive technique cannot provide a full
picture of the extent and type of control exhibited over women's
reproductive autonomy. It also cannot provide the opportunity to
investigate how the analysis itself changes once one steps back from
the specific focus-a single reproductive technology-and views a
larger entity-all women's reproductive autonomy.
This Note will apply this two-part analysis to the specific repro-
ductive technology of in vitro fertilization (IVF). VF is the pro-
cess whereby a woman's egg is fertilized with sperm in a petri dish
and then returned to the woman's uterus for development and de-
livery.2 This Note argues that IVF has not received the close scru-
tiny necessary to prevent its potential misuse against the women
turning to the technology. This Note will analyze the power struc-
ture within IVF by looking at the power relations between the wo-
men and the technology, the women and the doctors, and the
phenomena of informed consent.
The question will then be asked: "Who is missing from IVF
t Candidate forJ.D., 1998, The City University of New York School of Law; MA.,
1995, The George Washington University; B.A, 1993, Vanderbilt University.
I The original version of this Note was written to satisfy the thesis requirement for
the Master of Arts degree at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
2 Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: Wat About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L.
REv. 305, 307-08 (1993).
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participation and why?" Research from a variety of areas suggests
that IVF is employed by a relatively select subgroup of women in
the United States (white, middle-/upper-class, heterosexual
couples). While having a technology that is used only by selected
women suggests inequality, questioning why this occurs will shed
light on how reproductive technologies can be used to impact on
all women's reproductive autonomy.
Part two of the analysis places the inequality within IVF into
the larger pattern of societal control over women's reproductive
autonomy. There are many ways this can be accomplished. This
Note argues that control over women's reproductive autonomy is
demonstrated by the selective valorization of some women's repro-
ductivity and the selective devalorization of other women's repro-
ductivity. By viewing IVF alongside such reproductive controls as
forced sterilization, Norplant®3 use as a condition of probation,
and fetal abuse laws, a larger pattern becomes clear which may not
be seen when each phenomenon is viewed individually. Some wo-
men are being pushed toward reproduction as a result of the re-
productive options available to them while other women are
pushed away from reproduction as a result of the choices open to
them.
Using an analysis which questions not only the inequality
within the reproductive technology but also the inequality in the
application of all reproductive technologies allows for the identifi-
cation of larger patterns of control not visible through an individ-
ual analysis approach. It is only through this questioning of the
development and use of reproductive technologies that women
can gain control over the technologies and truly use them on their
own terms and for the benefit of all women.
II. IVF: A MEDICAL TECHNIQUE
The first baby conceived through the use of IVF was born in
England in 1978.' The first baby born in the United States
through the use of IVF came three years later in Virginia.5 These
births, however, followed years of medical development, including
a 1973 procedure in which an egg was fertilized in vitro, allowed to
3 The Norplant System® is marketed in the United States by Wyeth-Ayerst Labo-
ratories, Inc. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. PHYSiCANs' DESK REFERENCE 3085 (1998)
[hereinafter, Norplant].
4 George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 202 (1983).
5 Id.
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develop to the several-cell stage, and then transferred to a patient
who underwent a hysterectomy two days later.6 By the mid-1980s,
many no longer considered IVF an experimental procedure, and as
of 1993 an estimated 700 IVF programs in over fifty-three countries
were in operation.
7
An IVF treatment, or cycle, can be divided into three phases:
egg retrieval, fertilization and implantation, and storage.
A. Egg Retrieval
As part of the retrieval phase, clients are given a series of psy-
chological and physical tests to screen and prepare for the proce-
dure. Once screened, the woman is usually given drugs to produce
superovulation (production of multiple eggs during one cycle).'
The procedure is monitored daily through blood hormonal assays
and ultrasounds in order to track the quality and quantity of devel-
oping eggs.9 Once the maximum achievement point is reached,
human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) is given to the woman to
achieve final maturation of the eggs.'0
Thirty-four hours after the use of hCG, the eggs are gathered
either through the use of a laparoscopy or a transvaginal ultra-
sound." The 1992 IVF-ET Registry published by the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) reported that 85% of
IVF stimulations (24,996 out of 29,404 cycles) lead to an egg
retrieval. 12
6 Melvin G. Dodson et al., A Detailed Program Review of In Vitro Fertilization with a
Discussion and Comparison of Alternative Approaches, 162 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OB-
STETRICS 89, 90 (1986).
7 Marsden G. Wagner & Patricia Stephenson, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: Is
the Tail Wagging the Dog?, in TOUGH CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTIL17-ATION AND THE REPRO-
DuCrrVE TECHNOLOGIES 1, 2 (Patricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993).
8 Alan 0. Trounson & Carl Wood, /VF and Related Technology: The Present and the
Future, 158 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 853, 854 (1993).
9 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regu-
latory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625, 633
(1991).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 633-34. With a laparoscopy, a needle is inserted through the woman's
abdomen and gentle suction is used to retrieve the eggs. Feliciano, supra note 2, at
307. A transvaginal ultrasound locates structures by measuring reflections of high
frequency waves, and does not require anesthesia. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 307;
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1883 (26th ed. 1995).
12 Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada: 1992 Results Gener-
ated from The American Fertility Society / Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry,
62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1121, 1123 tbl. 1 (1994) [hereinafter 1992 IVF-ET Registry
Report]. An alternative to having the recipient produce her own eggs is to use one
provided by a donor.
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B. Fertilization and Implantation
Once eggs are obtained they are placed with sperm in a petri
dish containing a special medium and allowed to fertilize and grow
to the four-cell stage.' 3 At this point, the embryos are ready for
transfer into the recipient's uterus.1' This is done with the use of a
catheter inserted through the woman's cervix and into her
uterus.15 The number of embryos transplanted is usually balanced
with evidence that as the number of embryos transferred increases,
so does the pregnancy rate.' 6
If transfer is successful, the embryos will attach to the uterine
wall and continue as if a natural conception had occurred.' 7
Throughout the woman's first trimester, she is given estrogen and
progesterone replacement therapy to help maintain the preg-
nancy. 8 The woman, if given drugs to increase ovulation, is also
given a series of drugs to return her cycle to normal. 19
C. Storage
If superovulation has produced a high number of eggs for
which implantation at one time is unwarranted or unwanted, a
technique is used which allows doctors to freeze the "extra" em-
bryos for later implantation.2" Called cryopreservation, this tech-
nique has proven instrumental in the field. In cryopreservation,
embryos are placed in vials containing a freezing medium and a
13 James M. Treppa, In Vitro Fertilization Through Egg Donation: A Prospective View of
Legal Issues, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 777, 781 (1992).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 The 1989 IVF-ET Registry reported that clinical pregnancy rates and corre-
sponding live delivery rates among reporting fertility clinics were 15% and 13% re-
spectively for transfers of less than three embryos, 21% and 16% respectively for
transfer of three embryos, and 25% and 18% respectively for transfer of four or more
embryos. In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer (IVF-ET) in the United States: 1989 Results
from the 1VF-ETRegistry, 55 FERTILIY & STERILITY 14, 16 (1991) [hereinafter 1989 IVF-
ET Registry Report]. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), part
of The American Fertility Society (AFS) and Medical Research International (MRI),
was established to "explore the epidemiology of the [assisted reproductive technolo-
gies]." Id. at 14.
17 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
18 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781 n.27 (citing Mark V. Sauer et al., A Preliminary
Report on Oocyte Donation Extending Reproductive Potential to Women over 40, 323 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1157, 1158 (1990)).
19 Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57
ALB. L. REv. 733, 773 (1994).
20 Eggen, supra note 9, at 638.
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cryoprotective agent.2' The temperature of the vials are then low-
ered from 220 C (room temperature) to -80' C.22 The frozen vials
are then placed in liquid nitrogen at a temperature of -196' C.
21
At this temperature, biological activity is not considered possible.24
Embryos are typically frozen at the 2-, 4-, or 8-cell stage since earlier
or later embryos are too difficult to freeze or do not develop nor-
mally once thawed.25
Cryopreservation lowers the risk of multiple births by allowing
only one or two embryos to be implanted at one time and the
others preserved for later use.26 Freezing the unused embryos also
saves a woman from having to repeat the ovulation and egg collec-
tion process, thereby saving her body from additional drug therapy
and controlling costs of the procedure with each implantation.27
Cryopreservation is also useful in cases where there is some compli-
cation during the stimulation cycle or where patients will be under-
going medical therapy that will cause sterility (i.e., for leukemia or
breast cancer) .28 Alternatively, cryopreservation might be used
when a woman undergoes sterilization and wishes to store any eggs
available at the time of surgery for possible later use.29 Proponents
note that once cryopreservation has been perfected, women will be
able to store unfertilized eggs in much the same way men are cur-
rently able to freeze their sperm. 0
In 1989, the IVF-ET SART Registry reported the transfer of
2,124 cryopreserved embryos by 110 reporting clinics. Ten of these
clinics accounted for 56% of the total clinical pregnancy rate
(11%) and 54% of the overall live delivery rate (8%)." In general,
an 8-12% increase in IVF pregnancies occurs by using cryopreserva-
tion.3 2 This may be attributable to psychological and physical ben-
efits cryopreservation offers women undergoing IVF.
21 Phyllis L. Bean, Comment, Taking the Frozen Embryo to Court in Virginia: A Proposed




25 Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos:
Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17J. OF LEGIS. 97, 99 (1990).
26 See Eggen, supra note 9, at 638.
27 See Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
28 Trounson & Wood, supra note 8, at 855.
29 Eggen, supra note 9, at 640 n.53.
30 Katz, supra note 19, at 771.
31 1989 IVF-ET Registry Report, supra note 16, at 20.
32 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
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III. IVF AS A TOOL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
As noted earlier, this note argues IF can create inequitable
power structures for the women who turn to it. This can occur
through the power dynamic involved in using IVF as well as
through the selective control over who has access to the technol-
ogy. This section discusses IVF's potential misuse by: 1) analyzing
the power structure within IVF which minimizes women's control,
and 2) discussing the select demographics of IVF users.
The power relationship within IVF takes various forms. The
relationships between the women and the technology, the women
as patients and their doctors, and the concept of informed con-
sent, are all examples of how IVF creates inequitable power struc-
tures for women and will be discussed below.
A. Women v. Technology
Women using -VF turn to the technology because they are
told the technology can overcome a defect of their own bodies-
infertility. When they turn to 1VF women place their control over
their bodies into the hands of the technology. But is this neces-
sary? Women's relationship with the technology, built on a belief
that the technology can grant fertility, may be based on unreasona-
ble definitions of infertility. If so, women may be turning to IVF
too soon and in so doing unnecessarily cede power over their per-
son to the technology.
The United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
defines infertility as the inability to conceive after one year of inter-
course without contraception.3 Critics such as Janice Raymond
point out that this definition does not take into consideration
couples who already have children who only recently became "in-
fertile." 4 Noting that the time requirement of the OTA definition
of infertility has decreased within the past decade to its current one
year requirement, Raymond questions the appropriateness of such
a time frame since older women and those previously on birth con-
trol can sometimes experience temporary infertility. 5 If women
33 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 3. Not all agencies, however, use such a
lenient definition of infertility. The World Health Organization (WHO) requires a
two year inability to conceive to meet the definition of infertility. Wagner & Stephen-
son, supra note 7, at 3.
34 JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 5 (1993).
35 Id. at 3.
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are turning to IVF too soon, they are exposing themselves to un-
necessary physical, psychological, and financial burdens.
Critics such as Wagner and Stephenson argue that the one
year period is misleading. They point to one study which sug-
gested only 16% to 21% of couples originally meeting this one year
definition of infertility remained infertile throughout their lives.3 6
Further, they argue that the definition does not take into consider-
ation the frequency of intercourse. One study reported that
"16.7% of couples having intercourse less than once a week con-
ceived within [six] months, but 83.3% of couples having inter-
course four or more times a week conceived within that same
period."3 7
Ruth Hubbard has also suggested that this time requirement is
inadequate.3 8 She cites a 1983 study which found that over a two to
seven year period, 41 % of couples undergoing fertility treatments
became pregnant, as did 35% of those couples who did not pursue
the fertility treatments.3 9 Indeed, Wagner and Stephenson suggest
infertility "has become a kind of new morbidity-a medical recon-
struction of a social problem, that is, involuntary childlessness. "40
IVF and infertility treatments have also been criticized as not
being true aids to infertile women as the goal is not to correct in-
fertility, but only to bypass it. One study comparing IVF pregnancy
rates versus surgery procedures designed to repair the damaged
reproductive systems, found a continuing pregnancy rate of 25% to
30% with microsurgery or laser surgery using a laparoscope to re-
pair damaged fallopian tubes, a continuing pregnancy rate of 21%
to 41% for procedures with carbon-dioxide lasers in "fertility-pro-
moting procedures," and a 30% to 70% continuing pregnancy rate
for a "laser applied through a laparoscope, either alone or in con-
junction with danazol . ". .. "'4 This is compared to a continuing
pregnancy rate with IVF of 10%, plus the need for repeat proce-
dures with each pregnancy the woman desires.42 In response,
groups such as the Feminist International Network of Resistance to
Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE), argue that
36 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 3.
37 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 6.
38 RUTH HUBBARD, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BIOLOGY 203 (1990).
39 Id. at 203.
40 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 2.
41 H. David Banta, Technology Assessment and Infertility Care, in TOUGH CHOICES: IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 53, 58-59 (Patricia Ste-
phenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993).
42 Id. at 59.
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the focus should be shifted away from the reproductive technology
and instead placed on identifying the causes of infertility and re-
searching prevention.4 3
If, as these critics suggest, current definitions of infertility lead
to over diagnosis of infertility, women may be turning to IVF who
do not need to and in so doing placing themselves in unnecessary
danger. The safety of clinics, for example, has been questioned.
An outbreak of hepatitis which affected 172 women, was reported
in one IVF program in The Netherlands.44 The culture medium
used to grow fertilized embryos was contaminated with hepatitis B
virus.45 This type of physical danger is in addition to the ceding of
control of one's body to the technology.
B. Patient v. Doctor Relationship
As women coming to IVF clinics usually are emotionally and
physically drained and often see IVF as their last chance to have
biological offspring,46 the patient/doctor relationship in IVF is po-
tentially problematic. This relationship can cause women to be-
come subjugated to a technology "owned" by the doctor. This
ownership of -VF technology has the potential to minimize wo-
men's roles as women, mothers, and individuals, and to make wo-
men mere vessels in the process of childbirth. Indeed in many
cases, IVF doctors are perceived as giving life where the women
have failed. This dynamic can place extreme guilt and anxiety on
women who see their compliance with IVF protocols as the only
way to become pregnant. One study of 200 pre-treatment couples
noted that 49% of women believed infertility to be the most upset-
ting experience of their lives.47 This is compared to only 15% of
the men interviewed.48
Women lose autonomy over their reproductive identity when
43 Susan Behuniak-Long, Radical Conceptions: Reproductive Technologies and Feminist
Theories, 10 WOMEN & POLITICS 39, 51-52 (1990).
44 Pat Spallone, Reproductive Health and Reproductive Technology, in WOMEN AND
HEALTH: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 49, 58 (Sue Wilkinson & Celia Kitzinger eds., 1994).
45 Id.
46 Dorothy Greenfeld & Florence Haseltine, Candidate Selection and Psychosocial Con-
siderations of In-Vitro Fertilization Procedures, 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 119,
119 (1986) (reporting couples coming to IVF programs have long histories of infertil-
ity treatment including drug therapy and surgery).
47 Id. at 123. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209,
215 (1995) [hereinafter Roberts, Genetic Tie] ("[P]eople often see the inability to pro-
duce one's own children as one of nature's most tragic curses.").
48 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 123.
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they begin IVF programs. Ann Oakley described the phenomena
in this manner:
For a complex of reasons, then, reproduction exposes the social
fragility of women, not as the weaker but as the second sex, to use
Simone de Beauvoir's term. Women's existence as childbearers
is subject to a central paradox: although the most socially impor-
tant activity, it is also rendered the least important, as cultural
ideologies and practices enforce women's marginalization.49
Also note the relationship between Leslie Brown, the mother of
the world's first IVF baby, and her doctors, Drs. Steptoe and Ed-
wards. Her doctors insisted Brown not tell anyone about the pro-
cedure and had her sign an agreement consenting to an abortion
if the doctors thought it necessary.50 "Presumably [the doctors]
did not want to have the entire venture discredited by letting the
first baby be born with a disability."5 Again, women's interests and
reproductive autonomy are subjugated to the larger goals of creat-
ing a technology and in the doctors controlling it.
C. Informed v. Uninformed Consent
Critics of IVF have charged that due to a lack of enforcement
of informed consent or even a specific definition of what consti-
tutes informed consent, women turning to IVF are placed in the
position of ceding their control to a technology which many argue
is still, despite the medical community's assurances to the contrary,
experimental. 2 These critics charge that no clinical trials, cost
analysis, analysis of social consequences, or ethical discussions have
been performed, and that IVF should remain an experimental pro-
cedure and be ruled by the "safeguards covering research on
human subjects."" Questions such as these concerning the experi-
mental nature of LVF make informed consent questionable.
Wagner and Stephenson also express concern over the ways
pregnancy success rates are reported.54 For example, they noted
that women experienced disappointment when they found out that
the 20-25% pregnancy rate reported by one clinic was misleading.
55
49 ANN OAKLEY, EssAYs ON WOMEN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH 99 (1993) (footnote
omitted). Oakley is referring to the work The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir. See
generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1952) (1949).
50 Hubbard, supra note 38, at 204.
51 Hubbard, supra note 38, at 204.
52 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 1.
53 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 1.
54 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
55 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
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In actuality, only 40% of women in that program reached the 20%-
25% point.56 Unfortunately this was information the women found
out only after entering the program." For women to make in-
formed decisions about their participation in IVF programs, they
need to have accurate and standardized information. However,
the use of different pregnancy definitions can also mislead women.
Variations in reporting rates of pregnancy are attributed to dif-
ferent meanings given to pregnancy-clinical pregnancy versus
pregnancy resulting in delivery. If a woman is pregnant for two
days and then suffers a miscarriage, an IVF clinic may refer to this
as a successful pregnancy and report it as such.5 Women's goals
are a "take-home" baby and not solely a pregnancy.59 These rates
are obviously very different. Compare the two compilations of the
same facts presented below. The 1992 IVF-ET Registry reported
that 29,404 IVF cycles were conducted in 1992 with the following
break-down:
85% of cycles led to an egg retrieval (24,996)
87.5% of retrievals led to an embryo transfer (21,870)
24.1% of transfers led to a clinical pregnancy (5,279)
16.8% live delivery rate per retrieval (4,206)60
Note these percentages are derived from the total number of cycles
that led to an egg retrieval.
Now look at the information presented another way. Here,
the total number of cycles becomes the reference point for each
calculation, regardless of whether it led to an egg retrieval:
85% of all cycles led to an egg retrieval (24,996)
74.4% of all cycles led to an egg transfer (21,870)
18% of all cycles led to a clinical pregnancy (5,279)
14.3% of all cycles led to a live delivery (4,206)
The 14.3% live delivery rate may be of more value to women as it
standardizes the reference point-cycles-as well as addresses wo-
men's association with each cycle with a birth. This is not to say
that 14.3% (or one out of seven) of each woman's cycles will lead
to a live birth. These figures do not include information on causes
of infertility and, therefore, do not take into account women for
whom IVF has a higher probability of success than those for whom
56 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
57 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
58 Dr. Martha Field, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 CREIGH-
TON L. REv. 1589, 1597 (1992).
59 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 8.
60 1992 IVF-ET Registry Report, supra note 12, at 1123 tbl. 1.
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it does not.6 In part to remedy the discrepancy in expectations,
Dr. Martha Field suggests women get counseling on the success
rates, costs, psychological stress, and available alternatives before
beginning an IVF program.6"
This lack of clear and accurate information hampers a wo-
man's ability to give full and informed consent. But further, the
severe emotional toll and anxiety women are under when they
come to VF clinics also impacts on a woman's ability to make in-
formed decisions. Wagner and Stephenson indicated that it is nec-
essary to investigate how IVF is marketed, how success rates are
calculated, how they are communicated to patients, how hospitals
sell the experimental procedures, and how physicians disclose the
risks of IVF."6
While this could be construed as a problem within the medical
industry rather than one specific to women, two items are impor-
tant to remember. First, in a society and industry which are de-
fined by male standards, women are typically placed second.
Second, those steps that have been taken to try and control the IVF
industry have basically been geared to the needs of consumers, not
women.
Informed consent is of imperative importance in a technology
like IVF where women come to the technology desperate for a baby
and often view IVF as their last chance.64 Nancy Ehrenreich notes
that "by ceding [the doctor] all control over her reproductive
processes, [a woman] disempowers herself in a way likely to be
deeply destructive of her sense of self."65 These feelings were ex-
pressed by Mrs. J, a woman undergoing IVF treatments, in a 1986
publication of candidate selection:
It's like a steeplechase. One hurdle after another. First you
worry that you won't be accepted in the program. After you are
accepted, you worry about all that waiting and the enormous
cost. Once you start the program, you worry that you might do
something wrong or that you will not understand the instruc-
tion. Then you worry about getting the injections and the ef-
fects of the drugs that they give you. Then you worry that they
will not get eggs. Or that the eggs won't fertilize. Finally, they
do the implant and you are hit with what you feared all along-
61 1992 ]VF-ET Registry Report, supra note 12, at 1122-23.
62 Field, supra note 58, at 1597.
63 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
64 See Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 119 (suggesting long histories of
surgery and drug therapy in couples entering IVF programs).
65 Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKE L.J. 492, 495 (1993).
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that you won't get pregnant.66
You might do something wrong and as a result you may not get
pregnant. This relationship makes informed consent questionable.
Susan Bordo sums the effects of medical technologies on wo-
men's ability to choose by stating:
On the one hand, women now have a booming technology
seemingly focused on fulfilling their desires: to conceive, to pre-
vent miscarriage, to deliver a healthy baby at term. On the
other hand, proponents and practitioners continually en-
courage women to treat their bodies as passive instruments of
those goals, ready and willing, "if they want a child badly
enough," to endure however complicated and invasive a regime
of diagnostic testing, daily monitoring, injections, and operative
procedures may be required.67
One report noted that of ninety-one couples dropping out after
one IVF attempt, fifty-five (60.4%) said anxiety was their reason for
not continuing.
68
The anxiety to have a child and the concern that their actions
might harm their chances, force women's identities to be subli-
mated to the technology, the doctor, and inaccurate definitions of
informed consent. Women coming to 1VF are placed in an inter-
minable bind: they are told their bodies are incapable of produc-
ing offspring without aid (a misnomer as many couples are now
undergoing lVF for male related infertility problems69 ), that IVF is
their last chance, and if no baby is produced it is due to a woman's
non-compliance to a strict protocol (when in reality compliance
does not guarantee a baby).
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF LVF USE
On one hand, we have a technology which says it offers women
the possibility of having children they could not have before. On
the other hand, we have the narrowing of the reproductive auton-
omy of the women turning to lVF. There is also another concern
with IVF use-the demography of IVF users. Currently, a relatively
select subgroup of United States society turns to LVF. Although the
data on IVF users is sparse, available data suggest an unequal use of
66 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 123-24.
67 SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE
BODY 86 (1993).
68 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 124.
69 Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Reproductive Autonomy and Reproductive Technology: Gen-
der, Deviance and Infertility, in INTERSECTIONS: WOMEN ON LAw, MEDICINE AND TECHNOL-
oGY 99, 105 (Kerry Petersen ed., 1997).
[Vol. 2:183
1998] GENDER INEQUALITY IN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 195
IVF by white, middle-/upper-class, married women. A brief discus-
sion of the voices missing from IVF use and its ramifications are
discussed below.
A. Poor Women
The cost of IVF has been estimated to be between $67,000 and
$114,000.0 This insures that most poor women cannot access fer-
tility programs without outside help. But according to the Com-
mittee to Study Outreach for Prenatal Care, more than one-fourth
of all "women of reproductive age... have no insurance to cover
maternity care, and two-thirds of [this population of reproductive
age] have no health insurance at all."7' For the uninsured, the
costs of IVF can be prohibitive.72
A 'justification" for the exclusion of poor women from access
to IVF services is based on a stereotypical association of poor wo-
men and children-that poor women have children to get more
money from state assistance programs. Issues like sterilization and
mandatory Norplant use are based on this perception 7 3-regard-
less of its validity. Society stereotypes poor women as having "too
many children" which "we" have to support. With this mindset, it is
unlikely that mechanisms will be established which would aid infer-
tile poor women in accessing IVF,7" and indeed as will be suggested
70 Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 948
(1996) [hereinafter Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction].
71 Michelle Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9 (1992).
72 Id.
73 Note that this perception also has racial overtones. One report noted that the
African-American poverty rate was 31%, despite the fact that African-Americans con-
stituted only 12% of the United States population. Vernellia R_ Randall, Slavery, Segre-
gation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American
Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 191, 212 (1996).
74 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 989 (1986) ("At the present time the state
has no legal obligation to provide infertility services to indigents ...."). Roberts,
Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 245 n.140 ("Indeed, a major aim of current welfare re-
form proposals is to discourage women on welfare from having children.").
Note a report by Svensson and Stephenson which gave an example from one
state to show how some women were discouraged from using IVF. Per-Gunnar Sven-
sson & Patricia Stephenson, Equity and Resource Distribution in Infertility Care, in TOUCH
CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 161, 163 (Pa-
tricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993). Svensson and Stephenson re-
ported that Oregon extended its eligibility for public health insurance funds to cover
all people below the federal poverty level, although limits were placed on the medical
services paid with public funding. Id. Medical procedures were ranked by a cost-
utility procedure which rated each treatment by the benefit to the patient per unit of
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later, it is often the case that poor women's reproductive autonomy
is instead severely limited.
B. Women of Color
Various studies dating from as early as the 1900s suggest that
the infertility rate for African-American women is much higher
than that for white women. For example, Paula Giddings reports
in her book, When and Where I.Enter, two studies which suggest the
African-American infertility rate was as high as fifty percent.7 5 She
also reports a 1942 doctoral dissertation from Columbia University
which suggested a forty-one percent childlessness rate among Afri-
can-American college women. v6 In 1996, Roberts reported the in-
fertility rate for married African-American women was one and one
half times higher than married white women. 7 But despite their
high infertility rate, African-American women have not partici-
pated in reproductive services at the same rate as white women.78
Dr. Cheryl J. Sanders, in her article on African-American wo-
men and reproductive technologies, suggests one general reason
for African-American women's relative absence from reproductive
technologies is a less exclusive definition of family.79  Sanders
notes the idea of one mother, one father, and genetic offspring,
which has led to stigmatization when that ideal cannot be met, is
not necessarily an accurate family structure for African-American
families. "[T]he inclusion of infertile couples and individuals as
valued members of the extended family, and especially as partici-
pants in rearing children, seems to have erased or minimized
whatever stigma may have been attached to infertility by society."80
cost. Of the 714 items on the priority list, IVF was ranked 701. Id. A clear disincen-
tive for women on public health insurance to use IVF.
75 Dr. Cheryl J. Sanders, Surrogate Motherhood and Reproductive Technologies: An Afri-
can American Perspective, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1707, 1715 (1992).
76 PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
-RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 248, 379 n.30 (1984). Giddings suggests many factors were
involved in this 41% rate including an unconscious revolt against being forced into
the role of mothers. Id. at 248.
77 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 939.
78 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1715; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 244
("The people in the United States most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black,
and poorly educated. Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly educated,
and affluent." (footnote omitted)).
79 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 214
("[B]lood ties are less significant to the definition of family in the Black community
than they traditionally have been for white America.").
80 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 231-
32 (African-American culture is not dependent on the genetic ties).
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Sanders suggests that more fluid definitions of family have given
African-American families more alternatives in defining themselves
to the extent that they are not "forced" by society to produce ge-
netic offspring.8
While African-American women may have more choices in
family structure, racial stereotypes may narrow the available oppor-
tunities of African-American women who may wish to choose IVF.
As Sanders notes, the stereotypical image of the African-American
woman is the "public enemy whose babies are a burden to society
at large, unless, of course, she can produce sons who play football
or basketball."8 2 Also, note a phone conversation Sanders reported
between herself and a representative from the Surrogate Parenting
Association in Louisville, Kentucky, which although specifically ad-
dressing surrogacy is applicable here: "When I asked why so few
[African-Americans] participated in surrogacy arrangements, I was
given several reasons: 1) [African-American] babies are easier to
adopt; 2) the services are prohibitively expensive; and 3) [African-
Americans] are not solely interested in biological offspring. "83
Sanders notes: "the experience of racism and racial discrimination
breeds both skepticism and pessimism with regard to the question
of whether white advances in technology and medicine are irrele-
vant or even inimical to the well-being of [African-Americans]."84
C. Lesbian Women
In a 1984 report on the efficacy of single women and artificial
insemination (AI), two doctors who ran an Al clinic stated they
would only consider married heterosexual couples, and would not
consider lesbian couples or single women for their programs.85
Another doctor stated:
81 See generally Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15.
82 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1713.
83 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1715.
84 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1716. Roberts also reports that white women may be
diagnosed with infertility, and thus pointed towards reproductive technologies, more
often than African-American women.
[D]octors are more likely to diagnose white professional women with
infertility problems such as endometriosis that can be treated with in
vitro fertilization. In 1976, one doctor found that over 20[%] of his
[African-American] patients who had been diagnosed as having pelvic
inflammatory disease, often treated with sterilization, actually suffered
from endometriosis.
Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 940 (footnote omitted).
85 Carson Strong &Jay S. Schinfeld, The Single Woman and Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 29 J. REPROD. MED. 293, 294 (1984); see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at
241 n.125 (many lVF clinics accept only heterosexual married couples).
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[T] he restriction of the service to 'married heterosexual unions'
looks right. If, as we assume, the dominant and inescapable in-
terest must be that of the child and his enjoying a normal up-
bringing-an interest, it may be added, which can be
overlooked or subordinated to the couple's longing for
parenthood-then deliberately to contrive its birth into a les-
bian union or to a single woman would be to deny it justice.8
6
One might assume lesbians also turn to IVF to meet their desire for
children. Whether this is true or not, however, remains uncertain
as there are no studies on the use, or attempted use, of 1VF by
lesbians.
"Officially" few IVF programs accept lesbians.87 As Ann
Oakley reports "[a] ccess to IVF is controlled by an outdated ideol-
ogy which sees the heterosexual nuclear family as the only proper
recipe for parenthood."88 The same belief which tended to perpet-
uate opposition to lesbian custody89 also pervades access by lesbi-
ans to IVF. The stereotypical beliefs maintain an exclusionary lock
on access to IVF-at least officially.
V. A LARGER PATTERN OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL
If IVF is ever to be used for aiding women's search for repro-
ductive autonomy, it is important to understand what drives wo-
men to turn to IVF, what expectations they have, and what are
their outcomes. But one must be careful in treading this line. As
Hilary Rose noted in speaking of the world's first test tube mother:
"'It is one thing to argue against a specific technological develop-
ment which is against the interests of women.., it is quite another
to say to Lesley Brown (or any other infertile woman) that it was
86 Strong & Schinfeld, supra note 85, at 294.
87 Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 240-41 ("[F]ertility clinics routinely deny
their services to single women, lesbians, women with genetic disorders, and women
who are not considered good mothers."); see Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction,
supra note 70, at 936 ("Most IVF clinics only accept heterosexual married couples as
clients, and most physicians have been unwilling to assist in the insemination of single
women." (citations omitted)).
88 Oakley, supra note 49, at 178.
89 Generally, homosexuality is not considered an acceptable factor in making cus-
tody decisions today. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (it was
impermissible for a court to rely on any real or imagined stigma associated with a
mother being lesbian in custody decisions); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979) (mother's homosexuality was not a ground for change in cus-
tody); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (homosexual father
could not be denied overnight visitation with his children as a result of his homosexu-
ality); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (mother's desire to
share her lesbian relationship with her children was not a change in circumstance to
warrant an alteration in custody agreement).
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wrong for her to have Louise.' 9 0 Ann Oakley asks, "[i ]f we say that
the industry of new procreative technologies should be halted,
what do we say to women who want to become mothers, and who
believe that investment in this industry is their only means of doing
so?"
9 1
It seems there is no way to halt reproductive technologies, nor
does that seem an appropriate decision. As Oakley pointed out, it
would not be equitable to protect women by punishing them. Do-
ing so places the onus upon a woman by saying she must protect
herself by refraining from using these medical advances. Instead, a
better alternative would be to claim the technologies as women's
own. One way of doing this is to place IVF within a larger pattern
of controlling all women's reproductive autonomy. Only in this
way can we really see what domination does to all women. Only in
this way will medical, legal, and feminist theorists be able to realize
the use of IVF to control reproductive autonomy is not an isolated
issue, but rather part of a history and pattern of domination.
White women, women of color, poor women, lesbian women,
all women, are being systematically denied reproductive auton-
omy.92 The forced sterilization of women, the use of Norplant to
control poor women's reproduction, and the prosecution of
mothers for fetal abuse, will be discussed in order to lay the
groundwork for a discussion below to typify the larger pattern of
controlling all women's reproductive autonomy.
A. Forced Sterilization
Believing that social problems resulted from social defects, the
"socially undesirable" were sterilized as a means of race control.93
The first compulsory sterilization bill to be proposed was intro-
90 Oakley, supra note 49, at 180 (citation omitted).
91 Oakley, supra note 49, at 180 (citation omitted).
92 Women are being denied reproductive autonomy in many areas. See, e.g., Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding provision of Food Stamp Act which gave
lesser benefits to nuclear families than to unrelated persons or extended families
comprising a single household); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (denying statu-
tory and constitutional challenge to the Hyde Amendment which prohibited the use
of federal funds for certain types of abortions); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)
(upholding application of the Social Security Act which provided for termination of
benefits paid to a disabled dependent child of a deceased wage earner upon the
child's marriage to someone not receiving benefits); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (excluding elective abortions from state Medicaid funding did not unduly bur-
den a women's right to an abortion).
93 Steven S. Spitz, Note, The Norplant Debate: Birth Control or Woman Control?, 25
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 131, 135 (1993).
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duced but defeated in the Michigan legislature in 1897.9' A sec-
ond attempt, occurred in 1905 in Pennsylvania when the
legislature passed "An Act for the Prevention of Idiocy." 95 The bill
was vetoed by the Governor.96 The first bill to be enacted, a 1907
Indiana bill, allowed for the sterilization of criminals, idiots, imbe-
ciles, and rapists in state institutions upon the recommendation of
a board of experts.97
The eugenics movement in the United States quickly followed
and reached its peak in the late 1920s.98 By 1942, thirty-two states
had passed compulsory sterilization bills.9 9 It is estimated that over
60,000 individuals were forcibly sterilized to ostensibly eliminate so-
cial problems like "poverty, mental illness, mental retardation, dis-
ease, and criminality ....*"100
In 1927, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of forced ster-
ilization in the case Buck v. Bell.' In this case, Carrie Buck
brought a constitutional challenge to the Virginia sterilization stat-
ute.10 2 She was a resident of the State Colony for Epileptics and
the Feeble Minded, and was chosen to be sterilized by the State
Colony's superintendent because of believed "hereditary forms of
insanity [or] imbecility . . . ."0 Buck was thought to be the off-
spring of a "feeble minded" woman and had herself recently given
birth to a girl who was assumed to also be "feeble minded."' °4 Jus-
tice Holmes, writing for the majority and affirming the decision of
the lower courts, stated: "[i] t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three generations of
imbeciles are enough." 10 5 It is interesting to note that Justice
Holmes himself was an ardent eugenicist. In an article he wrote in
1915 for the Illinois Law Review he stated: "I believe that the whole-
sale social regeneration .. .cannot be affected appreciably by tink-
ering with the institution of property, but only by taking in hand




98 Id. at 135.
99 Id. at 135 n.25.
100 Katz, supra note 19, at 742.
101 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
102 Id. at 201.
103 Id. at 205-06.
104 Id. at 205.
105 Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
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life and trying to build a race." ' 6
It was not until fifteen years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma,10 7 a
case dealing with the sterilization of a male "habitual criminal ,"108
that the Supreme Court held the right to procreation was a "basic
civil rights of man." 0 9 According to the Supreme Court, "[w] e are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race."11 Skinner clearly states the
right to procreate is a fundamental right. Nonetheless, forced ster-
ilization is still employed.
One reason for this, despite Skinner, is because the Supreme
Court decided Skinner on equal protection grounds rather than di-
rectly denouncing mandatory sterilization laws and overturning the
Buck decision.'11 As a result, sterilization laws are still on many
state books and "[u] nder either its police power or parens palriae
authority, a state retains the power to determine who should
reproduce."'
12
The use of sterilization laws today has broadened from "in-
competents" to included racial, ethnic, and class stereotypes. Dor-
othy Roberts argues that "abusive sterilization" is a means to
control African-American women's reproductive lives. 1 ' She be-
lieves the stereotype of African-American women as sexually pro-
miscuous has helped devalue their roles as mothers and created a
push for stricter control over African-American women's reproduc-
tive options." 4 Further, she argues the systematic denial of Afri-
can-American women's reproductive autonomy harkens back to
slavery, when slave owners controlled African-American women's
reproduction and used it as a means of control." 5 As evidence of
the modern day control of African-American women's reproduc-
106 Spitz, supra note 93, at 136 n.32 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and
Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1915)).
107 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108 Id. at 537.
109 Id. at 541.
110 Id.
111 Spitz, supra note 93, at 138-39.
112 Spitz, supra note 93, at 139 n.46. Note, however, that despite the fact that states
can still have sterilization laws, forced sterilization and consensual sterilization laws
must now overcome constitutional challenges to be upheld. Julie Marcus, In re Ro-
mero: Sterilization and Competency, 68 DENV. U. L. REv. 105, 107 (1991).
113 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1427 (1991) [hereinafter
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts].
114 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1436-39.
115 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1439.
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tion, she points to the rates of enforced sterilization for which Afri-
can-American women are inordinately represented.'16 A 1973
study reported that 43% of women sterilized under a federally
funded program were African-American, though only 33% of the
patients were African-American.17 A 1989 study reported that
9.7% of African-American women with college educations had
been sterilized, in contrast to only 5.6% of white women with col-
lege educations. 1 8 Further, 31.6% of African-American women
without a high school diploma were sterilized, while only 14.5% of
white women had been sterilized." 9
Roberts suggests African-American women are under a partic-
ular bind as African-American women are five times more likely to
be below the poverty line, and therefore in need of government
supported medical programs, than white women. 20 This unequal
balance exposes African-American women to greater governmental
control and thereby exposes them to greater controls over their
reproductive autonomy.' 2' For example, one study in North Caro-
lina reported that between 1933 and 1973 over 7500 women were
sterilized; of these women, about 5000 were African-American.
122
African-American women, however, are not the only ones to
be over represented among those sterilized. Spanish-speaking wo-
men are twice as likely to be sterilized as English-speaking wo-
men. 123 Of all the races in the United States, African-American
women and Hispanic women are the most likely to be sterilized.
124
Davis reports that by the 197 0s, 35% of all women of childbearing
age in Puerto Rico had been sterilized. 125 By 1976, 24% of all Na-
tive American women of child bearing age had been sterilized.'
26
Further, it is reported in 1972 alone, between 100,000 and 200,000
sterilizations were performed by government funded programs.
27
116 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442-43.
117 Roberts, Punishing Dr'ug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442 n.125 (citing Dick Gros-
boll, Note, Sterilization Abuse: Current State of the Law and Remedies for Abuse, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REv. 1147, 1153 n.30 (1980)).
118 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 942.
119 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 942.
120 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1432 n.60.
121 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1432.
122 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE
AND CLAss 202, 217 (1981)).
123 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442-43 n.125.
124 Jeanne L. Vance, Womb for Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor Women, 21 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 827, 833 (1994).
125 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 219).
126 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 218).
127 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 218).
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Perhaps more alarming, a survey of facilities performing steriliza-
tions in 1975 found that only 60% of the them were aware of gov-
ernment guidelines regulating sterilization and only 30% of
facilities were trying to comply with these regulations.128
Inconsistencies in the application of sterilization laws raise
questions over the reasons for its use. In Walker v. Pierce,129 a doc-
tor required an African-American woman in labor to consent to
sterilization before agreeing to assist her in delivering her fourth
child.1" 0 Contrast this with the story told by Ruth Colker of a white
law school classmate of hers who decided to be sterilized. 13 1 The
university doctor refused to allow the procedure unless the woman
agreed to undergo several sessions with a psychiatrist, presumably
as Colker says, to dissuade her from her decision.
13 2
Forced sterilization has been employed to selectively control
women's reproductive autonomy. Specifically, forced sterilization
seems to be employed most often to control the reproductive au-
tonomy of African-American women, Latina women, and poor wo-
men. One technology pushes a subgroup of women toward fertility
and another pushes a subgroup of women from fertility, though
both demonstrate a loss of reproductive control. The recent trend
by courts to use Norplant as a condition of parole also exemplifies
this selective control.
B. Norplant as a Probation Condition
With its release to the United States market, Norplant birth
control quickly became a tool for some courts to restrict women's
reproductive ability. Norplant, believed to be 98.5% effective in
preventing pregnancy over a five year period,133 was approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on December 10, 1990
as an "acceptable means of birth control in the United States."" 4
128 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAViS, supra note 122, at 220).
129 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
130 Vance, supra note 124, at 833.
131 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1443 n.130 (citing Ruth
Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL.
L. REv. 1011, 1067 n.196 (1989)).
132 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1443 n.130 (citing Colker,
supra note 131, at 1067 n.196).
133 Vance, supra note 124, at 828 n.5 (citing American Medical Association, Require-
ments or Incentives by Government for the Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 J. Am. MED.
ASS'N 1818, 1818 (1992)).
134 Spitz, supra note 93, at 132. Many people suggest the safety of Norplant was
unknown as tests were still on-going or inconclusive. Specifically:
[a]n organization called Health Action International charges that the
examiners [of tests involving Third World women as Norplant subjects]
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However, like forced sterilization, Norplant has often been used
disproportionately against African-American and poor women.
To use Norplant, six thin, flexible capsules containing a syn-
thetic hormone, levonorgestrel, are inserted under the skin of the
upper arm.1 5 Norplant works by first suppressing ovulation with a
continuous release of levonorgestrel, and second by keeping the
cervical mucus thick and thereby preventing the sperm from reach-
ing and fertilizing the egg.1"6 Once inserted, Norplant can begin
working within twenty-four hours if inserted within the first seven
days of the woman's menstrual cycle.1 3 7 To remove, another in-
office surgical visit is required. 138 Norplant is not, however, with-
out constraints. Norplant is not recommended for women with
liver or heart disorders, blood clots, high blood pressure, breast
nodules, fibrocystic disease of the breast or an abnormal breast x-
ray, women with diabetes, high cholesterol or triglycerides, mi-
graines, epilepsy, mental depression, or gallbladder or kidney dis-
eases.' 3 9 In women not constrained from using Norplant, side
effects can include excessive or irregular vaginal bleeding, head-
aches, nervousness, nausea, dizziness, ovarian enlargement, derma-
titis, acne, and change in appetite.
1 40
After its approval by the FDA, both state legislators and courts
were quick to try to use Norplant as a means to control women's
reproduction autonomy. In 1991, state legislators in Kansas at-
tempted to pass legislation which would encourage low income wo-
men on welfare or Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)1 4 1 to use Norplant by offering bonuses and increases in
lost track of whole groups of women and that they gave Norplant to
pregnant or lactating women. Women in Third World countries were
often so frightened by the procedure for implantation that they refused
to return to get the rods removed, even when they were experiencing
prolonged bleeding.
Karin E. Wilinski, Note, Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Controlling Women at the Ex-
pense of Human Rights,10 B.U. INr'L L.J. 351, 357-58 (1992) (citations omitted).
135 Spitz, supra note 93, at 132-33.
136 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133.
137 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133 n.ll.
138 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133.
139 Spitz, supra note 93, at 134 n.17.
140 Spitz, supra note 93, at 134 n.18.
141 AFDC was abolished in 1996 and replaced with the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which allowed block grants to go to
states from which states can individually tailor their welfare plans. Jane C. Murphy,
Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform, "Family, and Crim-
inal Law, 83 CORNELL L. Riv. 688, 734 (1998). Further, during its time AFDC itself
was not without conflict. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (AFDC re-
quirement that a family's eligibility for benefits take into account the income of all
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yearly benefits. 11 2 A 1991 report noted that 34.6% of AFDC recipi-
ents were African-American women.1 43 Compared to the fact that
African-American women made up only 6.35% of the United States
population, one begins to see the misuse of technology to control
African-American women's reproduction. The effect of state use of
Norplant, like enforced sterilization, also tended to target predom-
inately poor African-American women.
No Norplant bill has yet been made law; this is not, however,
due to a lack of interest by state legislators. In Mississippi and Flor-
ida, state senators proposed making welfare conditional upon Nor-
plant implantation.1 44 In Washington and North Carolina, on the
other hand, legislators proposed bills which would make Norplant
implantation mandatory for mothers whose babies are born with
fetal alcohol syndrome or drug addiction as determined at birth by
the hospitals.145 Other bills suggested increasing benefits for wo-
men who agreed to Norplant implantation. Among these states
were Ohio (increased welfare benefits), Colorado (a credit to in-
mates for a vasectomy, tubal ligation, or Norplant implant), Con-
necticut (a $700 bonus plus $200/year thereafter for Norplant
implant), and Florida (AFDC increase for Norplant or Depo
Provera use).146 Ex-Grand Wizard of the Klu Klux Klan and then
Louisiana state representative David Duke, introduced a bill in
Louisiana which in its original form offered incentives for mothers
on welfare with more than one child to use Norplant 1 47 Similarly,
Medicaid plans also provided funding for the insertion of Nor-
family members living in the same house was reasonable); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (state requirement of a home visit for recipients of AFDC served a valid
purpose and did not violate recipients' privacy rights).
142 Spitz, supra note 93, at 141. Kansas also proposed legislation that would require
woman able to conceive and convicted of a felony possession of drugs to choose be-
tween jail or Norplant use. Wilinski, supra note 134, at 361-62.
143 Spitz, supra note 93, at 140 n.52 (citing Stephanie Denmark, Birth-Control Tyr-
anny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at A23).
144 Vance, supra note 124, at 829.
145 Vance, supra note 124, at 829. A problem in itself is that few rehabilitation pro-
grams will accept pregnant substance abusers. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts,
supra note 113, at 1448; see also Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362 (Washington proposed
a bill allowing for a petition to a court for insertion of Norplant for women who give
birth to babies with fetal alcohol syndrome or drug addiction).
146 Vance, supra note 124, at 829 n.12; see also Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362 (Flor-
ida's proposed bill would increase AFDC payments from $258/month to $400/month
for Norplant use).
147 Spitz, supra note 93, at 141, 143. Louisiana's proposed bill would pay $100/year
to poor women who choose Norplant. See Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362.
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plant. 48 As of 1996, all fifty states provided funding for Norplant
use through their Medicaid plans. 49
Critics have charged that both doctors and legislators have
misused Norplant. Doctors have been criticized for enticing low-
income and minority women into using Norplant without inform-
ing them of the cost of removal ($150150) or of potential side ef-
fects.' Others have charged that the bills would effectively "rent
a low-income women's womb for the duration of the implant" and
that the bonus would act as an incentive for women to have it im-
planted.1 5 2 Proponents may argue that the bonuses for having
Norplant implanted are too small to be a true incentive, but this
may be inaccurate. Under the proposed Florida bill, for example,
assistance to mothers on AFDC would increase from an average
$258/month to $400/month upon proof the mother is using Nor-
plant.153 Increasing a mother's assistance by more than half is not
a small incentive, but rather a bribe a low-income mother might be
hard pressed to turn down in spite of any side effects from the
implantation.
Courts have also attempted to use Norplant to control wo-
men's reproduction. The most notable case involved a judge con-
ditioning parole on Norplant implantation. Darlene Johnson, a
twenty-seven year old unwed mother of four, pregnant with her
fifth child, had been arrested and pled guilty to violating Califor-
nia's penal code prohibiting corporal injury to a child. 154 The
judge ordered her to attend counseling sessions and parenting
classes, not punish her children by striking them, not smoke, and
not use drugs during her pregnancy.1 5 5 A month later, Johnson
was sentenced to a year in jail and placed on three years proba-
tion.1 56 In addition to the above probation conditions, Johnson
was ordered to be implanted with Norplant after the delivery of her
baby. 157 During the sentencing hearing, the judge inquired if
Johnson was currently on welfare or planned to be on welfare, to
148 Rachel Stephanie Arnow, The Implantation of Rights: An Argument for Uncondition-
ally Funded Norplant Removal 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 19 (1996).
149 Id. at 19.
150 Id. at 21.
151 Vance, supra note 124, at 829.
152 Vance, supra note 124, at 830.
153 Vance, supra note 124, at 831.
154 Spitz, supra note 93, at 143, n.72 (citing Mark A. Stein,Judge to Let Birth Control
Order Stand, LA. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A3).
155 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
156 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
157 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
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which she answered yes.158 Then, stating a concern for her chil-
dren and her parenting ability, the judge asked if she would be
willing to be implanted with a new birth control, similar to the pill,
which lasted five years and had recently been approved by the
FDA.'59 Johnson agreed without having been informed of the side
effects for her particular conditions-high blood pressure, diabe-
tes, and a heart murmur-which excluded her from its use.16 °
Within the week, her attorney, who had not been at the proba-
tion hearing, asked the court to set aside the terms of the proba-
tion in view of Johnson's medical unsuitability for Norplant
treatment, her constitutional right to privacy, and the statutory ar-
gument that Norplant was unrelated to her rehabilitation. 6' The
judge refused, stating that "[i]t is in the defendant's best interest
and certainly in any unconceived child's interest that she not have
any more children until she is mentally and emotionally prepared
to do So."162
The case was appealed but became a moot issue when Johnson
violated the terms of her parole to not use drugs, and was sen-
tenced to a prison term.163 The appeals court subsequently re-
fused to address the constitutionality of using Norplant as a
condition of parole."6
Johnson is not, however, the only woman for whom Norplant
has been used as a condition of parole. In Nebraska, twenty-one
year old Michelle Carlton agreed to use Norplant as part of her
plea agreement.165 In Texas, nineteen year old Ida Jean Tovar, an
unmarried mother of three, agreed to the use of Norplant in her
plea agreement. 166  Again in Texas, Cathy Lanel Knighten, a
twenty-three year old poor woman charged with smothering her
infant, agreed to a Norplant implantation as part of a plea
agreement.1
67
Like the forced sterilization of women, which has tended to
result in the misuse and abuse of African-American, Latina, and
158 Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
159 Michael Lev, Judge is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17; Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
160 Lev, supra note 159, at A17.
161 Spitz, supra note 93, at 146; Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
162 Lev, supra note 159, at A17; Spitz, supra note 93, at 146.
163 Spitz, supra note 93, at 147 n.91.
164 Spitz, supra note 93, at 147 n.91; People v. Johnson, No. F015316, 1992 WL
685375, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1992).
165 Spitz, supa note 93, at 144 n.78.
166 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144 n.78.
167 Spitz, supra note 93, at 145 n.78.
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poor women's reproductive autonomy, the use of Norplant has
also been used to control the reproductive autonomy of women.
Note Jeanne Vance's assessment of this situation:
[T] he public perception is that welfare mothers are unmarried
and non-white. Therefore, the Norplant bills may draw support
from prejudice and racial stereotyping. Certainly racism pro-
vides a partial motivation, even if only on a subconscious level,
for some politicians and medical professionals who seek to pre-
vent women of color from reproducing.
1 68
C. Fetal Abuse Laws
As of 1996, "two hundred women in thirty-five states had been
charged with abusing an unborn child."' 6 9 Fetal abuse laws have
also been employed to selectively control women's reproductive au-
tonomy. The use of fetal abuse laws-in addition to the fact that
they place the interests of the embryo higher than that of the
mother-has been shown to place a higher burden on African-
American and poor women than on white or middle-class wo-
men. 170 One study noted that although there were equal rates of
drug use among African-American and white women at one clinic,
African-American women were nearly ten times more likely than
white women to be reported to state agencies for drug abuse.
1 7 1
This same study also noted that poor women were more likely than
middle class women to be reported to the authorities.1 7 2 In Pinel-
las County, Florida, a study comparing the tests of pregnant wo-
men receiving care from either public or private clinics found that
60% of the 133 women reported to health authorities had incomes
less than $12,000, while only 8% of those reported had incomes of
$25,000 or more a year.173 It has been suggested that one reason
for this disparity is that doctors, in this case white and middle-/
upper-class, identified more readily with someone from their own
168 Vance, supra note 124, at 832-33 (citation omitted).
169 Murphy, supra note 141, at 713. Prosecution for fetal abuse has usually taken
two forms: prosecution under drug trafficking laws, or prosecution under criminal
child abuse and neglect statutes. The successful prosecution under drug trafficking
laws has been overturned on the grounds that these statutes prohibit trafficking to
"born persons." Prosecution under criminal child abuse and neglect statutes has cre-
ated litigation over whether a fetus is to be considered a child for the purposes of the
statute. Murphy, supra note 141, at 713-14.
170 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36.
171 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing IraJ. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in
Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990)).
172 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing Chasnoff, supra note 171, at 1205).
173 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing Chasnoff, supra note 171, at 1205).
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socio-economic background, and were thus less likely to report sus-
pected abuse by white or middle-class women to authorities than
for African-American or poor women.
Note the experience of twenty-three year old Jennifer Clarise
Johnson, the first woman convicted of exposing her baby to drugs
while pregnant, 174 as an example of this phenomenon. Johnson
was prosecuted with two counts of delivering a controlled sub-
stance to a minor. The delivery supposedly occurred in the sixty
seconds after birth and before the umbilical cord was cut. 75 The
conviction was upheld by the appeals court, marking the first time
a law prohibiting distribution of drugs to children under eighteen
was successfully used as a fetal protection law and upheld by a state
appeals court.1
76
The Johnson case, however, is not an isolated incident. Hoff-
man reports that between 1987 and 1991 at least fifty "fetal abuse"
cases were brought in nineteen states and the District of Colum-
bia.1 77 But as one study reported, of fifty-two defendants in fetal
abuse law cases, thirty-five were African-American, two were Latina,
and one was Native American. Only fourteen of the woman were
white.' 78 Also note a 1990 The New York Times report stating that of
sixty women charged with fetal abuse, 80% were minorities. 179 In
Florida, as of 1991, ten of the eleven criminal cases for fetal abuse
were brought against African-American women. Further, in South
Carolina from 1989 to 1991, seventeen of the eighteen women
charged with criminal neglect or distributing drugs to a minor
were African-American. 180 These statistics suggest that fetal abuse
laws are also being used to negatively control minority and poor
women's reproductive autonomy.
174 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420.
175 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420. There are many exam-
ples of prosecution under fetal abuse laws. See generally Roberts, Punishing Drug Ad-
dicts, supra note 113, at 1420 n.2.
176 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420 n.2 (citing Tamar Lewin,
Court in Florida Upholds Conviction for Drug Delivery by Umbilical Cord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1991, at 6).
177 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.5 (citingJan Hoffman,
Pregnant Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 19, 1990, at 32, 35).
178 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6 (referring to a mem-
orandum of the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project).
179 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6 (citing Gina Kolata,
Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13).
180 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6.
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VI. FINDING REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
There are many layers from which to analyze gender inequal-
ity within reproductive technologies. One is by viewing the bias
within the technology itself. With IVF the inequality results from
women being placed in competition with the technology, doctors,
and views of informed consent. Inequality can also become appar-
ent from viewing those who do not use IVF and how those women
have their reproductive autonomy controlled outside IVF use. All
women experience domination through the loss of their reproduc-
tive autonomy. From this common domination, it is possible to
move the discussion to fighting and ending the domination rather
than simply focusing on the differences within the experience of
domination.
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that IVF has the po-
tential to be used to control women's reproductive autonomy both
as an individual technology and as part of a larger pattern of con-
trol. When one views IVF as part of a system of gender control, it
becomes easy to see the systematic domination of women through
restrictions on all women's reproductive autonomy whether it is in
preventing or promoting their fertility.
Only by recognizing the limits that reproductive technologies
place on women can women gain control over the technology and
begin the quest to define their own reproductive autonomy.
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